Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 10 of 149 (1.58 seconds)

Belsund Sugar Co.Ltd vs State Of Bihar & Ors. Etc on 10 August, 1999

The latter decision is rendered in the case of SIEL Ltd. and Others vs. Union of India and Others (supra), as noted earlier. It must, therefore, be held that mere possibility of issuance of any future order under Section 30 (1) of the Tea Act by the Central Government, in the absence of any existing express order to that effect, cannot be said to have occupied the field regarding purchase and sale of manufactured tea and fixation of maximum or minimum price thereof, or the location of such sales. These topics cannot be said to be legitimately covered by the Tea Act. Hence, the field is wide open for the State Legislature to exercise its concurrent legislative power under Entry 33 of List III for effectively dealing with these matters. This is precisely what has been done by the State Legislature by enacting the Market Act. The insertion of item pertaining to Tea (leaf and dust) in the Schedule, therefore, cannot be said to be an unauthorised exercise on the part of the delegate of the State Legislature, namely, the State Government which has exercised its power under Section 39 of the Market Act. Before parting with the discussion on the Tea Act, it is also necessary to keep in view the history of tea industry in India. It is apparent that the Tea Committee 1934, Indian Tea Control Act, 1938 and Central Tea Board Act, 1949 had been made with a view to control export of tea and tea cultivation. The Tea Act, 1953 was enacted to provide for taking several functions of licensing and vesting it in the Board and to exercise (1) control over tea cultivation and (2) control over the export of tea and tea seeds. The preamble of the Act states that it is intended to provide for the control by the Union of the tea industry, including the control, in pursuance of the International Agreement, of the cultivation of tea and export of tea. Thus the objective of the Tea Act is focussed on tea cultivation/tea export and establishment of tea manufacturing plants. It is quite different from that of the Market Act, 1960 made by the Bihar Legislature. The Tea Act has no concern with the establishment of markets in the State of Bihar or other States wherein packed tea could be sold in wholesale or retail markets so as to ultimately reach the Indian consumers. That takes us to the consideration of the Control Orders issued by the Central Government in exercise of its power under Section 30, sub-sections (3) and (5) thereof. One such order is the Tea (Distribution and Export) Control Order, 1957 which pertains to licensing of the distributors and exporters of tea. Clause 3 requires distributors carrying on the business of distributing tea to have a licence under this order. The export of tea is not touched by the Market Act as it has nothing to do with the export of tea to other countries. Clause 9 says that the licence given is personal and nontransferable. Clause 10 requires the licensee to pack and mark containers of tea in the manner mentioned therein. The proviso is significant. According to it, Clause 10 (c) does not apply to containers containing not more than 20 Kg. net or such other weight as to make it package tea for the purpose of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Clause 11 provides that no distributor shall distribute tea for sale which is not packed and marketed as per Clause 10 and which is adulterated or which makes false claim for such tea. Thereafter, are noted various statutory requirements. Firstly, the "distributor" contemplated by the 1957 Order is a distributor in the commercial sense who as principal or agent distributes tea to the wholesaler. Secondly, the distribution controlled is linked with export. Thirdly, since distribution is clubbed with export, it can at best be said to be distribution which is being made in similar bulk as exports. Fourthly, Form A provides for granting of licence to carry on business in manufactured tea as distributors at the places mentioned in the application. While Form B deals with licence to carry on business in manufactured tea as distributor/exporter of tea. It thus, becomes at once clear that this Control Order does not command licencee to carry on distribution of tea for sale at any particular place/market. The aforesaid Control Order has nothing to do with the establishment of markets for selling packed tea. The requirement of packing and marketing is again not contemplated by the Market Act, 1960. Hence, it is difficult to appreciate how this Control Order has occupied the field of regulation of sale and purchase of packed tea in market areas. The next Order on which Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the appellant, strongly relied was the Tea (Marketing) Control Order, 1984. The said Order was promulgated by the Central Government in exercise of its power under subsections (3) and (5) of Section 30 of the Tea Act, 1953. It pertains to licensing of the distributors and exporters. A mere look at the said Order shows that it does not provide for any regulation of sale and purchase of tea in the markets in different States in India. Clause 3 requires registration of manufacturer of tea and such manufacturer has to submit monthly return under Clause 5 in Form C. Clauses 6 and 7 pertain to Organiser of Tea Auction and Broker in Tea Auction. Clause 14 declares that the licence is personal and non-transferable. These persons are to maintain records as per Clause 16. Clause 17 directs the manufacturer to sell not less than 75% or such higher percentage, as specified by the Board, of tea manufactured by him in a year through public tea auctions in India held under the control of organisers of tea auction. Clause 19 exempts tea marketed directly by the manufacturer as packet tea, instant tea, tea bags, aromatic tea and green tea from computation of the total production under para 17. Firstly, 1984 Order deals with manufacturers and