State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406, go to show that
they do not strictly speaking come into any conflict
with the observations of the majority made in Prem
Chand Garg case [Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr.,
AIR 1963 SC 996]. It is one thing to say that
"prohibitions or limitations in a statute" cannot come in
the way of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 to
do complete justice between the parties in the pending
"cause or matter" arising out of that statute, but quite
a different thing to say that while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 142, this Court can altogether
ignore the substantive provisions of a statute, dealing
with the subject and pass orders concerning an issue
which can be settled only through a mechanism
prescribed in another statute.
Learned counsel has also
relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
A.R. ANTULAY VS. R.S. NAYAK reported in AIR 1988 SC 1531 where
also the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held to the same effect as PREM
CHAND VS. EXCISE COMMISSIONER, U.P. (supra) case.
We are, therefore, unable to persuade ourselves
to agree with the observations of the Bench in V.C. Mishra's
case that the low laid down by the majority in Prem Chand
Garg's case is "no longer a good law".
As a matter of fact, the observations on which emphasis has been placed by us from the Union Carbide case [Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584] , A.R. Antulay case [A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 372] and Delhi Judicial Service Assn. v. State of Gujarat[Delhi Judicial Service Assn. v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406] , go to show that they do not strictly speaking come into any conflict with the observations of the majority made in Prem Chand Garg case [Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996] . It is one thing to say that "prohibitions or limitations in a statute" cannot come in the way of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 to do complete justice between the parties in the pending "cause or matter" arising out of that statute, but quite a different thing to say that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 142, this Court can altogether ignore the substantive provisions of a statute, dealing with the subject and pass orders concerning an issue which can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed in another statute.
We are, therefore, unable to persuade ourselves
to agree with the observations of the Bench in V.C. Mishra's
case that the low laid down by the majority in Prem Chand
Garg's case is "no longer a good law".