Kisan Cold Storage & Ice Factory Thru ... vs Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam ... on 3 April, 2019
(7) Chandra Kumar Sah & another vs. The District Judge & others - AIR 1976 ALL (FB);
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1 - 10 of 21 (0.71 seconds)Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd vs Asif And 7 Others on 18 February, 2020
"................82. A delegated/ subordinate legislation neither can create substantive rights and obligations nor can enhance efficacy or reduce normal functional ambit of principal legislation. A Full Bench of this Court in Chandra Kumar Sah and another Vs. The District Judge and others, AIR 1976 All 328 held that when a rule framing power is conferred upon State Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act, it does not give carte blanche to enact independent legislation. The expression "to carry out the purposes of the Act" means to enable its provisions to be effectively administered. They connote that rules are to be confined to the same field of operation as that marked out by Act itself. Court further observed in para 11 as under:
Chemplast Sanmar Ltd. vs Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax on 22 March, 2004
If a rule goes beyond what the section contemplates, the rule must yield to the statute [see Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen AIR 1960 SC 12, Chandra Kumar Sah v. District Judge, AIR 1976 All 328(FB)].
Baleshwar Prasad Srivastava vs Smt. Sita Devi And Anr. on 10 March, 1976
18. Sri S. K. Verma, counsel appearing for the petitioner, however, brought to my notice a referring order made by brother K. N, Singh in a writ petition doubting the correctness of the decision of the Full Bench in Chandra Kumar Sah's case (AIR 1976 All 328) (FB) (supra) and urged that the hearing of the present writ petition be referred till the aforesaid referred case decided. With great respect to brother K. N. Singh. I wish to point out that all the points which have been raised by him in the referring order have been decided by the Full Bench. As I feel that the decision of the Full Bench covers the controversy squarely. I am not prepared to accede to this request of the petitioner's counsel.
Smt. Asha Devi Jauhari vs Smt. Sharda Devi And Ors. on 2 September, 1977
In Chandra Kumar Shah v. District Judge (1976)2 A.I.R. 95, a Full Bench of this Court has held that the rules framed under an enastment can only complement the provisions of the Act. They cannot supplement it. If the Act itself does not confer any power on the Controlling Authority to decide a dispute in regard to the right of a person claiming the gratuity the said power cannot be conferred by rules. Consequently if Rule 12 purports to confer jurisdiction on the Controlling Authority to decide even any dispute in regard to the right of the applicant to the amount of gratuity if such right is disputed and a counter-claim is made, the said rule to that extent would be ultra vires.
Harbans Lal vs Amar Nath on 31 December, 2002
A Full Bench of this Court construed this to mean to genuinely or 'in goodfaith' and conveying an idea of absence of any intent to deceive, vide Chander Kumar Sah v. District Judge Varanasi, 1976 RCR 274: AIR 1976 All.
The Commissioner Of Income Tax vs M/S Chemplast Sanmar Limited on 9 April, 2009
If a rule goes beyond what the section contemplates, the rule must yield to the statute (see Central Bank of India Vs. Their workmen, AIR 1960 SC 12; Chandra Kumar Sah Vs. District Judge, AIR 1976 All. 328(FB).
Ameer Chandra Jain vs Addl. District Judge & Others on 23 November, 2012
The two terms support each other but do not and should not be taken so as to give an artificial meaning thereto. It does not mean that a landlord must show that he is on the street without any shelter, whatsoever, so as to get success in establishing a ground under Section 21 (1) (a) of Act, 1972 about personal need. The connotation of the word "need" or "requirement" should not be unnecessarily or artificially stretched or expanded so much so that it may give an impression that a landlord cannot get a premises released unless his requirement is absolute. A Full Bench of this Court considered this aspect in Chandra Kumar Sah and another Vs. The District Judge and others AIR 1976 All. 328 and observed that the above words should be construed so as to meet a good faith or genuity in the claim set up by landlord, i.e. something conveys to an idea of not a mere desire or an intent to deceive. In other words, if there is an ulterior motive or purpose or fanciful whim, the ground set up under Section 21 (1) (a) of Act, 1972 would not be a bona fide one.
M/S Dev Prayag Paper Mill (Pvt.) vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others on 21 March, 2017
Next we would like to consider the submission that the reasonable security which a distribution licensee was entitled to demand from consumer was to be determined by regulation, based upon the use of the expression "as may be determined by regulation" in sub-section (1) of Section 47. In support of this submission, it was further urged that Section 181, which empowers the State Commission to frame regulations, itself has hedged by the use of the phrase "to carry out the provisions of the Act". Relying upon the principles enunciated in Chandra Kumar Shah & Anr Vs The District Judge & Ors, AIR 1976 (All) 328 and Bharathidasan University & Anr Vs All-India Council for Technical Education & Ors, (2001) 8 SCC 676, it was further submitted that power to frame such regulations or rules could not be read as being a source of authority to enact independent legislation or to impose obligations which were not otherwise envisaged by the Act. This contention was presumably raised and urged with reference to Clause 4.20 of the Supply Code, 2005. In our opinion, we need not examine this contention in detail for more than one reason. Firstly, as stated earlier, Supply Code, 2005 takes care of all the situations that could be taken care by regulations and, secondly, no such challenge is raised in the writ petitions. It is pertinent to note that the petitioners do not deny their liability to give reasonable security as contemplated by Section 47. In other words, they have not challenged demand of security as contemplated under sub-section (1) of Section 47 of the Act, 2003. Secondly, in all the writ petitions, there is no assertion to the effect that the imposition of additional security is bad or is rendered without authority of law on account of having been imposed without the framing of regulations. That apart, such a contention has been raised for the first time only in the course of oral submissions. We may also note, at the cost of repetition, that the challenge is specifically raised only to sub-clause (1) of Clause 4.20 of the Supply Code, 2005. Sub-clause (1) of the Supply Code, 2005 relates to a prohibition on a distribution licensee demanding security where a person requires the supply to be made through a pre payment meter subject to the distribution licensee providing a choice to a consumer to opt for supply through such a meter. This clearly indicates that there was no challenge to the demand of security or additional security, as observed earlier, on the ground that the State Commission has failed to frame regulations under Section 181 for the purposes of determining security. The entire challenge was based solely upon the contention that once the consumer had opted for supply through a pre payment meter, the distribution licensee consequently could not demand any security. Submission that Clause 4.20 of the Supply Code, 2005 places an additional obligation or fetter upon the right of a consumer, is also not liable to be countenanced, since the availability of pre payment meter is a prerequisite to the consumer exercising the option of obtaining supply through such a meter. We will deal with this further a little later. Clause 4.20 travels no further than the above position which evidently flows from sub-section (5). The linking of the exercise of an option by the consumer to the distribution licensee making available such meters is, therefore, not ultra vires Section 47. We proceed to record our further reasons for taking such a view insofar as Clause 4.20, to the extent it is under challenge, is concerned.
National Insurance Company Limited, ... vs Lavkush & Anr. on 21 March, 2017
82. A delegated/ subordinate legislation neither can create substantive rights and obligations nor can enhance efficacy or reduce normal functional ambit of principal legislation. A Full Bench of this Court in Chandra Kumar Sah and another Vs. The District Judge and others, AIR 1976 All 328 held that when a rule framing power is conferred upon State Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act, it does not give carte blanche to enact independent legislation. The expression "to carry out the purposes of the Act" means to enable its provisions to be effectively administered. They connote that rules are to be confined to the same field of operation as that marked out by Act itself. Court further observed in para 11 as under: