Limited v. State of Mysore) and [1994] 93 STC 561 (Tungabhadra Sugar Works Ltd. v. State of Karnataka) the apex Court approved the view taken by the Karnataka High Court on the basis of the nature of the contract in those cases as necessitating and justifying the entire amount paid being treated as price of the sugarcane supplied since the statute does not prohibit any agreement between the grower and the purchaser for the payment of a higher price for the sugarcane by the purchaser.
Ltd. v. State of Mysore [1963] 14 S.T.C. 139, a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court held that excise duty paid by a buyer who purchases tobacco from a dealer for a specified amount under a contract of sale, which did not have any stipulation about the payment of duty, is not part of the price and cannot be included in the purchase turnover of the buyer and such duty is part of the price only if it forms part of the consideration for the sale.
26. A Division Bench of this Court has, in the case of Mokenzies Ltd. v. State of Mysore ((1978) 1 Kant LJ 57: (A IR 1978 Kant 89)) while dealing with the question of interference under S. 115 in relation to an application for leave to revoke the authority of the arbitrator under S. 5, Arbitration Act, 1940, adverted to the decision of the Supreme Court in . In regard to the contention raised by the Advocate General that the case was not a fit one for interference by the High Court under S. 115, CPC on the ground that the discretion vested in the Court below had been exercised in a particular manner, the Bench held as follows:
In the connected matters arising out of the judgment of the Karnataka High Court similar Writ Petitions filed by the purchasers of sugarcane were dismissed. The two decisions of the Karnataka High Court which require reference are Pandavapura Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane (P.) Ltd. v. State of Mysore (1973) 32 STC 104 and Tungabhadra Sugar Works Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (1994) 93 STC 561. In Pandavapura (1973 STC 104 (Mys) it was found proved as a fact that the substance of the transaction between the purchaser and the cane growers was for payment of the enhanced price for the sugarcane supplied and the amount paid in excess of the statutory price was paid under the contract and not either as ex gratia payment or towards advance. In that situation the entire amount paid was treated as the price. In our opinion, the nature of contract in that case being such, the entire amount paid had to be treated as price of the sugarcane supplied since the statute does not prohibit an agreement between the grower and the purchaser for payment of a higher price for the sugarcane by the purchaser. In the later decision in Tungabhadra (1994) 93 STC 561 (KAR) also it is noticed that there is no prohibition against the parties agreeing for the payment of a higher price of sugarcane. In that situation no doubt the entire amount paid has to be treated as the price of the sugarcane. However, as indicated earlier, for treating the entire amount paid by the purchaser as the price of sugarcane supplied, it must be found proved as a fact that the higher price including the excess amount was paid as the price of sugarcane under an agreement between the grower and the purchaser irrespective of a lower amount being fixed as the aggregate of the price fixation under Clauses 3 and 5-A of the Control Order. Unless a clear finding to that effect is recorded, the amount paid by the purchaser in excess of the aggregate of the minimum price fixed under Clause 3 and the additional price fixed under Clause 5-A, as a part of the amount paid as advance prior to fixation of the additional price under Clause 5-A as a part of the amount paid as advance prior to Fixation of the additional price under Clause 5-A, cannot be treated automatically as a part of the total price of sugarcane. In matters arising out decisions of the Karnataka High Court, this aspect has not been adverted to and the Writ Petitions have been dismissed without going into this question. The Karnataka matters have, therefore, to be remitted to the High Court for a fresh decision on the above basis."
Ltd. v. State of Mysore [1963] 14 S.T.C. 175 (S.C.), all rendered after the enactment of the Central Sales Tax Act, and held that a sale being by the definition, transfer of property, becomes taxable under Section 3(a) if the movement of goods from one State to another is under a covenant or incident of the contract of sale, and the property in the goods passes to the purchaser otherwise than by transfer of documents of title when the goods are in movement from one State to another, that sales in which property in the goods passes during the movement of the goods from one State to another by transfer of documents of title thereto come within the purview of Section 3(b) and that the two kinds of sales are distinct and different and are mutually exclusive. As per the above decision while the essence of the inter-State sale or purchase under Section 3(a) is that the inter-State movement of goods springs from the terms of the contract of sale or purchase or is incidental thereto or arises out of it, the movement of goods not necessarily being preceded by an agreement of sale or purchase, the. inter-State sale or purchase under Section 3(b) takes place during the movement of the goods from one State to another by transfer of doctiments of title to the goods, and the dividing line between sales or purchases under Section 3(a) and those under Section 3(b) is that in the former the movement of goods is under the contract of sale or purchase but in the latter the contract comes into existence after commencement but before termination of the inter-State movement of the goods. In both the classes of inter-State sales or purchases under Section 3(a) and 3(b) what is contemplated is completed sales though how the sales or purchases under Section 3(a) and 3(b) are completed and where, are quite irrelevant for the purpose of Section 3(a) and 3(b). These are the principles which have been formulated in that case. With respect, we are in entire agreement with the statement of the law contained in that decision and as to the proper tests to be applied for determining the inter-State character of a transaction of sale or purchase.
In the connected matters arising out of the judgment of the Karnataka High Court, similar writ petitions filed by the purchasers of sugarcane were dismissed. The two decisions of the Karnataka High Court which require reference are Pandavapura Sahakara Sakkare Kharkhane (P.) Ltd, v. State of Mysore [1973] 32 STC 104 and Tungabhadra Sugar Works Ltd, v. State of Karnataka [1994] 93 STC 561. In Pandavapura [1973] 32 STC 104 (Mys) it was found proved as a fact that the substance of the transaction between the purchaser and the cane growers was for payment of the enhanced price for the sugarcane supplied and the amount paid in excess of the statutory price was paid under the contract and not either as ex gratia payment or towards advance. In that situation the entire amount paid was treated as the price. In our opinion, the nature of contract in that case being such, the entire amount paid had to be treated as price of the sugarcane supplied since the statute does not prohibit an agreement between the grower and the purchaser for payment of a higher price for the sugarcane by the purchaser. In the later decision in Tungabhadra [1994] 93 STC 561 (Kar) also it is noticed that there is no prohibition against the parties agreeing for the payment of a higher price of the sugarcane. In that situation no doubt the entire amount paid has to be treated as the price of the sugarcane. However, as indicated earlier, for treating the entire amount paid by the purchaser as the price of sugarcane supplied, it must be found proved as a fact that the higher price including the excess amount was paid as the price of sugarcane under an agreement between the grower and the purchaser irrespective of a lower amount being fixed as the aggregate of the price fixation under clauses 3 and 5-A of the Control Order. Unless a clear finding to that effect is recorded, the amount paid by the purchaser in excess of the aggregate of the minimum price fixed under Clause 3 and the additional price fixed under Clause 5-A, as a part of the amount paid as advance prior to fixation of the additional price under Clause 5-A, cannot be treated automatically as a part of the total price of sugarcane."
10. The leading authority on this issue is the decision of a seven-Judge
Bench of the Apex Court in Salar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd (supra). The
question raised therein was as to whether transactions subjected to
statutory controls can still be deemed to be a contract came up for
consideration before the Apex Court. In that case, the appellants
challenged the demand and collection made against them for large sums
of money as and for purchase tax and penalty on the purchase of
sugarcane from the growers for the period April 1, 1962 to June 30, 1967
and further asked for refund of large sum of money collected as purchase
tax. In the fifties, practically all the States in which sugarcane was grown
for the purpose of manufacturing sugar used to levy cess on sugarcane
brought into the premises of sugar factories. The Mysore State
Legislature imposed tax on purchase of sugarcane purchased by sugar
factories with the result that the appellants were subjected to levy of tax
on purchase of sugarcane. Three principal contentions were raised before
the Apex Court, namely, there was no mutual assent by and between the
appellants and the growers of sugarcane in regard to supply of sugarcane
by the growers and of the acceptance by the factories and therefore there
was no purchase and sale of sugarcane. Secondly, the appellants were
not dealers within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Mysore Sales Tax
Act. Thirdly, the levy of tax on purchase of sugarcane at different rates in
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different states was discriminatory and in violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution. In the instant case, we are not concerned with the third
contention. After reviewing a number of the earlier decisions so rendered,
the Apex Court held at paragraphs 38, 39, 41 and 44 which read thus: