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Documents citing Gurnam Singh And Ors. vs Surjit Singh And Ors. on 5 August, 1974

Smt. Baljit Kaur And Ors. vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 18 December, 1991

In the case of Rajvendra and Ors. (supra), this court took the view that when the circular was issued by the State Government directing the District Establishment Committees to make appointment recruitment without there being any power conferred on the State Government, then it was held that such circular is beyond the scope of the provisions of the Rules and as such the same was struck down relying on the decision given in the case of Gurnam Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. 1971 (2) SLR 799. But now the State Government has realised this that the circular issued by the State Government has gone beyond the provisions of the Rules, therefore, the State Government has amended the Rule 17 and inserted the second proviso acquiring the power to give a direction to the District Establishment Committees that they shall make the selections on the basis of the marking formula laid down in the Circular. This acquisition of power by adding the proviso to Rule 17 does not amount to abdication of the essential legislative function of any authority. More-so, it was not out of place to mention here that there are thousands of vacancies of teachers Gr. III available in the various Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads. But there are no guidelines for recruitment to these vacancies for the various District Establishment Committees and a number of cases have come to the notice of this Court that bungling has been made in the recruitment of these teachers. It is common knowledge that at this level the situation is not very happy one and the recruitments have been made without due regard to the merit of the candidates and all sorts of allegations have been made against the recruitments. It is alleged that in the recruitment the political and other power has been playing a big role thereby making the recruitment to these posts arbitrary. Therefore, in such a back-ground when the situation is getting muddier and muddier and in order to avoid this kind of arbitrariness and large scale of bungling being made in the recruitment at this level a need has been felt by the State Government to lay down in arithmetic formula so as to avoid any kind of discretion with these District Establishment Committees. The formula which has been prepared by the Government which shall hereinafter be dealt with leaves little room for the discretion of the District Establishment Committees and lays down the marking system for each of the item so that the candidate can pin point the illegality or irregularity committed by the District Establishment Committee and it is also easier for the courts to scrutinise the same if any illegality is done by an District Establishment Committee the same can conveniently be led bare. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that such amendment of the proviso amounts to abdication of the essential legislative function.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 17 - Cited by 4 - A K Mathur - Full Document

Kheivl Singh vs Union Of India And Ors. on 30 May, 1975

THEnext case of Gurnam Singh v. State of Rajasthan and others (1971) 2 Slr 799 again has got no relevance. In this case the Supreme Court was faced with variance between the executive instructions and statutory rules providing for promotion on the basis of merits alone. The Supreme Court had held that the instructions which were the restrictions and limitations on the exercise of discretion of the selection committee, provided for in the statutory rules, are invalid. In the present case there are no statutory rules providing for selection. The executive instructions merely provide for Dpc to assist the appointing authority and the appointing authority can always overrule the decision of the Dpc for good reasons arrived at bonafide.
Delhi High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 0 - Y Dayal - Full Document