organisers of tea auction and brokers of tea auction and its basic concern is to require them to have licences in the form of authority. It is obvious that even this Order cannot advance the case of the appellant. The next Order which was pressed in service was the Tea Warehouses (Licensing) Order, 1989. The said order was also promulgated by the Central Government in exercise of the power conferred by sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 30 of the Tea Act, 1953. A mere look at the salient features of 1989 Order shows that it has not covered the field tried to be occupied by the Market Act. The public tea auctions contemplated by 1984 Order are those which are held under Clause 3 of the Tea Warehouses (Licensing) Order, 1989. In fact Clause 14(7) prohibits the warehouse owner from entering into any transaction with the manufacturer/broker/organiser of tea auction unless they have licences under the 1984 Order. The public tea auctions are held in specified areas in Calcutta, Siliguri, Guwahati, Cochin, Coimbatore and Amritsar. Thus, the 1984 Order and the Tea Warehouses (Licensing) Order 1989 are basically concerned with the public tea auctions and the licensing of manufacturer/broker/organiser of public auction and warehouses with regard to holding of public tea auctions. The warehouse is to be governed as per Clause 10(7) of the 1989 Order. This Order does not apply to the storage godowns in the markets established under the Market Act, 1960. But assuming it applies, the only effect would be that the storage places in markets should be in conformity with Clause 10(7). As far as obtaining of licence is concerned, it has to be obtained by the warehouse owner who carries on the activities of storing, blending or packing of tea in the warehouse. Once the manufacturer or trader takes space from the Market Committee in the godown in the Market Yard, then he would be the warehouse owner under Clause 2(1) of the 1989 Order and would have to take a licence, as authority, from the Tea Board. Both under the 1984 Order and 1989 Order, there is no requirement to carry on the business at any particular place/market. These Orders do not concern themselves with establishment of market or fixing place of business. The aforesaid Orders on which reliance was placed by learned senior counsel Shri Shanti Bhushan indicate that the Central Government in its wisdom did not think it fit to issue any Order under Section 30, sub-section (1), clauses (a) & (b) and, therefore, kept the field wide open in connection with the topics covered by the said provisions of Section 30 for the State Governments to exercise their legislative powers and enact suitable legislations under Entry 33 of the Concurrent List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Our attention was then invited by Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the appellant, to the Tea Waste (Control) Order, 1959. Even this order is issued by the Central Government under sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 30 The Tea Waste (Control) Order, 1959 applies only to tea waste as defined in Clause 2 (f). Thereunder a person selling/offering for sale/buying/holding any stock in tea waste is required to have licence. (Clauses 3,4,5, and 6). Clause 9 provides that licence is not transferable. Clause 13 provides that licensee shall have in possession tea waste not exceeding that which may be fixed by the licensing authority. Under Clause 19A false declaration is prohibited. On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid statutory Orders issued under the Tea Act and the relevant scheme of the Tea Act, it becomes at once clear that the provisions regarding fixation of appropriate price at which blended and packed tea can be sold to wholesalers in any established market or particular place at which sale transactions of such manufactured tea between the manufacturers on the one hand and the traders or other wholesale producers/dealers on the other are outside the sweep either of the Tea Act or of the relevant statutory Orders framed under Section 30 by the Central Government under the very same Act. The places at which public auctions can be held in connection with sale of roasted tea leaves to be purchased by manufacturers like the appellant are the earmarked six places indicated in 1984 and 1989 Orders. These auctions have nothing to do with the later sales of manufactured blended tea by such auction purchasers of tea leaves, who manufacture packed tea by blending and packing roasted tea leaves in their factories. The public auctions as contemplated by these Orders, therefore, serve out their purpose once the manufacturers of blended tea, like the appellants, purchase roasted tea leaves in public auctions. Once such purchased tea leaves are further processed after blending and packed in suitable receptacles for sale in local markets the stage is reached for regulating such sale transactions by manufacturers of tea when they are subjected to further auctions to be held in the market areas wherein the licensed distributors and manufacturers of tea can be subjected to the procedure of Section 15, sub-section (2) of the Market Act. So far as these later transactions are concerned, neither the Tea Act nor any of the aforesaid Orders can hold the field. Such sale transactions of manufactured tea in packed condition will, therefore, necessarily have to be governed by the provisions of the Market Act applicable to the area wherein such sale transactions in favour of wholesalers or retailers are effected by the stockists of the appellant operating in the market areas concerned. It is also pertinent to note that Section 15 of the Market Act gets attracted to such transactions of sale. It is not possible to agree with the contention of learned senior counsel Shri Shanti Bhushan that once the retail prices are fixed by the appellant there is no necessity of auctioning this tea in packed condition as per Section 15 sub-section 2 of the Market Act. It has to be kept in