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Deputy Commissioner Of Commercial ... vs Hameed Trading Company on 20 December, 1972

In view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kannappa Mudaliar v. State of Madras [1968] 21 S.T.C. 41, which is binding on us, the learned counsel for the petitioner in T.C. No. 411 of 1969 did not advance any argument in respect of the ground raised by him in the petition that coconut is an oil-seed. It has been held in that case that coconut is not an oil-seed within the meaning of item 6(a) of the Second Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The only question that remains to be considered in these tax cases and writ petitions is therefore whether coconut is a fresh fruit or vegetable within the meaning of those words in the exemption made in the notification of Government.
Madras High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 3 - V Ramaswami - Full Document

Karuppasamy Pandian vs The Inspector Of Police on 14 June, 2021

7. A Division Bench of this Court, in the case of M.Kannan vs. State reported in 2017 (2) MLJ (Crl.) 1, after referring to several Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held that the trial without legal assistance cannot be regarded as reasonable, fair and just and remanded the matter back to the trial Court so as to afford sufficient opportunity to the accused to cross examine the witness and to examine the witnesses in defence. The relevant https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ 4/10 Crl.A.(MD)No.92 of 2021 portion of the Judgment reads as under:

Gian Chand Ramji Das vs Sales Tax Officer, Ward No. 33, New ... on 29 March, 1985

26. In fairness to Mr. R. C. Chawla, the learned counsel for the petitioner, I may say that a number of authorities have been referred to laying down principles for construing fiscal legislation. Referring to the ratio of the precedents, he urges that the Courts in interpreting a taxing statute will not be justified in adding words thereto so as to make out some presumed object of the legislature. It cannot proceed to make goods the deficiencies, if there be any in the statute. It is settled law that in case of doubt, that interpretation of the taxing statute which is beneficial to the taxpayer must be adopted. If two views are possible then the view which is favorable to the assessed must be accepted while construing the provisions of a taxing statute. In considering a taxing Act, the Court is not justified in straining the language. (State of Bombay v. A & A Industries Corporation [1961] 12 STC 122 (SC), State of Punjab v. Jullundur Vegetables Syndicate [1966] 17 STC 326 (SC), Alladi Venkateswarlu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh [1978] 41 STC 394 (SC), Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kulu Valley Transport Co. Ltd. , Kannappa Mudaliar v. State of Madras [1968] 21 STC 41 (Mad), Rajpur Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [1972] 29 STC 177 (Pat) (FB), Commissioner of Income-tax v. Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1975] 98 ITR 78 (P & H), etc.) These principles stated in have been well settled and are hardly even doubted. It is in the application of those principles that one has to bear in mind that though the benefit of the ambiguity must go to the subject and the taxing provision must receive a strict construction, "that is not the same thing as saying that a taxing provision should not receive a reasonable construction". If the Administrator feels that the modification of the rate at 2 per cent. should not be available to the dealers in woolen carpet yarn, then he must step in as was done by the State of U.P., but till then the petitioner is entitled to get the benefit of the tax relief.
Delhi High Court Cites 29 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Kishinchand Chellaram And Ors. vs The Joint Commercial Tax Officer And ... on 25 August, 1967

16. After having thus gathered the necessary material to find out the true import, content and meaning of the expression " artificial silk " and from the interpretation given to it by the trade, experts, Governmental departments, as also statutory reference thereto ever since 1934, it is very difficult to accept the contention of the Revenue that artificial silk cannot mean and include the products under consideration. No doubt, departmental ruling by themselves cannot be a guide to Courts to find out the true meaning of words. But the meaning which the trade, Government officials and statutes, attribute to the words 'artificial silk ' must be taken to be the ordinary and popular meaning of the same. It cannot be denied, and it is equally undeniable, that the above group of personnel are persons conversant with the subject-matter and therefore the meaning they have given to the expression 'artificial silk ' should be taken to be the meaning which should be attributed to it. From the opinion expressed in well-known journals and by experts, it is clear that though Terrylene, Terene, Decron, Nylon etc., have petro-chemical as its base, it is nevertheless a polyster fabric which is certainly synthetic fibre and therefore is classifiable as artificial silk. We have recently held in Kannappa Mudaliar v. State of Madras Since that the popular understanding test prevails over others whilst appreciating the real purport and intent of words used in popular parlance and engaged in a taxing statute. We have also observed that;
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Mahendrakumar Iswarlal And Co., ... vs Commercial Tax Officer, North Arcot And ... on 7 March, 1967

(2) On the view we are inclined to take it seems to us to be unnecessary to decide the question whether what is levied under S. 18 of Madras Act 23 of 1959 is a tax or fee. There are two Bench decisions of this Court, Kutti Keya v. State of Madras and Kannappa Mudaliar v. State of Madras, W.P. No. 711 of 1964 (Mad) and connected petitions, which have expressed different views. The former decision took the view that the levy under S. 18 was in the nature of sales tax though it went into a separate fund called the Market Committee Fund under S. 20 and was to be appropriated to certain purposes specified by the enactment as it stood then. The section has since been amended in 1955, and, as amended, it expressly provides that the market committee shall levy a cess by way of sales tax on any notified agricultural produce bought or sold in the notified market area t a rate not exceeding fifty naye paise for every hundred rupees of the aggregate amount for which the notified agricultural produce is bought or sold whether for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration. The section as it stands now also says that the cess levied under the section shall be subject to the provisions of Art. 286 of the Constitution. Section 20 provides for a separate market committee fund into which the cess levied under S. 18 is to go and S. 21 directs that the market committee fund shall be expended for only the purposes specified in that section. With reference to these provisions, in the latter decision, this Court was of the view that impost under S. 18 was in the nature of a fee.
Madras High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

R.Rathakrishnan vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 30 November, 2011

The validity of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Produce Madras Act, 1959 (Act23 of 1959) was upheld by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in Kannappa Mudaliar Vs. State of Madras (1969 I MLJ 212). Subsequently, the 1959 Act was modified as the "Tamil Nadu Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act 1987 (Hereinafter referred "the said Act") and Tamil Nadu Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Rules 1991 (hereinafter referred as "the said Rules") and brought into force from 01.02.1991.
Madras High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 0 - V Dhanapalan - Full Document

Devendra Kumar vs State on 11 November, 2021

In support of this contention, Shri Choudhary, placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the High Court of Madras in the case of M. Kannan vs. State : 2018 CriLJ 116 and urged that the principles of fair trial have been violated and hence, these witnesses be recalled so that the effective cross-examination can be conducted from them on behalf of the accused Tersem Singh.
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur Cites 4 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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