In the case of Shviappa Fakirappa
Shetsanadi v. Kannappa Mallappa Shetsanadi [ILR
1987 Kar. 3155], it has been held that the normal rights of
a member of a joint Hindu family are not affected by the Act.
Interest in village office includes right to survivorship of
members of the joint Hindu family. That after abolition of
the village office and resumption of the land, it became a
ryotwari land and only on regrant the land is released from
the nature of impartibility.
(ii) The Division Bench considered the
consequences of abolition of village office and regrant of
the lands assigned to the village office by placing reliance
on another decision of the division bench of this Court in
the case Shivappa Fakirappa Shetsanadi vs.
-: 77 :-
Kannappa Mallappa Shetsanadi reported in ILR 1987
KAR 3155 (Shivappa Fakirappa), wherein reference was
made to two decisions of the Bombay High Court referred
to above namely, Laxmi Bai vs. Ganesh and Nagesh Bisto
Desai vs. Khando Thirmal and held that under the Act on
the abolition of the village offices, regrant of the land is
made to the person who was the holder of the village office
immediately prior to date of appointment on payment by
or on behalf of such holder to the State Government the
occupancy price. The Division Bench quoted from the
aforesaid judgments to hold that village office and the suit
land annexed to it had been continued to be joint family
property till the date on which the village office was
abolished and the land was annexed to it was resumed.
Further, an 'interest' in the village office means that the
member of the joint family even though he may belong to
a junior branch, had a right to succeed to the office in the
event none was available in the senior branch to succeed
to the office. Therefore, in the said case it was held that
the inferior village office which was granted to the great
-: 78 :-
grand father of the parties and the suit land which was
annexed to the said office, on abolition of the village office
and resumption of the suit land as a consequence of
abolition of the village office, became available for regrant
and the person officiating the said office became entitled to
have the land regranted. Further, the Division Bench also
cited that the definition of 'holder' means a person having
an interest in the said office under an existing law relating
to such office and the expression 'existing law relating to a
village office' includes any enactment, ordinance, rule,
bye-law, regulation, order, notification, firman, hukum, vat
hukum, or any instrument or any custom or usage having
the force of law relating to a village office which may be in
force immediately before the appointed date. Therefore,
the junior members of the family having an interest under
the village office must be considered as holders of the
village office and a regrant made in favour of a person
does not take away the right of the other persons or junior
members of the family to seek partition in the suit land as
per their personal law.
In this regard, he relied on a decision in the matter of Shivappa Fakirappa Shetsanadi v. Kannappa Mallappa Shetsanadi and submitted that after the abolition of village offices and resumption of the suit land, it became a Ryotwari land only on regrant and came to be released from the nature of its impartiability. He relied on paragraphs-13 and 14 and submitted that a Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Village Offices Abolition Act has held that though the regrant is made in the name of one of the members of the Hindu Joint Family, on regrant the junior members of the family are also entitled for share in the said property.
We are in agreement with the
view taken by the Division Bench in Shivappa
Fakirappa Shetsanadi's case (supra). Therefore
occupancy rights granted in favour of defendant Nos.2
19
to 5 shall enure to the benefit of plaintiffs. Accordingly,
the third issue is answered.