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Documents citing S. Vasudevan And Ors. vs S.D. Mital And Ors. on 18 January, 1961

Sri.Dasharath C P vs The State Of Karnataka on 13 March, 2026

NC: 2026:KHC:15168 WP No. 3511 of 2026 HC-KAR High Court in S. Vasudevan v. S.D. Mital [AIR 1962 Bom 53 : 63 Bom LR 774 : (1961-62) 21 FJR 441] . "Begar" is thus clearly a form of forced labour. Now it is not merely "begar" which is unconstitutionally (sic) prohibited by Article 23 but also all other similar forms of forced labour. This Article strikes at forced labour in whatever form it may manifest itself, because it is violative of human dignity and is contrary to basic human values. The practice of forced labour is condemned in almost every international instrument dealing with human rights. It is interesting to find that as far back as 1930 long before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came into being, International Labour Organisation adopted Convention No. 29 laying down that every member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this convention shall "suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms" and this prohibition was elaborated in Convention No. 105 adopted by the International Labour Organisation in 1957. The words "forced or compulsory labour" in Convention No. 29 had of course a limited meaning but that was so on account of the restricted definition of these words given in Article 2 of the Convention. Article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also prohibit forced or compulsory labour. Article 23 is in the same strain and it enacts a prohibition against forced labour in whatever form it may be found. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents laid some emphasis on the word "similar" and contended that it is not every form of forced labour which is prohibited by Article 23 but only such form of forced labour as is similar to "begar" and since "begar" means labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it, the interdict of Article 23 is limited only to those forms of forced labour where labour or service is exacted from a person without paying any remuneration at all and if some remuneration is paid, though it be inadequate, it would not fall within the words "other similar forms of forced labour". This contention seeks to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition against forced labour enacted in Article 23 and is in our opinion not well founded. It does not accord with the
Karnataka High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - S R Kumar - Full Document

Madhyan Bhojan Rasoiya Mazdoor Sangh ... vs Union Of India Throu Secy.Ministry Of ... on 8 February, 2023

Under the old system, when pressed for public service, no pay was given. The begari, though still liable to be pressed for public objects, now receives pay. Forced labour for private service is, prohibited." "Begar" may therefore be loosely described as labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it. That was the meaning of the word "begar" accepted by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in S. Vasudevan v. S.D. Mital [AIR 1962 Bom 53 : 63 Bom LR 774 : (1961-62) 21 FJR 441] . "Begar" is thus clearly a form of forced labour. Now it is not merely "begar" which is unconstitutionally (sic) prohibited by Article 23 but also all other similar forms of forced labour. This Article strikes at forced labour in whatever form it may manifest itself, because it is violative of human dignity and is contrary to basic human values. The practice of forced labour is condemned in almost every international instrument dealing with human rights. It is interesting to find that as far back as 1930 long before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came into being, International Labour Organisation adopted Convention No. 29 laying down that every member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this convention shall "suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms" and this prohibition was elaborated in Convention No. 105 adopted by the International Labour Organisation in 1957. The words "forced or compulsory labour" in Convention No. 29 had of course a limited meaning but that was so on account of the restricted definition of these words given in Article 2 of the Convention. Article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also prohibit forced or compulsory labour. Article 23 is in the same strain and it enacts a prohibition against forced labour in whatever form it may be found. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents laid some emphasis on the word "similar" and contended that it is not every form of forced labour which is prohibited by Article 23 but only such form of forced labour as is similar to "begar" and since "begar" means labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it, the interdict of Article 23 is limited only to those forms of forced labour where labour or service is exacted from a person without paying any remuneration at all and if some remuneration is paid, though it be inadequate, it would not fall within the words "other similar forms of forced labour". This contention seeks to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition against forced labour enacted in Article 23 and is in our opinion not well founded.
Allahabad High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 1 - P Bhatia - Full Document

Mrs. Ruby Jadon vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 11 September, 2020

The Begari, though still liable to be pressed for public objects, now receives pay: Forced labour for private service is prohibited." "Begar" may therefore be loosely described as labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for 'it. That was the meaning of the word 'begar' accepted by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in S. Vasudevan v. S.D. Mital.(1) 'Begar' is thus clearly a film of forced labour. Now it is not merely 'begar' which is unconstitutionally prohibited by Article 23 but also all other similar forms of forced labour. This Article strikes at forced labour in whatever form it may manifest itself, because it is violative of human dignity and is contrary to basic human values. The practice of forced labour is condemned in almost every international instrument dealing with human rights. It is interesting to find that as far back as 1930 long before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came into being, International Labour organisation adopted Convention No. 29 laying down that every member of the International Labour organisation which ratifies this convention shall "suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms" and this prohibition was elaborated in Convention No. 105 adopted by the International Labour organisation in 1957. The words "forced or compulsory labour" in Convention No. 29 had of course a limited meaning but that was so on account of the restricted definition of these words given in Article 2 of the Convention. Article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also prohibit forced or compulsory labour. Article 23 is in the same strain and it enacts a prohibition against forced labour in whatever form it may be found. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent laid some emphasis on the word 'similar' and contended that it is not every form of forced labour which is prohibited by Article 23 but only such form of forced labour as is similar to 'begar' and since 'begar' means labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it, the interdict of Article 23 is limited only to those forms of forced labour where labour or service is exacted from a person without paying any remuneration at all and if some remuneration is paid, though it be inadequate, it would not fall within the words 'other similar forms of forced labour. This contention seeks to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition . against forced labour enacted in Article 23 and is in our opinion not well founded.
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - S Nagu - Full Document

