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Smt. Sadhna Agrawal vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 3 January, 2017

The guidance on the question as to when an old statute can apply to new state of affairs not in contemplation when the statute was enacted was furnished by Lord Wilberforce in his dissenting speech in Royal College of Nursing of 7 McCartan Turkington Breen (a firm) v. Times Newspapers Ltd., (2000) 4 All ER 913, p. 926 (HL) (LORD STEYN) 8 Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxminarayan Chopra, AIR 1962 SC 159, p. 162 : 1962 (3) SCR 146 9 Randal N. Grahm, A Unified Theory of Statutory Interpretation, (2002) 23 Statute Law Review 91, p. 134 10 Birmingham City Council v. Oakley, (2001) 1 All ER 385, p. 396 (HL) W.P.(S)No.4927/2016 Page 12 of 24 the U.K. v. Dept. of health and Social Security 11. Which is now treated as authoritative12. Lord Wilberforce said: "In interpreting an Act of Parliament it is proper, and indeed necessary, to have regard to the state of affairs existing, and known by Parliament to be existing, at the time. It is a fair presumption that Parliament's policy or intention is directed to that state of affairs. Leaving aside cases of omission by inadvertence, this being not such a case when a new state of affairs, or a fresh set of facts bearing on policy, comes into existence, the courts have to consider whether they fall within the parliamentary intention. They may be held to do so, if they fall within the same genus of facts as those to which the expressed policy has been formulated. They may also be held to do so if there can be detected a clear purpose in the legislation which can only be fulfilled if the extension is made. How liberally these principles may be applied must depend on the nature of the enactment, and the strictness or otherwise of the words in which it has been expressed. The courts should be less willing to extend expressed meaning if it is clear that the Act in question was designed to be restrictive or circumscribed in its operation rather than liberal or permissive. They will be much less willing to do so where the new subject matter is different in kind or dimension from that for which the legislation was passed. In any even there is one course which the courts cannot take under the law of this country: they cannot fill gaps; they cannot by asking the question, 'What would Parliament have done in this current case, not being one in contemplation, if the facts had been before it?' attempt themselves to supply the answer, if the answer is not to be found in the terms of the Act itself13".
Chattisgarh High Court Cites 34 - Cited by 0 - S Agrawal - Full Document
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