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Documents citing R. S. Nayak vs A. R. Antulay on 16 February, 1984

A.R. Antulay vs R.S. Nayak & Anr on 29 April, 1988

SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. The main question involved in this appeal, is whether the directions given by this Court on 16th February, 1984. as reported in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay,[1984] 2 S.C.R. 495 at 557 were legally proper. The next question is, whether the action and the trial proceedings pursuant to those directions, are legal and valid. Lastly, the third consequential question is, can those directions be recalled or set aside or annulled in those proceedings in the manner sought for by the appellant. In order to answer these questions certain facts have to be borne in mind.
Supreme Court of India Cites 153 - Cited by 1309 - S Mukharji - Full Document

Ntpc Limited vs Central Electricity Regulatory ... on 28 August, 2023

Reports and recommendations made by the Parliamentary Committees/Commissions that precede enactment of a statute are not decisive, and a Court is free to arrive at a different conclusion based on its own findings and other evidence produced by the parties. (State of Mysore v. R.V. Bidap, (1974) 3 SCC 337; R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183; Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 1).
Appellate Tribunal For Electricity Cites 153 - Cited by 0 - R Ranganathan - Full Document

Harsha D vs State By High Ground Police Station on 17 October, 2022

In spite of this while giving directions in the other matter, that is, R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay [(1984) 2 SCC 183, 243: 1984 SCC (Cri) 172: (1984) 2 SCR 495, 557] this Court directed transfer to the High Court of Bombay the cases pending before the Special Judge. It is true that Section 7(1) and Section 6 of the 1952 Act were referred to while dealing with the other matters but while dealing with the matter of directions and giving the impugned directions, it does not appear that this court kept in mind the exlusiveness of the jurisdiction of the Special Court to try the offences enumerated in Section 6.
Karnataka High Court Cites 53 - Cited by 0 - M Nagaprasanna - Full Document

Entertaining Enterprises, Madras And ... vs State Of Tamil Nadu And Anr. on 21 June, 1984

Therefore, we are of the view that the decision in Gannon Dunkerley's case does not affect the interpretation of the expression "cinema" occurring in Entry 33 of List IT. The decision in Antulay's case in is also not of any help to the petitioners herein. In that case, the question arose as to whether Mr. Antulay who was a Member of the Legislative Assembly is or is not a public servant and whether he should be proceeded against under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. One of the contentions raised before the Supreme Court was that he comes within the meaning of public servant under S. 21 of the I. P. C. The Supreme Court held that looking to the history and evolution of S. 21, it is clear that till 1964, an M. L.A., could not have been conceivably comprehended in the expression "public servant" and the law did not undergo any change since the amendment, and therefore, apart from anything else, on historical evolution of S. 21, adopted as an external aid to construction, one can confidently say that an M. L, A. was not and is not a 'public servant' within the meaning of the expression' in any of the clauses of S. 21 of the I. P. C. The view taken by the Supreme Court was that since the office of an M. L. A., was not there in 1860 when the 1. P. C. was passed, S. 21 cannot attract an M. L. A., and therefore, an M. L. A., is not a public servant within the meaning the expression contained in C1. 12 (a) of S. 21 of the I. P. C. Thus, the reasoning of the Supreme Court is that since the office of an M. L. A., came into being long after the Indian Penal Code was passed and as there is no mention of that office in any of the Clauses in S. 21, Section 21 cannot be taken to refer to an office, which was created later long subsequently. That reasoning will not apply to the case on hand which - raises the question, whether a modern apparatus, which produces the same audio visual effect on the viewer, will come within the scope of the expression "cinema" occurring in Entry 33 of List II of Sch. VIII. Such a question as arises now before us is governed by the well established rule of construction that the legislative heads should receive the widest possible interpretation, and their scope cannot be restricted with respect to those apparatuses that were available and used at the time when the Constitution was framed. Dealing with this question, Seervai, in his Treatise on the Constitutional Law of India, Third Edition, Vol. I, says as fallows: -
Madras High Court Cites 51 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Jagannath Mishra vs State Th. S.P.C.B.I. on 27 July, 2009

The Court after taking notice of the provision as contained in Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and also on the ratio laid down in A.R.Antulay's case did hold categorically that as the petitioner was not holding office of the Chairman and Managing Director of Goa Shipyard Limited at the relevant time when the charge sheet was submitted, question of obtaining any previous sanction of the Central Government does not arise.
Jharkhand High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 0 - A Sahay - Full Document

Akhand Pratap Singh vs Union Of India & Ors. on 5 March, 2009

"The Law Commission of India in its 41st Report recommended amendment to Section 197 of the Code suggesting to grant protection of previous sanction to a Public Servant who is or was a Public Servant at the time of cognizance. Following the report of the Law Commission of India, Section 197 of the Code was amended in 1969. The Act was enacted on 9.9.1988 and the Statement of Objects and Reasons indicated widening of the scope of the definition of "Public Servant" and the incorporation of offences already covered under Sections 161 to 165A of the IPC in the Act. New Section 19 as was enacted virtually the same as Section 6 of the Old Act. Earlier to R.S. Nayak's case (supra) this Court had occasion to deal with the issues in S.A. Venkataraman v. State AIR1958 SC107. In para 14 it was stated as follows:
Delhi High Court Cites 34 - Cited by 0 - S L Bhayana - Full Document

M.S.Vijayakumar vs The Chairman And Managing Director on 12 March, 2012

27.It cannot be said that the sanction order is not an order, as stated by the Hon'ble Apex Court. As reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the sanctioning order is a statutory order. A statutory order has got a legal force and that is the basis for starting the prosecution against the delinquent officer and therefore, it cannot be lightly taken up. It was held as early as in the year 1984 in R.S.Nayak V. A.R.Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183 that granting sanction to prosecute is a sacrosanct act. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which is in pari materia with Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in categorical terms held that granting sanction is not expected to be misused or abused by the Sanctioning Authority and it cannot be for the purpose of frivolous prosecution. While holding that the grant of sanction is a sacrosanct act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
Madras High Court Cites 34 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

P.V. Narasimha Rao vs State(Cbi/Spe) on 17 April, 1998

This Court held that a member of a Legislative Assembly did not satisfy the ingredients of these clauses and that, therefore, he was not a public servant within the meaning of that expression in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. It was in this context that this Court made the observation that we have already quoted. Having regard to the fact that there was no clause in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code which is comparable to Section 2(c)(viii) of the said Act, the decision in Antulay's case is of little assistance in this context.
Supreme Court of India Cites 121 - Cited by 206 - S C Agrawal - Full Document
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