Imtiyaz Ahmad Mir Amd Ors vs State And Ors on 14 December, 2020

'Begar' may, therefore, be loosely described as labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it. This definition was accepted by a Divisional Bench of the Bombay High Court, in case titled 'S Vasudevan v. S.D Mital',AIR 1962 Bom 53' 'Begar' thus, clearly is a form of forced labour and all forms of forced labour are unconstitutionally prohibited by Article 23 of Constitution of India. This Article strikes at forced labour in whatever form it may manifest itself, because it is violative of human dignity and is contrary to basic human values. In the case on hand, the respondents are extracted services from the petitioners but are not paying them any salary/wages/remuneration for the same solely on the ground that their appointment is not genuine, thereby subjecting the petitioner to 'Begar', moreso, when there is no formal order declaring the petitioners as having been fraudulently appointed. In absence of a final decision with reference to the case of petitioners' fraud appointment, coupled with the factum of the petitioners discharging their duties in the respondent department, the respondents cannot retain the salary of the petitioners for inordinate time. The respondents, in law, were/are obliged to take all possible steps so as to ensure that the decision in the matter is taken regarding their fraudulent appointment of the petitioners. The petitioners have been discharging their duties ever since their joining the Page 10 of 10 SWP No. 840/2019 [ WP(C) No. 1338/2019] CM No. 6150/2020 C/w CCP(S) No. 280/220 respondent department. It is also well settled that salary is the property of an employee and that the right to receive the salary is a fundamental right of an employee as enshrined under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. In the case on hand, the only reason for non-payment of the salary in favour of the petitioners is genuineness or otherwise of the appointment of the petitioners. As already stated, the petitioners are discharging their duties in the respondent department and not paying them salary would tantamount to taking 'Begar' form the petitioners which, as observed hereinabove, in forbidden under Article 23 of the Constitution of India.
Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench Cites 18 - Cited by 0 - A Magrey - Full Document

Chandrawati Devi vs State Of U.P. And 6 Others on 15 December, 2020

Under the old system, when pressed for public service, no pay was given. The begari, though still liable to be pressed for public objects, now receives pay. Forced labour for private service is, prohibited." "Begar" may therefore be loosely described as labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it. That was the meaning of the word "begar" accepted by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in S. Vasudevan v. S.D. Mital [AIR 1962 Bom 53 : 63 Bom LR 774 : (1961-62) 21 FJR 441] . "Begar" is thus clearly a form of forced labour. Now it is not merely "begar" which is unconstitutionally (sic) prohibited by Article 23 but also all other similar forms of forced labour. This Article strikes at forced labour in whatever form it may manifest itself, because it is violative of human dignity and is contrary to basic human values. The practice of forced labour is condemned in almost every international instrument dealing with human rights. It is interesting to find that as far back as 1930 long before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came into being, International Labour Organisation adopted Convention No. 29 laying down that every member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this convention shall "suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms" and this prohibition was elaborated in Convention No. 105 adopted by the International Labour Organisation in 1957. The words "forced or compulsory labour" in Convention No. 29 had of course a limited meaning but that was so on account of the restricted definition of these words given in Article 2 of the Convention. Article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also prohibit forced or compulsory labour. Article 23 is in the same strain and it enacts a prohibition against forced labour in whatever form it may be found. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents laid some emphasis on the word "similar" and contended that it is not every form of forced labour which is prohibited by Article 23 but only such form of forced labour as is similar to "begar" and since "begar" means labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it, the interdict of Article 23 is limited only to those forms of forced labour where labour or service is exacted from a person without paying any remuneration at all and if some remuneration is paid, though it be inadequate, it would not fall within the words "other similar forms of forced labour". This contention seeks to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition against forced labour enacted in Article 23 and is in our opinion not well founded.
Allahabad High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 3 - P Bhatia - Full Document

