17. As regards the next ground raised to challenge the order under appeal that the District Commission erroneously relied upon the affidavits of the witnesses to hold that the cause of death was due to an accident, it may be stated here that the ground raised is unsustainable in view of discussion made in the preceeding paras of our order. Moreover, as referred to above, the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai versus State of Gujarat (supra) holds water, wherein, it was held that in case of inconsistency between the medical evidence and evidence given by eyewitnesses, the evidence of the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out. Thus, the District Commission rightly held that the statements of the witnesses given under oath duly tallied with the statements so given by them to the Investigator appointed by the appellants and it was established beyond doubt that the death of Sh. Subhash Chander Rana, the insured, occurred only due to accidental fall and the appellants failed to suggest any of possibility, which caused the death of the policyholder.
On the other hand, in Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 484, it was held if medical evidence goes so far that it completely rules out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner alleged by eye witnesses, the testimony of the eye witnesses can be thrown out on the ground of alleged inconsistency and the medical evidence.
22.2 In Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1983 SC 484, the Supreme Court held that ordinarily the value of medical evidence is only corroborative and it proves that injuries could have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. Unless the medical evidence goes so far that it completely rules out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner alleged by the eye witnesses, the testimony of the eye witnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of alleged inconsistency between it and the medical evidence.
In the case of Sohanki Chimmanbhai Ukabhai v. The State of Gujarat , their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed at Page 437
Oridinarily the value of medical evidence is only corroborative. It appears that the injuries could have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. The use which the defence can make of the medical evidence is to prove that the injuries could not possibily have been caused in the manner alleged and thereby discredit the eye-witnesses. Unless however the medical evidence in its turn goes so far as to completely rule out all possibilities whatsover of injuries taking place in the manner alleged by the eye-witnesses, the testimony of eye-witnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of alleged inconsistency between it and the medical evidence.
In Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat this Court observed: (SCC p.
180, para 13)
'13. Ordinarily, the value of medical evidence is only corroborative. It
proves that the injuries could have been caused in the manner
alleged and nothing more. The use which the defence can make of
the medical evidence is to prove that the injuries could not possibly
have been caused in the manner alleged and thereby discredit the
eyewitnesses. Unless, however, the medical evidence in its turn goes
so far that it completely rules out all possibilities whatsoever of
injuries taking place in the manner alleged by eyewitnesses, the
testimony of the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground
of alleged inconsistency between it and the medical evidence.'
The two cases of the Supreme Court, Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat, and Mayur Panabhai Shah v. State of Gujarat, cited by the learned Public Prosecutor are quite distinguishable. Expert evidence consists of two parts; data evidence and opinion evidence. The first part of the evidence cannot ordinarily be rejected, whereas the second part may or may not be accepted by a Court. It is in reference to this second part of the evidence of the expert that the Supreme Court has said in the said cases that it is not always preferable to oral evidence of eye-witnesses.
In Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat, (supra) the Supreme Court held that when inconsistency between the testimony of eye-witnesses and medical evidence is found, such inconsistency cannot be a ground for discarding the testimony of eye-witnesses. The Supreme Court elaborating on this proposition has held that ordinarily the value of medical evidence is only corroborative. It proves that the injuries could have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. The defence can make use of the medical evidence to prove that the injuries could not possibly have been caused in the manner alleged and thereby discredit the eye-witnesses. Unless, however the medical evidence in its rum goes too far that it completely rules out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner alleged by eye-witnesses, the testimony of the eye-witnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of alleged inconsistency between it and the medical evidence. Thus it is clear that as long as the testimony of eye-witnesses cannot be thrown out, the inconsistency in medical evidence need not be a ground for rejecting the evidence of prosecution witnesses as spoken to by them narrating the use of weapons by the accused.