view that under the relevant Orders issued by the Central Government under Section 30 of the Tea Act, as noted earlier, the purchasers of tea have also to be licensed. Such licensed purchasers can bid at the auctions to be held as per Section 15, sub-section (2) of the Market Act for purchasing such packed tea. At that stage, there is no inconsistency or conflict between the earlier public auction held under the relevant statutory Orders issued under Section 30 of the Tea Act concerning roasted tea leaves and the auction of packed and processed tea by the appellant selling such commodities in the market areas through their stockists to wholesale dealers and traders operating in the market area and the market yard or sub-market yards concerned. In this connection, we may note one other submission of learned senior counsel Shri Shanti Bhushan for the appellant. He submitted that for almost 16 years tea was not a scheduled item governed by the Market Act. In fact, the Bihar Legislature did not think it fit to include Tea (leaf and dust) as a scheduled item from the inception but it is only the delegate, namely, the State of Bihar in exercise of its power under Section 39 thought it fit to introduce Tea (leaf and dust) as a scheduled item. The procedure of Sections 3 and 4 has not to be followed while undertaking this exercise. In this connection, it was submitted that no reasonable person could have undertaken such an exercise as tea was already a controlled commodity under the Tea Act and also governed by the relevant Orders issued thereunder. As we have seen earlier, under the relevant provisions of the Tea Act and the operative Orders promulgated thereunder the Central Government has left untouched the field of regulation of prices and the location of market places where such packed tea could be sold to the wholesale dealers or even to the retailers. When that field was wide open, the State Government in its wisdom, could legitimately try to cover the filed by issuing appropriate Orders under Section 39 of the Act. It cannot be said, therefore, that such an exercise was totally ultra vires or amounted to non-application of mind. In fact, what the Central Government should have done and did not do by issuing appropriate Orders under Section 30, subsection (1) Clauses (a) & (b) of the Tea Act could legitimately be done by the State Government. It was not required to wait indefinitely till the Central Government could find time to issue such an Order. Shri Shanti Bhushan, in this connection, further submitted that if that is so, then if in future the Central Government wakes up and issues such an Order, would the then existing Entry in the Schedule regarding tea get superseded or become inoperative ? This is a hypothetical question raised which does not require any answer obviously at this stage. As and when in future such an eventuality occurs, then the question of continuation of regulation of sale and purchase transactions of Tea (leaf and dust) by retaining this item in the Schedule may have to be examined. But as the statutory provisions stand at present, in the absence of any such existing Order under Section 30 sub-section (1) Clauses (a) & (b) by the Central Government, the field remains wide open and at least it was definitely open when the State Government introduced the Entry of Tea (leaf and dust) in the Schedule to the Market Act in 1976. This exercise, by no stretch of imagination, could be said to be unauthorised, illegal or amounting to non-application of mind. The second contention, therefore, is answered in negative against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. That takes us to the consideration of contention no.3 POINT NO. 3 : Once it is held that the Market Act covers the transactions of sale of packed blended tea in sealed packets and receptacles by the appellant's stockist in the market areas concerned especially when these transactions take place in the market yard or sub-market yards as laid down by Section 15 of the Act which remains fully operative to cover such transactions, there is no escape from the conclusion that the entire infrastructural facilities for regulation of such sale transactions as made available by the market committee concerned would enure for the benefit of sellers of such packed blended tea. It is also pertinent to note that so far as the appellant is concerned, all that is required of it is to take licence for selling packed tea in market yards, sub-market yards from the market committee concerned. The appellant is not required to bear the burden of any market fee. As per Section 27 of the Act, the burden of market fee is to be borne by the purchasers of such packed tea, namely, the wholesale dealers licensed to purchase such tea as per the Central Orders mentioned earlier. Such purchasers have not brought in challenge levy of market fee on them. So far as the appellant is concerned, once its stockist sells the packed tea in the market yard or sub-market yards maintained by the market committee, the entire infrastructural facilities made available by the market committee to all the purchasers and sellers of agricultural produce in the market yard, would automatically become available to the appellant's stockist who sells its goods, namely, packed tea in the market yard or sub-market yards concerned. In this connection, it has also to be kept in view that establishment of markets and maintenance thereof is a topic of legislation squarely covered by Entry 28 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. For maintaining such markets, the market committees obviously have to spend large amounts for providing necessary infrastructure for the benefit of those who use such established markets. In this connection, Section 30 of the Market Act, as noted earlier, becomes relevant for our consideration. Amongst others, the Market Committee Fund has to be utilised under Section 30 for the following purposes :
Supreme Court of India Cites 64 - Cited by 111 - S B Majmudar - Full Document

The Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd vs The State Of Bihar & Ors. Etc on 10 August, 1999

The latter decision is rendered in the case of SIEL Ltd. and Others vs. Union of India and Others (supra), as noted earlier. It must, therefore, be held that mere possibility of issuance of any future order under Section 30 (1) of the Tea Act by the Central Government, in the absence of any existing express order to that effect, cannot be said to have occupied the field regarding purchase and sale of manufactured tea and fixation of maximum or minimum price thereof, or the location of such sales. These topics cannot be said to be legitimately covered by the Tea Act. Hence, the field is wide open for the State Legislature to exercise its concurrent legislative power under Entry 33 of List III for effectively dealing with these matters. This is precisely what has been done by the State Legislature by enacting the Market Act. The insertion of item pertaining to Tea (leaf and dust) in the Schedule, therefore, cannot be said to be an unauthorised exercise on the part of the delegate of the State Legislature, namely, the State Government which has exercised its power under Section 39 of the Market Act. Before parting with the discussion on the Tea Act, it is also necessary to keep in view the history of tea industry in India. It is apparent that the Tea Committee 1934, Indian Tea Control Act, 1938 and Central Tea Board Act, 1949 had been made with a view to control export of tea and tea cultivation. The Tea Act, 1953 was enacted to provide for taking several functions of licensing and vesting it in the Board and to exercise (1) control over tea cultivation and (2) control over the export of tea and tea seeds. The preamble of the Act states that it is intended to provide for the control by the Union of the tea industry, including the control, in pursuance of the International Agreement, of the cultivation of tea and export of tea. Thus the objective of the Tea Act is focussed on tea cultivation/tea export and establishment of tea manufacturing plants. It is quite different from that of the Market Act, 1960 made by the Bihar Legislature. The Tea Act has no concern with the establishment of markets in the State of Bihar or other States wherein packed tea could be sold in wholesale or retail markets so as to ultimately reach the Indian consumers. That takes us to the consideration of the Control Orders issued by the Central Government in exercise of its power under Section 30, sub-sections (3) and (5) thereof. One such order is the Tea (Distribution and Export) Control Order, 1957 which pertains to licensing of the distributors and exporters of tea. Clause 3 requires distributors carrying on the business of distributing tea to have a licence under this order. The export of tea is not touched by the Market Act as it has nothing to do with the export of tea to other countries. Clause 9 says that the licence given is personal and nontransferable. Clause 10 requires the licensee to pack and mark containers of tea in the manner mentioned therein. The proviso is significant. According to it, Clause 10 (c) does not apply to containers containing not more than 20 Kg. net or such other weight as to make it package tea for the purpose of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Clause 11 provides that no distributor shall distribute tea for sale which is not packed and marketed as per Clause 10 and which is adulterated or which makes false claim for such tea. Thereafter, are noted various statutory requirements. Firstly, the "distributor" contemplated by the 1957 Order is a distributor in the commercial sense who as principal or agent distributes tea to the wholesaler. Secondly, the distribution controlled is linked with export. Thirdly, since distribution is clubbed with export, it can at best be said to be distribution which is being made in similar bulk as exports. Fourthly, Form A provides for granting of licence to carry on business in manufactured tea as distributors at the places mentioned in the application. While Form B deals with licence to carry on business in manufactured tea as distributor/exporter of tea. It thus, becomes at once clear that this Control Order does not command licencee to carry on distribution of tea for sale at any particular place/market. The aforesaid Control Order has nothing to do with the establishment of markets for selling packed tea. The requirement of packing and marketing is again not contemplated by the Market Act, 1960. Hence, it is difficult to appreciate how this Control Order has occupied the field of regulation of sale and purchase of packed tea in market areas. The next Order on which Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the appellant, strongly relied was the Tea (Marketing) Control Order, 1984. The said Order was promulgated by the Central Government in exercise of its power under subsections (3) and (5) of Section 30 of the Tea Act, 1953. It pertains to licensing of the distributors and exporters. A mere look at the said Order shows that it does not provide for any regulation of sale and purchase of tea in the markets in different States in India. Clause 3 requires registration of manufacturer of tea and such manufacturer has to submit monthly return under Clause 5 in Form C. Clauses 6 and 7 pertain to Organiser of Tea Auction and Broker in Tea Auction. Clause 14 declares that the licence is personal and non-transferable. These persons are to maintain records as per Clause 16. Clause 17 directs the manufacturer to sell not less than 75% or such higher percentage, as specified by the Board, of tea manufactured by him in a year through public tea auctions in India held under the control of organisers of tea auction. Clause 19 exempts tea marketed directly by the manufacturer as packet tea, instant tea, tea bags, aromatic tea and green tea from computation of the total production under para 17. Firstly, 1984 Order deals with manufacturers and organisers of tea auction and brokers of tea auction and its basic concern is to require them to have licences in the form of authority. It is obvious that even this Order cannot advance the case of the appellant. The next Order which was pressed in service was the Tea Warehouses (Licensing) Order, 1989. The said order was also promulgated by the Central Government in exercise of the power conferred by sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 30 of the Tea Act, 1953. A mere look at the salient features of 1989 Order shows that it has not covered the field tried to be occupied by the Market Act. The public tea auctions contemplated by 1984 Order are those which are held under Clause 3 of the Tea Warehouses (Licensing) Order, 1989. In fact Clause 14(7) prohibits the warehouse owner from entering into any transaction with the manufacturer/broker/organiser of tea auction unless they have licences under the 1984 Order. The public tea auctions are held in specified areas in Calcutta, Siliguri, Guwahati, Cochin, Coimbatore and Amritsar. Thus, the 1984 Order and the Tea Warehouses (Licensing) Order 1989 are basically concerned with the public tea auctions and the licensing of manufacturer/broker/organiser of public auction and warehouses with regard to holding of public tea auctions. The warehouse is to be governed as per Clause 10(7) of the 1989 Order. This Order does not apply to the storage godowns in the markets established under the Market Act, 1960. But assuming it applies, the only effect would be that the storage places in markets should be in conformity with Clause 10(7). As far as obtaining of licence is concerned, it has to be obtained by the warehouse owner who carries on the activities of storing, blending or packing of tea in the warehouse. Once the manufacturer or trader takes space from the Market Committee in the godown in the Market Yard, then he would be the warehouse owner under Clause 2(1) of the 1989 Order and would have to take a licence, as authority, from the Tea Board. Both under the 1984 Order and 1989 Order, there is no requirement to carry on the business at any particular place/market. These Orders do not concern themselves with establishment of market or fixing place of business. The aforesaid Orders on which reliance was placed by learned senior counsel Shri Shanti Bhushan indicate that the Central Government in its wisdom did not think it fit to issue any Order under Section 30, sub-section (1), clauses (a) & (b) and, therefore, kept the field wide open in connection with the topics covered by the said provisions of Section 30 for the State Governments to exercise their legislative powers and enact suitable legislations under Entry 33 of the Concurrent List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Our attention was then invited by Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the appellant, to the Tea Waste (Control) Order, 1959. Even this order is issued by the Central Government under sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 30 The Tea Waste (Control) Order, 1959 applies only to tea waste as defined in Clause 2 (f). Thereunder a person selling/offering for sale/buying/holding any stock in tea waste is required to have licence. (Clauses 3,4,5, and 6). Clause 9 provides that licence is not transferable. Clause 13 provides that licensee shall have in possession tea waste not exceeding that which may be fixed by the licensing authority. Under Clause 19A false declaration is prohibited. On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid statutory Orders issued under the Tea Act and the relevant scheme of the Tea Act, it becomes at once clear that the provisions regarding fixation of appropriate price at which blended and packed tea can be sold to wholesalers in any established market or particular place at which sale transactions of such manufactured tea between the manufacturers on the one hand and the traders or other wholesale producers/dealers on the other are outside the sweep either of the Tea Act or of the relevant statutory Orders framed under Section 30 by the Central Government under the very same Act. The places at which public auctions can be held in connection with sale of roasted tea leaves to be purchased by manufacturers like the appellant are the earmarked six places indicated in 1984 and 1989 Orders. These auctions have nothing to do with the later sales of manufactured blended tea by such auction purchasers of tea leaves, who manufacture packed tea by blending and packing roasted tea leaves in their factories. The public auctions as contemplated by these Orders, therefore, serve out their purpose once the manufacturers of blended tea, like the appellants, purchase roasted tea leaves in public auctions. Once such purchased tea leaves are further processed after blending and packed in suitable receptacles for sale in local markets the stage is reached for regulating such sale transactions by manufacturers of tea when they are subjected to further auctions to be held in the market areas wherein the licensed distributors and manufacturers of tea can be subjected to the procedure of Section 15, sub-section (2) of the Market Act. So far as these later transactions are concerned, neither the Tea Act nor any of the aforesaid Orders can hold the field. Such sale transactions of manufactured tea in packed condition will, therefore, necessarily have to be governed by the provisions of the Market Act applicable to the area wherein such sale transactions in favour of wholesalers or retailers are effected by the stockists of the appellant operating in the market areas concerned. It is also pertinent to note that Section 15 of the Market Act gets attracted to such transactions of sale. It is not possible to agree with the contention of learned senior counsel Shri Shanti Bhushan that once the retail prices are fixed by the appellant there is no necessity of auctioning this tea in packed condition as per Section 15 sub-section 2 of the Market Act. It has to be kept in view that under the relevant Orders issued by the Central Government under Section 30 of the Tea Act, as noted earlier, the purchasers of tea have also to be licensed. Such licensed purchasers can bid at the auctions to be held as per Section 15, sub-section (2) of the Market Act for purchasing such packed tea. At that stage, there is no inconsistency or conflict between the earlier public auction held under the relevant statutory Orders issued under Section 30 of the Tea Act concerning roasted tea leaves and the auction of packed and processed tea by the appellant selling such commodities in the market areas through their stockists to wholesale dealers and traders operating in the market area and the market yard or sub-market yards concerned. In this connection, we may note one other submission of learned senior counsel Shri Shanti Bhushan for the appellant. He submitted that for almost 16 years tea was not a scheduled item governed by the Market Act. In fact, the Bihar Legislature did not think it fit to include Tea (leaf and dust) as a scheduled item from the inception but it is only the delegate, namely, the State of Bihar in exercise of its power under Section 39 thought it fit to introduce Tea (leaf and dust) as a scheduled item. The procedure of Sections 3 and 4 has not to be followed while undertaking this exercise. In this connection, it was submitted that no reasonable person could have undertaken such an exercise as tea was already a controlled commodity under the Tea Act and also governed by the relevant Orders issued thereunder. As we have seen earlier, under the relevant provisions of the Tea Act and the operative Orders promulgated thereunder the Central Government has left untouched the field of regulation of prices and the location of market places where such packed tea could be sold to the wholesale dealers or even to the retailers. When that field was wide open, the State Government in its wisdom, could legitimately try to cover the filed by issuing appropriate Orders under Section 39 of the Act. It cannot be said, therefore, that such an exercise was totally ultra vires or amounted to non-application of mind. In fact, what the Central Government should have done and did not do by issuing appropriate Orders under Section 30, subsection (1) Clauses (a) & (b) of the Tea Act could legitimately be done by the State Government. It was not required to wait indefinitely till the Central Government could find time to issue such an Order. Shri Shanti Bhushan, in this connection, further submitted that if that is so, then if in future the Central Government wakes up and issues such an Order, would the then existing Entry in the Schedule regarding tea get superseded or become inoperative ? This is a hypothetical question raised which does not require any answer obviously at this stage. As and when in future such an eventuality occurs, then the question of continuation of regulation of sale and purchase transactions of Tea (leaf and dust) by retaining this item in the Schedule may have to be examined. But as the statutory provisions stand at present, in the absence of any such existing Order under Section 30 sub-section (1) Clauses (a) & (b) by the Central Government, the field remains wide open and at least it was definitely open when the State Government introduced the Entry of Tea (leaf and dust) in the Schedule to the Market Act in 1976. This exercise, by no stretch of imagination, could be said to be unauthorised, illegal or amounting to non-application of mind. The second contention, therefore, is answered in negative against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. That takes us to the consideration of contention no.3 POINT NO. 3 : Once it is held that the Market Act covers the transactions of sale of packed blended tea in sealed packets and receptacles by the appellant's stockist in the market areas concerned especially when these transactions take place in the market yard or sub-market yards as laid down by Section 15 of the Act which remains fully operative to cover such transactions, there is no escape from the conclusion that the entire infrastructural facilities for regulation of such sale transactions as made available by the market committee concerned would enure for the benefit of sellers of such packed blended tea. It is also pertinent to note that so far as the appellant is concerned, all that is required of it is to take licence for selling packed tea in market yards, sub-market yards from the market committee concerned. The appellant is not required to bear the burden of any market fee. As per Section 27 of the Act, the burden of market fee is to be borne by the purchasers of such packed tea, namely, the wholesale dealers licensed to purchase such tea as per the Central Orders mentioned earlier. Such purchasers have not brought in challenge levy of market fee on them. So far as the appellant is concerned, once its stockist sells the packed tea in the market yard or sub-market yards maintained by the market committee, the entire infrastructural facilities made available by the market committee to all the purchasers and sellers of agricultural produce in the market yard, would automatically become available to the appellant's stockist who sells its goods, namely, packed tea in the market yard or sub-market yards concerned. In this connection, it has also to be kept in view that establishment of markets and maintenance thereof is a topic of legislation squarely covered by Entry 28 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. For maintaining such markets, the market committees obviously have to spend large amounts for providing necessary infrastructure for the benefit of those who use such established markets. In this connection, Section 30 of the Market Act, as noted earlier, becomes relevant for our consideration. Amongst others, the Market Committee Fund has to be utilised under Section 30 for the following purposes :
Supreme Court of India Cites 64 - Cited by 0 - S B Majmudar - Full Document

