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Documents citing State Of Punjab vs Mohar Singh on 20 October, 1954

Cbi vs . M/S Vikash Metal & Power Ltd. & Ors. on 30 November, 2018

"In order to see whether the rights and liabilities under the repealed law have been put an end to by the new enactment, the proper approach is not to enquire if the new enactment has by its new provisions kept alive the rights and liabilities under the repealed law but whether it has taken away those rights and liabilities. The absence of a saving clause in a new enactment preserving the rights and liabilities under the repealed law is neither material nor decisive of the question - see State of Punjab Vs. Mohar Singh AIR 1955 SC 84 and T.S. Baliah V. CIT AIR 1969 SC 701."
Delhi District Court Cites 178 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Ram Chandra Yadav vs State Of U.P. And Others on 16 January, 2013

DW-21 Kapoor Lal Pal, Advocate has stated that in Case nos. 456 of 2007 (State vs. Mohar Singh) under Section 4/25 of Arms Act, P.S. Mehroni, 340 of 2008 (State vs. Harban) under Section 60 of Excise Act, P.S. Madawara and 482 of 2008 (State vs. Malkhan @ Malthoo) under Section 60 of Excise Act, the statement of PW-1 Constable Pairokars were written in front of him. He had also cross examined the witnesses in case nos. 456 of 2007 and 340 of 2008 with PW-1, but did not cross examine the PW-1 Constable Radhey Shyam in Case no. 482 of 2008.
Allahabad High Court Cites 41 - Cited by 18 - Full Document

Tarachand Koyal vs Maheswar Choudhury on 11 May, 1973

" The principle of this enactment (section 6 of the General Clauses Act) would apply even to a case of repeal of one of the sections of the Act of 1961, namely, the omission of Section 137 by the Finance Act of 1964. The Supreme Court has indicated in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 84 that unless a contrary intention appears in the repealing statute, the consequences of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply, and that it is not necessary that the repealing of new Act should expressly keep alive old rights and liabilities. They say that the line of enquiry should be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. Leaving aside for a moment the question whether there is anything in the Finance Act of 1964 disclosing a different intention, it is clear that under Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, the inadmissibility of the evidence of Sri Marar will continue, notwithstanding the omission of Section 137 of the Income-tax Act of 1961 by the Finance Act of 1964. The matter can be looked at, first, from the point of view of the Income-tax Officer himself, and secondly, from the point of view of the Commissioner of Income-tax. From the point of view of the Income-tax Officer, he was under an obligation not to give evidence in court relating to the initials in question, and the circumstances under which they were affixed. This obligation accrued or was incurred under Section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922 on August 17, 1957, itself in respect of the initials, because that was the Act that was in force then and that obligation continued when the Act of 1922 was repealed and the Act of 1961 was enacted. This obligation of the Income-tax Officer was correlated to the corresponding right of the assessee concerned, namely, Buhari Hotel, to forbid the Income-tax Officer giving evidence about such initials.
Orissa High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

The Brihan Maharashtra Sugarsyndicate ... vs Janardan Ramchandra Kulkarniand ... on 22 February, 1960

Section 6 of the General Clauses Act provides that where an Act is repealed, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any right or liability acquired or incurred under the repealed enactment or any legal proceeding in respect of such right or liability and the legal proceeding may be continued as, if the repealing Act had not been passed. There is no dispute that s. 153-C of the Act of 1913 gave certain rights to the shareholders of a company and put the company as also its directors and manag- ing agents under certain liabilities. The application under that section was for enforcement of these rights and liabilities. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would therefore preserve the rights and liabilities created by s. 153-C of the Act of 1913 and a continuance of the proceeding in respect thereof would be 88 competent in spite of the repeal of the Act of 1913, unless of course a different intention would be gathered. Now it has been held by this Court in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (1) that s. 6 applies even where the repealing Act contains fresh legislation on the same subject but in such a case one would have to look to the provisions of the new Act for the purposes of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The Act of 1956 not only repeals the Act of 1913 but contains other fresh legislation on the matters enacted by the Act of 1913.
Supreme Court of India Cites 17 - Cited by 3 - A K Sarkar - Full Document

The Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate ... vs Janardan Ramchandra Kulkarni And Ors. on 22 February, 1960

9. We are unable to accept these contentions. Section 10 of the Act of 1956 deals only with the jurisdiction of courts. It shows that the District Courts can no longer be empowered to deal with applications under the Act of 1956 in respect of matters contemplated by s. 153-C of the Act of 1913. This does not indicate that the rights created by s. 153-C of the Act of 1913 were intended to be destroyed. As we have earlier pointed out from State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh , the contrary intention in the repealing Act must show that the rights under the old Act were intended to be destroyed in order to prevent the application of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act. But it is said that s. 24 of the General Clauses Act puts an end to the notification giving power to the District Judge, Poona to hear the application under s. 153-C of the Act of 1913 as that notification is inconsistent with s. 10 of the Act of 1956 and the District Judge cannot, therefore, continue to deal with the application. Section 24 does not however purport to put an end to any notification. It is not intended to terminate any notification; all it does is to continue a notification in force in the stated circumstances after the Act under which it was issued, is repealed. Section 24 therefore does not cancel the notification empowering the District Judge of Poona to exercise jurisdiction under the Act of 1913. It seems to us that since under s. 6 of the General Clauses Act the proceeding in respect of the application under s. 153-C of the Act of 1913 may be continued after the repeal of that Act, it follows that the District Judge of Poona continues to have jurisdiction to entertain it. If it were not so, then s. 6 would become infructuous.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 29 - Full Document
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