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Documents citing Queen-Empress vs Dalip And Ors. on 18 February, 1896

State vs Yamanappa Limbaji Pandhare on 7 December, 1955

Finally, the Sub-Inspector was asked by the District Superintendent of Police's order dated July 29, 1954, to take "legal action" against the accused, and that order also was given to Mr. Salvi. Thus, there is no doubt that when Mr. Salvi on August 11, 1954, went to the accused's room to execute the District Superintendent of Police's order, he went there under colour of his office as a Sub-Inspector attached to the 'A' Division Police Station, Sholapur. It is thus clear that, when Mr. Salvi went to the accused's room to enforce the District Superintendent of Police's order dated July 29, 1954, he was acting in good faith and under colour of his office. Accordingly, the principle of Queen Empress v. Dalip and Emperor v. Madho would apply and in any event the accused would be liable to be convicted under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code. The fine imposed by the learned Magistrate upon the accused could also be imposed under Section 323.
Bombay High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Court Of India In The Judgment Titled As ... vs . State Of on 25 April, 2018

12.3. It is without any doubt that all of the three said police officials were posted as Constables in PS Seemapuri, though they were assigned different duties. Further, it has nowhere been disputed by Accused Praveen Kumar that all the three police officials were on duty at the time of the incident. Another parameter which may be taken into account while considering whether PW2 and PW6 were on duty or not is whether if they had rushed for the help of a common man would their discharging of duty still be under question? The answer is certainly in negative. 12.4. To understand the meaning of the term discharging of duties better, a judgment from the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad titled as Queen-Empress vs. Dalip And Ors [(1896) ILR 18 All 246] is vital to be perused wherein it has been held that:
Delhi District Court Cites 19 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Rameshwar vs Emperor on 1 May, 1934

4. The next ground which was argued did not appear in the grounds of revision but was argued before the lower Court. This was that the names of the constables who went to make the arrest should have been endorsed on the requisition. There is no provision in Section 56 for any such procedure. That section states that the document - an order in writing - shall be "delivered" to the officer required to make the arrest, and further in Section 54, ninthly, it is provided that a police officer may arrest any person for whose arrest a requisition has been received from another police officer. Both these sections specify exactly what are the particulars which are required in the requisition but they do not specify that one of the particulars required is the name of the officer making the arrest. There is therefore no section which lays down that there must be such an endorsement on a requisition. Learned Counsel referred to a ruling reported in Queen Empress v. Dalip (1896) 18 All. 246. That was a case in which a Magistrate had issued a warrant under Section 114, Criminal P.C., for the arrest of Dalip and warrant was copied in the thana and a copy was given to certain police officers to execute as a warrant. In view of the provisions in Section 77, Criminal P.C., and other sections of the Code it was held that it was not sufficient for the police officers effecting the arrest to be in possession of merely a copy and not of the original document. In the present case there is no such question as the police officers who went to make the arrest were in possession of the original requisition and not a copy. I find nothing irregular in tke circumstances of the arrest. This application in revision is therefore dismissed. The applicant must surrender to his bail and undergo the rest of his sentence.
Allahabad High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Badri Gope And Ors. vs Emperor on 27 October, 1925

12. As to the effect of Section 99 of the Indian Penal Code a clear explanation, has been given by Sir John Edge, C. J., and Burkitt, J., in the case of Queen-Empress v. Dalip 18 A. 246 : A.W.N. (1896) 48 : 8 Ind. Deo (N.S.) 871, If in the present case the petitioners had assaulted or caused grievous hurt to the peon, under Section 99 they would not have been, able to plead the right of private defence of property as a justification, because the peon was acting in good faith under colour of his office, though his attachment of the cattle may not have been justifiable by law.
Patna High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Emperor vs Mukhtar Ahmad And Anr. on 24 March, 1915

1. Mukhtar Ahmad and Amir Ahmad have been, convicted by a Magistrate on the charge of having caused hurt to an Excise Inspector, one Mr. D.D.C. Das, and certain constables in the discharge of their duties as public servants, and have, been sentenced, to imprisonment and fine. The conviction and the sentences have been affirmed by the Sessions Judge on appeal. It seems to me that the courts below have assumed, but cannot be said to have judicially determined, that the persons who were hurt were acting at the time in the discharge of their duties as public servants. They have dealt with the plea of private defence set up on behalf of the accused persons and have excluded that plea by reason of the provisions of Section 99 of the Indian Penal Code. This finding implies that the Excise Inspector and the constables were resisted at a time when they, being public servants, were acting in good faith under colour of their office. That is not the same thing as a finding that they were acting in the-discharge of their duties as public servants. The distinction' was pointed out by a Bench of this Court in Queen-Empress v. Dalip (1896) I.L.R. 18 All. 246. So far as my examination of the record goes I do. not find myself able to arrive at the conclusion that the Excise Inspector and the constables were acting in the discharge of their duties as public servants. Mr. Das, who was engaged in searching the house of Mukhtar Ahmad, accused, on suspicion that he right find there cocaine, committed a number of irregularities in conducting this search. He had no warrant authorising him to make this search; he brought with him only one search witness (Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), and nothing in Sections 102/48 of the same Code justified him in directing a constable to scale the outer wall and effect a burglarious entry into the house. Following the precedent set by the reported decision of this Court, which I have already quoted, I set aside the conviction of Mukhtar Ahmad, and Amir Ahmad, under Section 332 of the Indian Penal Code and in lieu thereof, convict them of the offence of causing hurt under Section 323 of the same Code. I reduce the sentence to one of imprisonment for such period as they may have already undergone, together with a fine of Rs. 15 each. Any fine in excess of this amount which has been paid by applicants will be refunded. The accused need not surrender and their bail-bonds are discharged.
Allahabad High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Madho And Anr. vs Emperor on 13 August, 1917