Awdesh Yadav vs Municipal Council Pichore on 24 February, 2021

The word 'begar' in this Article is not a word of common use in English language. It is a word of Indian origin which like many other words has found its way in the English vocabulary. It is very difficult to formulate a precise definition of the word begar' but there can be no doubt that it is a form of forced labour under which a person is compelled to work without receiving any remuneration. Molesworth describes 'begar' as "labour or service exacted by a government or person in power without giving remuneration for it." Wilson's glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms gives the following meaning of the word 'begar': "a forced labourer, one pressed to carry burthens for individuals or the public. Under the old system, when pressed for public service, no pay was given. The Begari, though still liable to be pressed for public objects, now receives pay: Forced labour for private service is prohibited." "Begar" may therefore be loosely described as labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for 'it. That was the meaning of the word 'begar' accepted by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in S. Vasudevan v. S.D. Mital.(1) 'Begar' is thus clearly a film of forced labour. Now it is not merely 'begar' which is unconstitutionally prohibited by Article 23 but also all other similar forms of forced labour. This Article strikes at forced labour in whatever form it may manifest itself, because it is violative of human dignity and is contrary to basic human values. The practice of forced labour is condemned in almost every international instrument dealing with human rights. It is interesting to find that as far back as 1930 long before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came into being, International Labour organisation adopted Convention No. 29 laying down that every member of the International Labour organisation which ratifies this convention shall "suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms" and this prohibition was elaborated in Convention No. 105 adopted by the International Labour organisation in 1957. The words "forced or compulsory labour" in Convention No. 29 had of course a limited meaning but that was so on account of the restricted definition of these words given in Article 2 of the Convention. Article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also prohibit forced or compulsory labour. Article 23 is in the same strain and it enacts a 6 WA-1792-2019 & WA-1793-2019 prohibition against forced labour in whatever form it may be found. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent laid some emphasis on the word 'similar' and contended that it is not every form of forced labour which is prohibited by Article 23 but only such form of forced labour as is similar to 'begar' and since 'begar' means labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it, the interdict of Article 23 is limited only to those forms of forced labour where labour or service is exacted from a person without paying any remuneration at all and if some remuneration is paid, though it be inadequate, it would not fall within the words 'other similar forms of forced labour. This contention seeks to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition . against forced labour enacted in Article 23 and is in our opinion not well founded.
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - S Nagu - Full Document

Sh. Rahul Kumar Doddi vs Also At on 12 October, 2021

5:4. The word "begar" in Article 23 is not a word of common use in English language, but a word of Indian origin which like many other words has found its way in English vocabulary. It is a form of forced labour under which a person is compelled to work without receiving any remuneration. Begar is thus clearly a film of forced labour. S. Vasudevan v. S.D. Mittal AIR 1962 Bom. 53 applied.
Delhi District Court Cites 20 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Sh. Lokendra Singh vs Also At on 12 October, 2021

5:4. The word "begar" in Article 23 is not a word of common use in English language, but a word of Indian origin which like many other words has found its way in English vocabulary. It is a form of forced labour under which a person is compelled to work without receiving any remuneration. Begar is thus clearly a film of forced labour. S. Vasudevan v. S.D. Mittal AIR 1962 Bom. 53 applied.
Delhi District Court Cites 21 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Sayeed Khan vs State Of Rajasthan on 17 August, 1979

10. Mr. Mridul also submitted that Explanation to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 320A is bad as the question whether any society, institution, association or organisation is purely social, recreational or religious under Clause (b) of Sub-rule (1) has been left to be determined by the Government without laying down any guide lines for the purpose and this determination can be arbitrary The Explanation is capable of being used arbitrarily so as to discriminate unreasonably and unjustifiably. No guide lines have been mentioned in the Sub-rule (1) of Rule 320A for determining social, recreational or religious nature of any society, institution, association or organization. The decision of the Government in this regard has been made final. As there is nothing to control over possible misuse of power, it may affect the exercise of rights conferred by Sub-clause (c) of Clause (1) of Article 19. Applying the test Nos. 2 and 5 mentioned herein above, and having regard to the meaning of the expression "public order" and further keeping in view the principles laid down in Madanlal's case 1963 R.L.W. 19, Kameshwar Prasad's case and S. Vasudevan's case . I am of opinion that Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 320A cannot be said to impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of the public order. There is no direct and proximate nexus or reasonable connection between the restriction imposed and the object, which is sought to be achieved. I, therefore, hold that Sub-rule (1) of Rule 320A in invalid.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 30 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Madan Lal Thanvi vs Deputy Inspector General Of Police, ... on 5 October, 1962

If a complete ban on demonstrations cannot be sustained, there is still less justification for rules which prohibit formation of association of the Government servants except after a prior recognition by the Government which recognition may be refused on a merely subjective satisfaction of the Government. The principle of the case is thus fully applicable to the facts of the present case. The exact case on the point is S. Vasudevan v. S.D. Mital, AIR 1962 Bom 53. Before the Bombay High Court, the validity of Rule 4 (B) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules (1955) was challenged. The rule reads as follows: -
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 17 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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