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Documents citing Yakub Ismailbhai Patel vs State Of Gujarat on 31 August, 2004

State vs . Dharamvir @ Sanju Etc. on 11 March, 2020

19. There is no reason brought forth by the accused I either in their statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C or any substantive DE for the complainant to falsely implicate the accused persons and his sole testimony is sufficient , if otherwise reliable to hold the conviction of the accused persons. It has been observed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Yakub Ismailbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat 2004 CRI. L.J. 4205 "The legal position in respect of the testimony of a solitary eye­witness is well­settled in a catena of judgments in as much as this Court has always reminded that in order to pass conviction upon it, such a testimony must be of a nature which inspires the confidence of the Court.
Delhi District Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Jiya Lal vs State Of U.P. on 19 May, 2020

21. So far the contention regarding delay in lodging the first information report is concerned, it is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that mere delay in lodging the FIR may not prove fatal in all cases, but in given circumstances of a case, delay in lodging the FIR can be one of the factor which corrode the credibility of the prosecution version. Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be a ground by itself for throwing away the entire prosecution case. The court has to seek an explanation for delay and check the truthfulness of the version put toward. If the court is satisfied then the case of the prosecution cannot fail on this ground alone. (vide Jitender Kumar vs State Of Haryana and Others 2012 (78) ACC 70, the apex court referred the case laws of Yakub Ismailbhai Patel vs State Of Gujarat (2004) 12 SCC 229 and Shub Shanti Services v Manjula S. Agrawal and others (2000) 5 SCC 30) In Chunni Lal Vs. State of U.P. 2010 (70) ACC 583, the apex court observed that the delay which was caused due to reasonable factual situation cannot destroy the prosecution case nor creates any suspicion with regard to the prosecution case.
Allahabad High Court Cites 32 - Cited by 0 - R B Singh - Full Document

Rajesh @ Sarkari vs The State Of Haryana on 3 November, 2020

34 The precedent which we have reviewed above would thus indicate that there is no inflexible rule which requires the prosecution to examine a ballistics 38 examiner in every case where a murder is alleged to have been caused with the use of a fire arm. The decision in Mohinder Singh (1953) has since been explained in Gurucharan Singh (1963) by a co-ordinate Bench. Thereafter, the principle which has emerged from the line of authority which we have noticed earlier, is that the failure of the prosecution in a given case, to examine a ballistics expert has to be assessed bearing in mind the overall context of the nature of the evidence which is available. When direct evidence of an unimpeachable character is available and the nature of injuries is consistent with the direct evidence, the examination of a ballistics expert need not be insisted upon as a condition to the prosecution proving its case. On the other hand, where direct evidence is not available or there is doubt in regard to the nature of that evidence, the failure to examine the ballistic examiner would assume significance. In the present case, the weapons of offence were alleged to have been recovered in the context of the investigation in another FIR (FIR No.311 dated 19 May 2006). The weapons were marked as W/1 and W/2 in that case. The third FSL report arising out of the investigation in FIR No. 781 in the present case does not deal with weapon W/1 at all. Moreover, as we have noted earlier, the third FSL report wrongly attributes weapon W/2 to accused Rajesh alias Sarkari. Whether or not weapon W/2 had been made available to the ballistics examiner was a matter which could have been explained if the prosecution were to lead his evidence. The prosecution cited a ballistics examiner as a witness and yet, did not lead his evidence. This must be juxtaposed in light of the fact that the eye-witness account of PW4 and PW5 is not free from doubt. We have also analysed the evidence of PW4 and PW5 and have noted that there is a grave 39 element of doubt as to whether they were witnesses at the scene of occurrence. In this context, the Court must therefore hold that the discrepancies which have been noticed in the FSL report could have best been explained by the authors of FSL reports both in FIR No. 311/2006 and FIR No. 781/2006. This not having been done, the accused would, in our view, be entitled to the benefit of doubt. 35 The appellants have urged that PW4 was not an eye-witness as he had deposed that Sandeep was fired at from a distance of 4-5 feet which is not supported by the medical evidence. They urge that the blackening of a few firearm injuries on the deceased’s body is conclusive proof that the firing must have been done from a closer distance, which could be less than 2 feet. 16 Since the depositions of PW4 and PW5 suffer from several material contradictions and improvements; and the non-examination of the ballistics expert in light of serious controversies in the FSL reports has cast a shadow on the prosecution’s story, we need not deal with the additional argument on blackening of injuries. Refusal to undergo Test Identification Parade 17 36 The prosecution has submitted that an adverse inference should be drawn against the appellants for refusing to submit themselves to a TIP. Before we deal with the circumstances in which the appellants declined a TIP, it becomes essential to scrutinize the precedent from this Court bearing on the subject. A line of precedent of this Court has dwelt on the purpose of conducting a TIP, the source of the authority of the investigator to do so, the manner in which these 16 Relies on (2016) 2 SCC 607 17 TIP 40 proceedings should be conducted, the weight to be ascribed to identification in the course of a TIP and the circumstances in which an adverse inference can be drawn against the accused who refuses to undergo the process. The principles which have emerged from the precedents of this Court can be summarized as follows:
Supreme Court of India Cites 33 - Cited by 93 - D Y Chandrachud - Full Document
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