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Documents citing Kiritkumar D. Vyas vs State And Anr. on 18 December, 1981

Ahmadkhan Inyatkhan vs Dt. Supdt. Of Police, Banaskantha And ... on 8 December, 1988

This principle has been enunciated by this Court in Kiritkumar D. Vyas v. State of Gujarat & Anr. wherein a Bench of out High Court had an occasion to consider Rule 14 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971. In this decision, this Court held that even though this Rules does not contemplate giving of the notice, it must be read into this Rule that notice should be given to satisfy the principles of natural justice. The single Judge of our High Court in the decision cited above has also held that until the criminal proceedings are finally over, no action can be taken simply on the ground that the lower Court has found the delinquent guilty. Admittedly, criminal proceedings are pending in this High Court against the order of conviction made on the petitioner herein. Thus, the principles enunciated in both these decisions squarely apply to the facts of the case and as such the order of dismissal cannot stand. Rule is made absolute by allowing this Special Civil Application. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
Gujarat High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

Vinod Kumar vs Department Of Personnel And Training on 26 August, 2022

In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the decision of Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench in OA-802/2010 (Vinod Kumar Vs. UOI &Ors.) dated 26.04.2012, decisions of Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No. 22629/2019 (RamsingbhaiSaburbhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat) dated 5 O.A. No. 2229/2022 23.03.2022 and Kiritkumar D. Vyas Vs. State and Anr., (1982)2 GLR 79.
Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

H. N. Rao vs State Of Gujarat on 21 July, 2000

In the said judgment, in a similar set of facts, the learned Judge, relying upon the judgment of this Court in the matter of Kiritkumar D. Vyas v. State & Anr., [23 (2) GLR 79] quashed and set-aside the order of removal from service of the deliquent petitioner and directed that, `it will be open for the respondents to pass a fresh order after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.'
Gujarat High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 6 - R M Doshit - Full Document

J.M. Mehta vs State Of Gujarat on 20 December, 1990

There is, therefore, delay in challenging the order of premature retirement. As pointed out hereinabove, in fact in the original petition there was no challenge about the subsequent rejection of representation of the petitioner and such challenge came to be introduced only at the time of hearing of this petition. In view of the above facts, the question of grant of back wages to the petitioner is required to be considered. Miss Rekha Doshit, learned AGP for respondents, has relied upon the decision of this court in the case of Kiritkumar D. Vyas v. State wherein the Division Bench of this Court (Coram. M. P Thakar, CJ & D. C. Gheewala, J.) has held that ordinarily the court will frown upon delay and laches on the part of aggrieved person if any right of innocent persons intervened. However, in cases where the rights of other innocent persons are not likely to be affected the court should take broad view and condone delay on condition that he petitioner shall not be paid the benefits accruing to him for the period for which he has not come to the court. In the present case, since the petition was filed in the month of October 1979 and was circulated only in the month of November 1979, it could be said that the petitioner did not challenge the impugned order of premature retirement till then and therefore he is not entitled to back wages for the period of delay. It would therefore, be just and proper in the present case not to grant back wages to the petitioner from the date of impugned retirement till the month of December 1979, i.e., the date 20 when the notice on respondents was returnable and the respondents appeared. I would, therefor, direct the respondents to pay back wages to the petitioner with effect from January 1, 1980 till the date of his superannuation. However, for the period from December 31, 1976 to December 31, 1979 no back wages shall be paid to the petitioner. The back wages starting from January 1, 1980 till the date of his superannuation would be paid to the petitioner. In view of the fact that actual retiral benefits of the petitioner shall have to be calculated on the basis of directions given hereinabove, and the difference shall have to be worked out, and in view of the fact only the back wages shall have to be paid for the period between January 1, 1980 till the date of his superannuation, some reasonable time shall have to be granted to the respondents. I, therefore, direct the respondents to carry out the directions given hereinabove by June 15, 1991 and to pay to the petitioner the actual backwages from January 1, 1980 till the date of his superannuation, and also to fix his pensionary benefits on the basis of his continuance in service till the date of his superannuation.
Gujarat High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

Ramkumar Chandansindh Since Deceased ... vs Dy. Comissioner Of Police on 14 November, 2000

Mr.Mehta, learned advocate for the petitioner has also relying on the division bench decision of this Court in case of KIRITKUMAR D. VYAS VS. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER reported in 1982 GLH page 687 wherein, conviction for prohibition offence resulted into termination, where the Division Bench of this Court considered the penalty aspect and held that in such circumstances, this cannot be considered to be an offence of moral turpitude and therefore, punishment of termination is considered harsh and disproportionate. The Division Bench has also observed that it must be realised that quantum of punishment is a delicate question which requires to be resolved by the competent authority be it a Judge presiding over Criminal Court or a disciplinary authority exercising disciplinary jurisdiction. The punishment imposed must neither to be an excessive nor too lenient. It must be just, proper and adequate at the same time not too harsh nor to lenient, it has to be either deterrent or reformative.
Gujarat High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - H K Rathod - Full Document

Piyushbhai Bhagvatbhai Gamit vs State Of Gujarat on 20 March, 2026

In the said judgment, in a similar set of facts, the learned Judge, relying upon the judgment of this Court in the matter of Kiritkumar D. Vyas v. State & Anr., [23 (2) GLR 79] quashed and set-aside the order of removal from service of the deliquent petitioner and directed that, `it will be open for the respondents to pass a fresh order after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.'
Gujarat High Court Cites 34 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Vikrambhai vs State on 10 July, 2006

3. We have heard learned advocate Mr. Supehia for the appellant. He submitted that the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition mainly on the ground of delay. According to learned advocate Mr. Supehia, as per the decision of Supreme Court, mere delay is not sufficient to dismiss the petition, there has to be laches also, and here in the instant case, there is no question of any laches and therefore, the learned Single Judge committed an error in not entertaining the petition. Learned advocate Mr. Supehia has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Smt. Sudama Devi versus The Commissioner and others, AIR 1983 SC 653, and the decision of this Court in case of Kiritkumar D. Vyas versus State and Another as reported in 1982 (2) GLR 79 in support of his argument.
Gujarat High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 0 - A L Dave - Full Document
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