Indian Bank vs V.R. Venkataraman And Ors. on 17 December, 2003

Similarly, Ex.A-3 is the document showing the assets and liabilities of the 3rd defendant. Ex.A-4 is the similar document of the assets and liabilities of the 2nd defendant. It is mainly contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents that the original documents have been suppressed, which are material, and hence they have to be nonsuited for suppression of the important documents. He has placed reliance on the decisions reported in N. Eranna Rao v. Vitta Dodda Hanumanthappa Subbayya Setty and Co., , Brahmdeo Narain Singh v. Members of the Notified Area Committee, , and Gurnam Singh and Ors. v. Surjit Singh and Ors., . The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above decisions clearly indicate that adverse inference is justified to be drawn for the suppression of the documents when the party in possession does not produce the originals. The entire contentions of the respondents concentrated mainly on the discrepancies found in the said application. No doubt, originals are not produced. The plaintiff has not made out a case for letting in secondary evidence. It is not the case that originals are not available in their office. It is the case of the 2nd defendant that D.1 has applied for loan and the applications are filled up at their house. The 2nd defendant is the wife of Member of Parliament. The 3rd defendant is the Municipal Chairman. P.W.1 is an officer in respect of a particular branch. Is he capable of manipulating the documents in respect of politicians? Even according to the evidence of D.W.1 he stood as guarantor for others and suits were filed by other banks against him. If the cumulative effect of these circumstances including the pleadings have taken into consideration, it makes clear that the first defendant applied for loan and Defendants 2 and 3 in all probability offered security and handed over title deeds. Even according to the evidence of D.W.1 in February or March, 1986 the bank people obtained his signatures on certain documents making him to believe that his sister-in-law had applied for a loan. According to him he was doing wine business since two years and studied up to 6th class in Tamil medium. He did excise contracts for two years. He expressed his ignorance about the written statement filed by his sister-in-law. He did not give any instructions to his Counsel to file a memo adopting the written statement of D-2. His Counsel said not read over and explain the contents of written statement filed by him on his behalf. He admits that he stood as guarantor to Ramachandra Gupta for rupees ninety lakhs loan. He admits about receipt of legal notice from the plaintiff bank. The entire evidence goes to show that he signed on the documents in English. His complaint is that the documents are not read over to him at the time of taking signatures. It is too much to contend that he has signed on seeing the signatures of his sister-in-law, who is said to have applied for the loan. This cannot be believed since he is an arrack contractor and also stood as guarantor to others for obtaining loans from the banks. It is improbable for the bank officials to manipulate the documents in collusion with the first defendant. If the conduct of the defendants is judged, it is clear that notice has been issued by the bank under Exhibits A17 and A-19 and no reply has been given by the defendants. The said conduct or failure to give reply would only go to show that it was against the conduct of a prudent person to keep silent when the documents were manipulated and fraud was played. Moreover, the failure to initiate action immediately against the bank officials for manipulation will throw doubt about the different versions given out by D.W.1. The version of D.W.1 is not consistent when compared with the documentary evidence. No doubt the application forms cannot be looked into for failure to make out the case for admission of secondary evidence and there is no need to judge the said inadmissible documents. In the absence of production of originals, one cannot make a cryptic analysis of those documents. Moreover, the 3rd Defendant has adopted the statement of the 2nd defendant and she has admitted in her own pleadings that the documents were executed at her house and the loan application was presented at the house. In the light of the said evidence, it can safely be taken that the first defendant has approached the bank for loan and Defendants 2 and 3 stood as guarantors.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 23 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Part-Iiia

Radha Sunder Datta vs. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim: AIR 1959 SC 24; Anayatullah vs. Commr. of Muslim Wakfs: 1991 Suppl(1) SCC 396; T.N. State Education Board vs. N. Raju Reddi: 1996(4) SCC 551; Gen Court Martial vs. Aniltej Singh Dhaliwal: 1998(1)SCC 756; Ishwar Das Jain vs. Sohan Lal: 2000(1) SCC 434; Zahuri Shah vs. Dwarka Prasad: 1966(2) SCWR 184; Gurnam Singh vs. Surjit Singh: 1975(4) SCC 404; Mohinder vs. State of Haryana 1974(4) SCC 285; Bhireshwara Swami Varu Temple vs. Pedapudi: 1973(2)SCC 261; Fort Gloster Industries vs.Sethia Mercantile:
Law Commission Report Cites 359 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Srinivasan Raman vs State Of Gujarat & on 15 March, 2013

In view of the observation by Hon ble Apex Court in case of Dharmatma Singh (supra) and the observations by Hon ble Apex Court in case between Raj Kapoor (supra) and also in the decision in case between Joseph Salvaraj A. (supra) and also having regard to the facts, aspects and issues involved in the matter, the Court is of the view that these are the cases wherein it would not be appropriate to exercise power under Section 482 at this stage but the petitioners ought to take out appropriate proceedings before learned trial Court.
Gujarat High Court Cites 37 - Cited by 0 - K M Thaker - Full Document
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