Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 6 of 6 (0.93 seconds)
Documents citing Union Of India vs Veekay Industries And Anr. on 21 September, 2001

Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs Canara Bank & Anr. on 27 September, 2023

48. In view of the aforesaid, the contention of the petitioner that the impugned Award is based on presumption is found to be entirely flawed. As noted by the Coordinate Bench in its judgment dated 06 th July, 2009 while setting aside the First Award, all that the law requires is that the party seeking compensation on account of breach proves that in the absence of breach, it was ready and willing to perform its part of the agreement so as to claim compensation. Arbitrator is the master of evidence. Therefore, it will not be for this Court to take upon itself the task of being a judge on the evidence that was before the arbitrator (See: Union of India Vs. Peekay Industries, (2009) 160 DLT 735).
Delhi High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Vale Australia Pty Limited vs Steel Authority Of India Limited & Anr. on 30 March, 2012

47. It is submitted by Vale and AMCI that advance notice prior to undertaking risk purchase as envisaged under Para 9 GCA, was consistent with the customary practice. Reliance is placed on the decisions in Alfa Laval (India) Ltd. v. Union of India (2000) I AD (Del) 145; Union of India v. Peekay Industries 2008 (3) Arb LR 569 (Del); Flowmore Private Limited v. National Thermal Power Corporation 2009 X AD (Del) 486; Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd. (2005) 6 SCC 462; