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Documents citing H.H. Sir Sayaji Rao, Gaekwar Of Baroda vs Madhavrao Raghunathrao Dhavale on 16 July, 1928

Dundoobai Anandrao Deshmukh vs Vithalrao Anandrao Deshmukh on 8 August, 1935

I think, however, it is clear that the decision in Sir Sayaji Rao v. Madhavrao is based to some extent on the special rules applicable to saranjams and not to other inams, and Sir Charles Fawcett in his judgment in that case at pages 1471 and 1472 recognised that there may be a distinction between the two kinds of grants. The law which has been consistently laid down as to ordinary watans is that the effect of resumption is no more than this; Government levies the full assessment, and the right to hold free of assessment or at a reduced assessment is lost.
Bombay High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Kartar Singh vs Sultan Singh Partap Singh on 12 August, 1966

In Sayaji Rao v. Madhavrao Raghunathrao, AIR 1929 Bom 14 which is another case relied upon by Mr. Chopra, the plaintiff claimed deduction of the time taken by him for obtaining permission to file a suit against a defendant against whom suit could be filed only after obtaining permission under Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was observed that the plaintiff could have applied very much earlier than he did and that no deduction could be allowed for that period for the purpose of limitation.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 3 - A N Grover - Full Document

Narendrasingji Ranjitsingji vs Udesinghji on 4 February, 1946

In Shrimant Sayaji Maharaj Gaikwar of Baroda v. Madhavrao (1928) I.L.R. 53 Bom. 12, S.C. 30 Bom. L.R. 1463, where a suit was filed against the ruling Chief of the Baroda State after the plaintiffs had obtained a certificate under Section 86 of the Civil Procedure Code, it was contended that the plaintiffs were entitled to deduct a period of four years, three months and twenty-one days as time required to obtain the said certificate from the period between the date given as the date of the cause of action, when the plaintiffs had been dispossessed, and the date of the suit. This contention was disallowed on the ground that the argument that the plaintiffs were obliged to obtain the certificate before filing the suit cannot prevail against the express provisions of Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act, any more than principles of equity can prevail against the provisions of statutory law such as Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act and Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. It seems to us difficult to say that this case was wrongly decided. A provision regarding the filing of a certificate before legal action can be instituted or continued, similar to the provision under the Pensions Act under consideration, is to be found in Section 17 of the Court of Wards Act, Bombay I of 1905, which says that on the publication of a notice under Section 14, Sub-section (1), no proceeding in execution of any decree against the Government ward or his property shall be instituted or continued until the decree-holder files a certificate from the Court of Wards that the decree-claim has been duly submitted, or until the expiration of one month from the date of receipt by the Court of Wards of a written application for such certificate, accompanied by a certified copy of the decree; and it seems to us that the argument of Mr. Thakor that such a provision should be regarded as one affecting the jurisdiction of the Court rather than as one affecting limitation should be upheld. It has been pointed out again and again by the Privy Council, and recently in Genera (1940) 43 Bom.
Bombay High Court Cites 51 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Daulatrao Malojirao vs Government Of Bombay on 17 March, 1944

18. The initial question, which falls for determination in this appeal, arises from the assertion made by the learned Government Pleader that the Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain this suit by reason of Section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876. The Government Pleader relies on the case of Shrimant Sayaji Maharaj Gaikwar of Baroda v. Madhavrao (1928) I.L.R. 53 Bom. 12 : S.C. 30 Bom. L.R. 1463 and in particular on the passage at p. 24, which is as follows:
Bombay High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Turner Morrison And Co., Ltd vs Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd on 9 March, 1972

The same view was expressed in that case by Warrington L.J. and Atkin L.J. A division bench of the Bombay High Court in Sayaji Rao Gaikwar of Baroda v. Madhavrao Raghunathrao(3) dealing with the scope of s. 13 of the Limitation Act 1908 which is identical with the resent s. 15(5) held that s. 13 must be read so, as to avoid the obvious absurdity that arises if such corporate bodies (1) [1924] 2. Ch. 201.
Supreme Court of India Cites 18 - Cited by 61 - K S Hegde - Full Document

Ramchandra Ganpatrao Dalvi vs Lakshmibai Shamrao Kalkundri on 1 October, 1937

For this proposition he has relied on Sir Sayaji Rao v. Madhavrao That was a case in which the Raja of Satara had granted a saranjam to the Gaekwar of Baroda by a sanad and there was a subsequent grant out of the same lands by the Gaekwar of Baroda to one Limbaji as a new inam. With great respect, we have found it difficult to follow the line of reasoning at pages 1471 and 1472 which is relied on, as it is not easy to discover which grant is being referred to. Reference is first made to Divan Bahadur Rao's contention that the grant contained the expression " a new inam," and that the word " inam " did not mean " saranjam." Thereafter Mr. Justice Fawcett has come to the conclusion that the grant to the Gaekwar must be held to be one of saranjami. In this case it further appears that the Gaekwar had accepted the position that the grant made by himself was a saranjam grant and ultimately Mr. Justice Fawcett appears to have decided the point mainly on the ground that primarily it was for the Government to determine in any particular case of this kind whether a political tenure such as the saranjam existed. We think that this case is no useful guide to the question whether a saranjam can be created by the saranjamdar. It appears that in the present case all that the Inam Commission recognised was that the grant by the saranjamdars, i.e. the Dalvis, was an inam or a sarva inam, but as subject to the condition of forfeiture in case of the extinction of the Herekar family. It cannot be said that the plaintiff's family were grantees from Government or that the inam was created by Government. A saranjam, which is a political inam, appears by its very nature to be incapable of being created except by Government or the sovereign power alone. It does not appear from the decision of the Inam Commissioner, which must be the basis of the appellant's contention, that the Inam Commissioner even recognised the position of Dalvis as saranjamdars. All that the decision stated was that the plaint village was a part of the saranjam of Herekar and that it could not exist beyond the lifetime of the Here saranjam.
Bombay High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 4 - Full Document
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