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Documents citing A. R. Antulay vs Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak And Another on 16 February, 1984

S.Jayapal vs I.Periyasamy on 13 October, 2009

The case of Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and others, [AIR 1987 Supreme Court 877] also follows the decision in A.R.Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and Another, [(1984)2 Supreme Court Cases 500] on the aspect of setting the criminal law in motion and passes on to hold that one, who set the criminal law in motion has the right to prefer revision against withdrawal of such case which had been initiated on his instance.
Madras High Court Cites 57 - Cited by 3 - C T Selvam - Full Document

A.R. Antulay vs R.S. Nayak & Anr on 29 April, 1988

In order to meet the submission that cognizance of the offences had not been taken properly, it was urged by Shri Jethmalani that after the Government Notification appointing Judge Sule as the Special Judge, the objection that cognizance of the offences could not be taken by Shri Bhutta was not agitated any further. The other objections that the appellant raised against the order passed by Judge Bhutta were dismissed by the High Court of Bombay. Against the order of the Bombay High Court the appellant filed a petition under Article 136 of the constitution. The appeal after grant of leave was dismissed by a judgment delivered on 16th February, 1984 by this Court in A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another, [1984] 2 S C.R. 914. There at page 954 of the report, this Court categorically observed that a private complaint filed by the complaint was clearly maintainable and that the cognizance was properly taken. This was the point at issue in that appeal. This was decided against the appellant. On this aspect therefore, the other point is open to the appellant. We are of the opinion that this observation of this Court cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered to be without jurisdiction. Therefore, this decision of this Court precludes any scope for argument about the validity of the cognizance taken by Special Judge Bhutta. Furthermore, the case had proceeded further before the Special Judge, Shri Sule and the learned Judge passed an order of discharge on 25th July, 1983. This order was set aside by the Constitution Bench of this Court on 16th February, 1984, in the connected judgment (vide 1984 2 S.C.R. 495). The order of taking cognizance had therefore become final and cannot be reagitated. Moreover section 460(e) of the Code expressly provides that if any Magistrate not empowered by law 40 to take cognizance of an offence on a complaint under section 190 of the Code erroneously in good faith does so his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground that he was not so empowered.
Supreme Court of India Cites 153 - Cited by 1309 - S Mukharji - Full Document

K. Duraisamy vs Rajendra Babu on 17 September, 2012

53. In the earlier discussion, I have also held that the first appellate court has not framed necessary points to discuss and reach findings and it had not also discussed the evidence to reach the findings. Therefore, in the said circumstances, the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court is necessarily to be interfered and set aside and the first appellate court is directed to frame necessary points in the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 1984 (2) SCC 500 (A.R.Antulay ..vs.. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another) and to issue summons to examine necessary witnesses from the office of the third defendant on the side of plaintiff and if plaintiff is not taking steps to issue summons, the Court itself to examine the same witnesses as Court witnesses to speak about the genuineness of the approval made in Exs.B1 and B2 and thereafter, to decide the points to be framed as referred in this judgment. For the said purpose, it has become necessary for this Court to remand back the matter to the first appellate court for fresh disposal in accordance with the directions as stated above. After the examination of necessary witnesses either on the side of the plaintiff or examined as Court witnesses, the said evidence shall be received as additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, since those evidence are necessary to enable the first appellate court to pronounce judgment.
Madras High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - V P Karuppiah - Full Document

Soumendu Adhikari vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 31 January, 2023

"5. Before adverting to the matter in issue and the rival contentions advanced, one redeeming feature ought to be noticed here pertaining to criminal jurisprudence. To pursue an offender in the event of commission of an offence is to subserve a social 37 need -- society cannot afford to have a criminal escape his liability, since that would bring about a state of social pollution, which is neither desired nor warranted and this is irrespective of the concept of locus -- the doctrine of locus standi is totally foreign to criminal jurisprudence. This observation of ours, however, obtains support from the decision of this Court in A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak [(1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 277] ."
Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side) Cites 60 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Arup Chatterjee vs The State Of Jharkhand on 3 October, 2024

and therefore any person who is interested in cleanliness of public administration and public morality would be entitled to file a complaint, as held by this Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 277] and equally he would be entitled to oppose the withdrawal of such prosecution if it is already instituted. We must therefore reject the contention urged on behalf of Dr Jagannath Mishra that Sheonandan Paswan had no locus standi to oppose the withdrawal of the prosecution. If he was entitled to oppose the withdrawal of the prosecution, it must follow a fortiorari that on the turning down of his opposition by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate he was entitled to prefer a revision application to the High Court and on the High Court rejecting his revision application he had standing to prefer an appeal to this Court. We must therefore reject this contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Dr Jagannath Mishra."
Jharkhand High Court Cites 40 - Cited by 0 - S K Dwivedi - Full Document

D. Gopalan vs B. Shanthi Alias Vennira Adai Nirmala ... on 23 January, 1989

A reference has been made in the above case to A. R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak , wherein the Supreme Court has observed that the locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except where the statue creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complainant, by necessary implication the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision. It is, therefore, patent that except in cases of specific statutory exception, strait-jacket formula of locus standi is unknown to criminal jurisprudence. If there is a right on any person to initiate a criminal prosecution, he should equally be entitled to take part in further proceedings arising out of the prosecution initiated by him. Section 279 of the Income-tax Act provides for prosecution being launched at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax for the offences specified therein and also bars any person being proceeded against for offences under sections specified therein, except at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax. The first respondent is being prosecuted by the second respondent for an offence punishable under Section 276DD for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 269SS of the Act, for which a prosecution can be at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax alone and not at the instance of any private party. It is, therefore, obvious that the petitioner will not be competent to initiate a criminal prosecution against the first respondent and, therefore, as a necessary corollary, he would be equally incompetent to implead himself in this petition.
Madras High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Maritime Institutes Association vs District Board on 17 November, 2009

The meaning intended and conveyed in Sections 79, 81 and 85 of the Merchant Shipping Act, cannot be stretched beyond the purpose for which, they are incorporated in the statute and as held in A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Navak and another reported in 1984 (2) SCC 500 and State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese and others reported in 1986 (4) SCC 746. The power and authority of IMU is explicit in the Statute. If the interpretation of the respondents 1 and 3 to the provisions in M.S. Act and the rules made thereunder, in the manner as suggested were to be accepted, then it will not be a purposive interpretation of the statutory provisions of IMU Act, so as to effectuate the intention of the legislature and on the contra, it would defeat the intention of the very legislation itself.
Madras High Court Cites 69 - Cited by 0 - S Manikumar - Full Document

Smt. Ritu Aggarwal @ Aditi & Ors. vs State & Anr. on 16 December, 2024

Thus, the questions which arise in this reference were not involved in Antulay '1984' case [A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 277] : since there, this Court was not dealing with the question of bar of limitation reflected in Section 468 CrPC at all, in our opinion, the said judgment could not have been usefully referred to in Krishna Pillai [Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp SCC 121 :
Delhi High Court Cites 43 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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