I.T.C. Limited vs Agricultural Produce Market Committee ... on 24 January, 2002

Mr. Dwivedi placed reliance on the Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in SIEL's case (supra), but in view of our conclusions already arrived at, the aforesaid Full Bench decision must be held not to have been correctly decided. It is also difficult for us to accept the submission of Dr. Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for the Market Committee of Monghyr, that if the subject head of legislation in List II is not subject to the corresponding Entry in List I then the power of State Legislature to legislate with regard to that matter is paramount and supreme, and therefore, the Market Committee Act being relatable to Entries 14 and 28 of List II, which are not subject to any of the Entries of List I, the Market Committee Act must be allowed to prevail. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid approach to consider the validity of a law made by the Parliament or a law made by the State legislature is not a correct approach. The Entries merely being the subject head of the legislation and the power to make law having emanated from Article 246, if a particular law made by Parliament comes within the legislative competence of the Parliament with reference to any of the Entries in List I then the State legislature would not have the competence to make law with respect to that subject with reference to some other Entries in List II. It is of course true, that Courts while examining the competing legislations would make an attempt and see whether both the legislations could operate, and that question we will deal later. But the contention that Entries 14 and 28 of List II not being subject to any Entry under List I and the Market Committee Act being relatable to Entries 14 and 28 of List II the same should be allowed to operate notwithstanding the wide meaning to the word 'industry' in Entry 52 of List I and the Parliament has already taken over the control of the industry and has made law in that respect. In the context of our conclusions on the question of the import and extent of expression 'industry' in Entry 52 of List I it is not necessary to examine the other contentions of Dr. Singhvi that whether the theory of occupied field is relevant only in case of law made with reference to Entries in List III. We are also not persuaded to agree with the submission of Dr. Singhvi that the Market Committee Act can still be operative and the Market fee could be levied by the Market Committee under the State Act for services provided by it on the principle of quid pro quo even if the Court comes to the conclusion that the Tobacco Board Act is a valid piece of legislation enacted by the Parliament and that Act also has made necessary provision for growing of tobacco as well as purchase and sale of tobacco. We are also unable to sustain the argument of Mr. Sanghi, learned senior counsel appearing for Krishi Mandi in the Madhya Pradesh batch of appeals, that the enquiry in the case should be whether the State legislature had the legislative competence to enact the Market Committee Act under 28 of List II. His other submission on the question that there is no irreconciable clash between the two Acts and the meaning of Section 31 of Tobacco Board Act will be considered while considering the different provisions of the two Acts. Mr. Ganguli, learned senior counsel appearing for the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Marketing Board also submitted in the same manner as Dr. Singhvi and relied upon Article 246(3) of the Constitution. But in our considered opinion Article 246(1) itself being notwithstanding anything in clauses 2 and 3 of the said Article the submission of Mr. Ganguli is devoid of any force. The elaborate submissions of Mr. Ganguli in relation to the decisions of this Court in Baij Nath Kedia, M.A. Tulloch, India Cement and Orissa Cement, all of which dealt with mining legislations are not necessary to be dealt with inasmuch as we have not relied upon the principles enunciated in those decisions, even though Mr. Shanti Bhushan pressed those decisions in support of his contention.
Supreme Court of India Cites 131 - Cited by 218 - Full Document

I.T.C. Limited vs Tchoemmaigtrtieceul&Tuorrasl. ... on 24 January, 2002

(emphasis supplied is ours) The principles aforesaid would equally apply to Entries 14 27, 28 and 66 of List II. It may further be noticed that in para 170 of Belsund Sugar Company's case, the Constitution Bench reiterates the view expressed in Tika Ramji's case as also in SIEL's case affirming Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in M/s. Shriram Industrial Enterprises (supra).
Supreme Court of India Cites 62 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

M/S Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd vs State Of Uttranchal & Ors on 21 September, 2007

JT 2001 (4) SC 31, dealing with the executive policy regulating trade in liquor in Delhi, this Court stated that it was well settled that the courts, in exercise of power of judicial review do not ordinarily interfere with the policy decisions unless such policy could be faulted on the grounds of mala fide, unreasonableness, arbitrariness, unfairness, etc. But the mere fact that it would hurt business interests of a party would not justify invalidating the policy. In tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial restraint, if not judicial deference, to judgment of the executive. The Courts are not expected to express their opinion as to whether at a particular point of time or in a particular situation any such policy should have been adopted or not. It is best left to the discretion of the State. (emphasis supplied) [See also SIEL Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., (1998) 7 SCC 26 : AIR 1998 SC 3076].
Supreme Court of India Cites 43 - Cited by 153 - C K Thakker - Full Document

