He contended that
the decision in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax,
Bombay v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co., Bombay("), turned on the
statutory provisions of the Excess Profits Tax Act read with
section 42 (3) of the Indian Income-tax Act which was
expressly incorporated therein by virtue of section 21 of
the Act and not on any general principles of apportion. ment
of income, profits or gains enunciated therein. He took us
in extensover the portions of the majority judgments and
tried to demonstrate that the decision there was based
purely on the applicability of section 42 (3) of the Indian
Income-tax Act, but for the applicability of which,
according to his submission, there was no room for the
apportionment of the income, profits or gains of the
business, in the manner contended by the appellant. We do
not accept this contention of the respondent.
Bombay v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co., Bombay, turned on the statutory
provisions of the Excess Profits Tax Act read with Section 42(3) of the
Indian Income tax Act which was expressly incorporated therein by virtue
of Section 21 of the Act and not on any general principles of
apportionment of income, profits or gains enunciated therein. He took us
in extenso over the portions of the majority judgments and tried to
demonstrate that the decision there was based purely on the applicability
of Section 42(3) of the Indian Income tax Act, but for the applicability of
which, according to his submission, there was no room for the
apportionment of the income, profits or gains of the business in the
manner contended by the appellant. We do not accept this contention of
the respondent. Section 4A(c)(b) is concerned with the income arising in
the taxable territories in a particular year exceeding the income arising
without the taxable territories in that year and the very words of the
section are capable of being construed as also contemplating a state of
affairs where there may have to be a division or apportionment between
the income arising in the taxable territories and the income arising without
the taxable territories in the particular year. The whole of the argument
urged before us on behalf of the respondent was aimed at establishing
that the scheme of the Indian Income tax Act was not to tax the source
of income but the income, profits or gains from whatever source
derived which were received or were deemed to be received in the
taxable territories or which accrued or arose or were deemed to
accrue or arise in the taxable territories during the particular year
and that it was immaterial whether the income, profits or gains were
derived from business operations carried on in the taxable territories
or without the taxable territories. This argument was possible when
the decisions which held that income, profits or gains arose or accrued
at the places where the sales took place were good law, because then
there was no question of apportionment of income, profits or gains
arising from the business operations carried on in the taxable
territories and income, profits or gains arising from business
operations carried on without the taxable territories.
tuents in those States through these branches. The point in
dispute is whether the profits made by the appellant on
those sales are chargeable to tax. The contention of the
appellant before the Tribunal was that the matter was
governed by section 14(2) (c), and that the profits could be
taxed only if they were remitted to British India. That was
not disputed by the Department, but they contended that as
the appellant sold in the States goods manufactured by it in
British India, the governing provisions were sections 42(1)
and 42(3), and that under these provisions, the appellant
was liable to be taxed on such portions of the profits as
were apportionable to the manufacture of the goods in
British India. That was accepted by the Tribunal, and the
profits were apportioned in the ratio of 85:15. In its
application under section 66(1), the appellant raised the
contention that sections 42 (1) and 42 (3) applied 'only to
nonresidents, and that it was only section 14(2) (c) that
would apply to residents and applied to have that question
referred to the decision of the court. But the Tribunal
held that the decision of this Court in Commissioner of
Income-tax, Bombay v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai and Co.(1) had
settled that sections 42(1) and 42(3) applied both to
residents as well as nonresidents and consequently declined
to refer the question'
The correctness of this decision does not appear to have
been contested before the High Court, the only point dealt
with in the judgment of the learned Judges being as to the
correctness of the ratio in which the apportionment was
made.
4. Now, in connection with this amount, the case of the Revenue is that the assessee-company maintained its accounts in accordance with the mercantile system. In accordance with that system, it was obligatory on the assessee-company to make credit entries in its books of account for interest due at the rate of 2.1/2% in respect of its debenture-holdings on June 30 and December 31, 1950. This was obligatory, because, under the above system, accounts are not maintained on cash and/or receipt basis. Accounts maintained must show credits in respect of whatever accounts become payable to an assessee, though not received in fact. In that connection, reliance is placed on the provisions of s. 13 of the Act. Reliance is also placed on the observations of the Supreme Court as regards the true construction and effect of the word "arising" as contained in s. 4A(c) and other sections of the Act in the case of CIT v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co. , Anglo-French Textile Co. v. CIT and E. D. Sassoon & Co. Ltd. v. CIT . The submission was that the observations of the Supreme Court in these cases go to show that the word "arising" has been used in diverse sections of the Act in contradistinction to the phrase "received". The submission was that particularly in the matter of the assessees who maintained books of account on the mercantile system, receipt or collection of debts was not the relevant date for considering the arisal of income of these assessees. In respect of the assessees maintaining accounts in accordance with the mercantile system the true date of arisal of income was the date when the debt in respect of the income became due and/or the due date for payment in respect of such income. The submission was that interest on the debenture-holdings under the terms of the debentures themselves must be held to have become due for the accounting year 1950 on June 30 and December 31 of that year. As the sum of pound 12,152-10-10 (Rs. 1,62,033) was interest relating to the accounting year 1950, the assessee's case that the income of this interest had not arisen in that year should be negatived. A finding accordingly should be made that the above income had arisen in 1950 and the gross income from taxable territories without India in 1951 was accordingly Rs. 3,11,000 odd only.
Cases like McMillan v. Guest or Lakshmipat Singhania v. CIT [1969] 72 ITR 512 (All) and other cases dealing with the remuneration of directors, managing directors, managing agents, etc., are not directly relevant in view of the assistance which we have received from the decisions of the Supreme Court in E. D. Sassoon's case [1954] 26 ITR 27 and the other in Ahmedbhai Umarbhai's case [1950] 18 ITR 472. It is true that different commentators have interpreted these words occurring in Section 9(1)(ii) in the manner indicated above but not a single decision has been cited by these commentators in
support of their commentaries in this regard and, therefore, the commentators' opinions will not have the same weight as they would have had if their views had been supported by any decision.
214. At this juncture, the Bench called upon the learned counsel for the assessee to explain the working of Rule 10(ii) of the Income-tax Rules by giving concrete examples so that the point made may be appreciated better. Mr. Farooq Irani, the learned counsel appearing for Motorola alongwith Mr. Syali, lucidly explained, with illustrations, as to how the Rule actually work and also explained the rule with reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai (supra). We shall refer to his explanation of the rule at the appropriate juncture.
13. The third case viz.,--'Commr. of Income-tax Bombay v. Ahmedabhai Umarbhai & Company (C) turned on the wordings of Section 5 proviso (iii). Excess Profits Tax Act and it had to be decided as to what part of the profits could be said to have arisen from the manufacture of the oil at Raichur and what part by its sale at Bombay. That was not a case where their Lordships had
to consider when the income from commission accrued or arose to an agent.