In the case of Queen-Empress v. Dalip 18 A. 240: A. W. N. (1896) 48: 8 Ind. Dec. (N. S.) 871. which was in some respects similar to the present case, it was held that the words "'in the discharge of his" duty as such public servant" in Section 332 of the Indian Penal Code mean in the discharge of a duty imposed by law on such public servant in the particular case. If the order issued by the District Magistrate in August 1914 ceased to have effect after the expiry of two months from the date of issue, the constable in carrying out the order could not be said to have been acting in the discharge of a duty imposed by law on him. The learned Government Pleader has referred to Section 23 of the Police Act (V of 1861) and has contended that it was the duty of the constable to obey and carry out the order issued by the District Magistrate, no matter whether that order was justified by law or not. The answer to this contention is afforded by the language of Section 23 itself, which provides that it shall be the duty of every Police Officer promptly to obey and execute all orders and warrants lawfully issued to him by any competent authority. The word "lawfully" governs both "orders" and "warrants", so that an order which a subordinate Police Officer is bound to obey must be an order. which was lawfully issued. If the order passed by the District Magistrate could not be lawfully issued by him, it was not the duty of the constable to obey that order. Therefore when he was carrying out that, order, he cannot be said to have been discharging his duty as a public servant.
Allahabad High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Emperor vs Madho And Anr. on 13 August, 1917

Under paragraph 5 of the same Section no order passed under the Section shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof, unless in certain cases the Local Government by notification in the official Gazette otherwise directs. If the order in the present case was made under Section 144, it ceased to have operation after the expiry of two months from the date of it. It has not been stated or shown on behalf of the Crown that this order was repeated at any subsequent time, and therefore I must take it that it had ceased to have force at the time when the offence in the present case was committed. In the case of Queen. Empress v. Dalip , which was in some respects similar to the present case, it was held that the words "in the discharge of his duty as such public servant" in Section 332 of the Indian Penal Code mean in the discharge of a duty imposed by law on such public servant in the particular case. If the order issued by the District Magistrate in August, 1914, ceased to have effect after the expiry of two months from the date of issue the constable in carrying out the order could not be said to have been acting in the discharge of a duty imposed by law on him. The learned Government Pleader has referred to Section 23 of the Police Act (No. V of 1861) and has contended that it was the duty of the constable to obey and carry out the order issued by the District Magistrate, no matter whether that order was justified by law or not. The answer to this is afforded by the language of Section 23 itself which provides that it shall be the duty of every police officer promptly to obey (1896) I. L. R., 18 All., 246. and execute all orders and warrants lawfully issued to him by any competent authority. The word "lawfully" governs both "orders" and "warrants," so that an order which a subordinate police officer is bound to obey must be an order which was lawfully issued. If the order passed by the District Magistrate could not be lawfully issued by him, it was not the duty of the constable to obey that order. Therefore when he was carrying out that order he cannot be said to have been discharging his duty as a public servant.
Allahabad High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Mukhtar Ahmad And Anr. vs Emperor on 24 March, 1915

1. Mukhtar Ahmad and Amir Ahmad have been convicted by a Magistrate on the charge of having caused hurt to an Excise Inspector, one Mr. D.D.C. Das, and certain constables in the discharge of their duties as public servants, and Lave been sentenced to imprisonment and fine. The conviction and the sentences Lave been aflirmed by the Sessions Judge on appeal. It seems to me that tLe Courts below have assumed, but cannot be said to Lave judicially determined, that the persons who were hurt were acting at the time in the discharge of their duties as public servants. They have dealt with the plea of private defence set up on behalf of the accused persons, and have excluded that plea by reason of the provisions of Section 99 of the Indian Penal Code. This finding implies that the Excise Inspector and the constables were resisted at a time when they, being public servants, were acting in good faith under colour of their office. That is not the same thing as a finding that they were acting in the discharge of their duties as public servants. The distinction was pointed out by a Bench of this Court in Queen-Empress v. Dalip 18 A. 246 : A.W. N (1896) 48. So far as my examination of the record goes, I do not find myself able to arrive at the conclusion that the Excise Inspector and the constables were acting in the discharge of their duties as public servants. Mr. Das, who was engaged in searching the house of Mukhtar Ahmad, accused, on suspicion that he might find there cocane, committed a number of irregularities in conducting this search. He had no warrant authorising him to make this search : he brought with him only one search witness (section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), and nothing in Sections 102/48 of the same Code justified him in directing a constable to scale the outer wall and effect a burglarious entry into the house. Following the precedent set by the reported decision of this Court, which I have already quoted, I set aside the conviction of Mukhtar Ahmad and Amir Ahmad tinder Section 332 of the Indian Penal Code and in lieu thereof convict them of the offence of causing hurt under Section 323 of the same Code. I reduce the sentence to one of imprisonment for such period as they may have already undergone, together with a fine of Rs. 15 each. Any fine in excess of this amount which har; been paid by the applicants will be refunded. The accused need not surrender and their bail-bonds are discharged.
Allahabad High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 1 - Full Document
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