Laxmi Prasanna Traders vs The State Of Telangana on 30 November, 2021

Ch.Tika Ramji v. State of U.P.1, State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley2, Calcutta Gas Company Limited v. State of West Bengal3, Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola4, Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Limited v. State of Kerala5, Shah Ashu Jaiwant v. State of Maharashtra6, Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (Private) Limited v. State of U.P.7, D.C.Wadhwa v. State of Bihar8, Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-I v. M/s.Parle Exports9, India Cement Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu10, Synthetics & Chemicals Limited v. State of 1 1956 SCR 393 2 1959 SCR 379 3 1962 Supp (3) SCR 1 4 (1962) 1 SCR 279 5 (1972) 2 SCC 218 6 (1976) 2 SCC 99 7 (1980) 4 SCC 136 8 (1987) 1 SCC 378 9 (1989) 1 SCC 345 10 (1990) 1 SCC 12 16 U.P.11, State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co.,12, SIEL Limited v. Union of India13, ITC Limited v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee14, S.Samuel, M.D., Harrisons Malayalam v. Union of India15, Gulati & Co., v. Commissioner of Sales Tax16, and Dharampal Satyapal Limited v. State of Assam17. (21) The respondent No.3/Commissioner of Food Safety, Telangana has filed a detailed counter affidavit and it has been stated that the petitioners are engaged in the wholesale business of the products like chewing tobacco. The products contain pure tobacco, flavoured tobacco and scented tobacco. It has been stated that the chewing tobacco products flavoured with some spices such as cardamom, menthol, clove etc., includes scented tobacco. This also includes edible perfumes and therefore, as per the FSS Act 2006, the spices and other edible perfumes added to the chewing tobacco comes under the definition of 'food'. It has been stated that the law of the land is very clear and the FSS Act 2006 read with Regulations framed thereunder provides that no food product shall contain tobacco and nicotine as ingredient. The stand of the respondent No.3 is that the petitioner while obtaining GST 11 (1990) 1 SCC 109 12 (1996) 3 SCC 709 13 (1998) 7 SCC 26 14 (2002) 9 SCC 232 15 (2004) 1 SCC 256 16 (2014) 14 SCC 286 17 (2018) 2 Gauhati Law Reports 168 17 number and GST certificate has stated that he is doing business to sell unmanufactured tobacco, refuse tobacco, not stem or strippe, flue cured Virginia tobacco, but the petitioner is selling chewing tobacco products flavoured with some spices, such as cardamom, menthol, clove etc., scented tobacco comprising edible perfumes. In the other writ petitions, the petitioners are dealing with gutka or pan masala, which certainly contain tobacco.
Telangana High Court Cites 62 - Cited by 0 - S C Sharma - Full Document

Ravi Kiranam vs The State Of Telangana on 30 November, 2021

Ch.Tika Ramji v. State of U.P.1, State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley2, Calcutta Gas Company Limited v. State of West Bengal3, Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola4, Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Limited v. State of Kerala5, Shah Ashu Jaiwant v. State of Maharashtra6, Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (Private) Limited v. State of U.P.7, D.C.Wadhwa v. State of Bihar8, Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-I v. M/s.Parle Exports9, India Cement Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu10, Synthetics & Chemicals Limited v. State of 1 1956 SCR 393 2 1959 SCR 379 3 1962 Supp (3) SCR 1 4 (1962) 1 SCR 279 5 (1972) 2 SCC 218 6 (1976) 2 SCC 99 7 (1980) 4 SCC 136 8 (1987) 1 SCC 378 9 (1989) 1 SCC 345 10 (1990) 1 SCC 12 16 U.P.11, State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co.,12, SIEL Limited v. Union of India13, ITC Limited v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee14, S.Samuel, M.D., Harrisons Malayalam v. Union of India15, Gulati & Co., v. Commissioner of Sales Tax16, and Dharampal Satyapal Limited v. State of Assam17. (21) The respondent No.3/Commissioner of Food Safety, Telangana has filed a detailed counter affidavit and it has been stated that the petitioners are engaged in the wholesale business of the products like chewing tobacco. The products contain pure tobacco, flavoured tobacco and scented tobacco. It has been stated that the chewing tobacco products flavoured with some spices such as cardamom, menthol, clove etc., includes scented tobacco. This also includes edible perfumes and therefore, as per the FSS Act 2006, the spices and other edible perfumes added to the chewing tobacco comes under the definition of 'food'. It has been stated that the law of the land is very clear and the FSS Act 2006 read with Regulations framed thereunder provides that no food product shall contain tobacco and nicotine as ingredient. The stand of the respondent No.3 is that the petitioner while obtaining GST 11 (1990) 1 SCC 109 12 (1996) 3 SCC 709 13 (1998) 7 SCC 26 14 (2002) 9 SCC 232 15 (2004) 1 SCC 256 16 (2014) 14 SCC 286 17 (2018) 2 Gauhati Law Reports 168 17 number and GST certificate has stated that he is doing business to sell unmanufactured tobacco, refuse tobacco, not stem or strippe, flue cured Virginia tobacco, but the petitioner is selling chewing tobacco products flavoured with some spices, such as cardamom, menthol, clove etc., scented tobacco comprising edible perfumes. In the other writ petitions, the petitioners are dealing with gutka or pan masala, which certainly contain tobacco.
Telangana High Court Cites 62 - Cited by 0 - S C Sharma - Full Document

Chaithanya General Stores vs The State Of Telangana on 30 November, 2021

Ch.Tika Ramji v. State of U.P.1, State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley2, Calcutta Gas Company Limited v. State of West Bengal3, Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola4, Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Limited v. State of Kerala5, Shah Ashu Jaiwant v. State of Maharashtra6, Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (Private) Limited v. State of U.P.7, D.C.Wadhwa v. State of Bihar8, Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-I v. M/s.Parle Exports9, India Cement Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu10, Synthetics & Chemicals Limited v. State of 1 1956 SCR 393 2 1959 SCR 379 3 1962 Supp (3) SCR 1 4 (1962) 1 SCR 279 5 (1972) 2 SCC 218 6 (1976) 2 SCC 99 7 (1980) 4 SCC 136 8 (1987) 1 SCC 378 9 (1989) 1 SCC 345 10 (1990) 1 SCC 12 16 U.P.11, State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co.,12, SIEL Limited v. Union of India13, ITC Limited v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee14, S.Samuel, M.D., Harrisons Malayalam v. Union of India15, Gulati & Co., v. Commissioner of Sales Tax16, and Dharampal Satyapal Limited v. State of Assam17. (21) The respondent No.3/Commissioner of Food Safety, Telangana has filed a detailed counter affidavit and it has been stated that the petitioners are engaged in the wholesale business of the products like chewing tobacco. The products contain pure tobacco, flavoured tobacco and scented tobacco. It has been stated that the chewing tobacco products flavoured with some spices such as cardamom, menthol, clove etc., includes scented tobacco. This also includes edible perfumes and therefore, as per the FSS Act 2006, the spices and other edible perfumes added to the chewing tobacco comes under the definition of 'food'. It has been stated that the law of the land is very clear and the FSS Act 2006 read with Regulations framed thereunder provides that no food product shall contain tobacco and nicotine as ingredient. The stand of the respondent No.3 is that the petitioner while obtaining GST 11 (1990) 1 SCC 109 12 (1996) 3 SCC 709 13 (1998) 7 SCC 26 14 (2002) 9 SCC 232 15 (2004) 1 SCC 256 16 (2014) 14 SCC 286 17 (2018) 2 Gauhati Law Reports 168 17 number and GST certificate has stated that he is doing business to sell unmanufactured tobacco, refuse tobacco, not stem or strippe, flue cured Virginia tobacco, but the petitioner is selling chewing tobacco products flavoured with some spices, such as cardamom, menthol, clove etc., scented tobacco comprising edible perfumes. In the other writ petitions, the petitioners are dealing with gutka or pan masala, which certainly contain tobacco.
Telangana High Court Cites 62 - Cited by 0 - S C Sharma - Full Document

C. Naveen Kumar vs The State Of Telangana on 30 November, 2021

Ch.Tika Ramji v. State of U.P.1, State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley2, Calcutta Gas Company Limited v. State of West Bengal3, Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola4, Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Limited v. State of Kerala5, Shah Ashu Jaiwant v. State of Maharashtra6, Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (Private) Limited v. State of U.P.7, D.C.Wadhwa v. State of Bihar8, Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-I v. M/s.Parle Exports9, India Cement Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu10, Synthetics & Chemicals Limited v. State of 1 1956 SCR 393 2 1959 SCR 379 3 1962 Supp (3) SCR 1 4 (1962) 1 SCR 279 5 (1972) 2 SCC 218 6 (1976) 2 SCC 99 7 (1980) 4 SCC 136 8 (1987) 1 SCC 378 9 (1989) 1 SCC 345 10 (1990) 1 SCC 12 16 U.P.11, State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co.,12, SIEL Limited v. Union of India13, ITC Limited v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee14, S.Samuel, M.D., Harrisons Malayalam v. Union of India15, Gulati & Co., v. Commissioner of Sales Tax16, and Dharampal Satyapal Limited v. State of Assam17. (21) The respondent No.3/Commissioner of Food Safety, Telangana has filed a detailed counter affidavit and it has been stated that the petitioners are engaged in the wholesale business of the products like chewing tobacco. The products contain pure tobacco, flavoured tobacco and scented tobacco. It has been stated that the chewing tobacco products flavoured with some spices such as cardamom, menthol, clove etc., includes scented tobacco. This also includes edible perfumes and therefore, as per the FSS Act 2006, the spices and other edible perfumes added to the chewing tobacco comes under the definition of 'food'. It has been stated that the law of the land is very clear and the FSS Act 2006 read with Regulations framed thereunder provides that no food product shall contain tobacco and nicotine as ingredient. The stand of the respondent No.3 is that the petitioner while obtaining GST 11 (1990) 1 SCC 109 12 (1996) 3 SCC 709 13 (1998) 7 SCC 26 14 (2002) 9 SCC 232 15 (2004) 1 SCC 256 16 (2014) 14 SCC 286 17 (2018) 2 Gauhati Law Reports 168 17 number and GST certificate has stated that he is doing business to sell unmanufactured tobacco, refuse tobacco, not stem or strippe, flue cured Virginia tobacco, but the petitioner is selling chewing tobacco products flavoured with some spices, such as cardamom, menthol, clove etc., scented tobacco comprising edible perfumes. In the other writ petitions, the petitioners are dealing with gutka or pan masala, which certainly contain tobacco.
Telangana High Court Cites 62 - Cited by 0 - S C Sharma - Full Document
1   2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Next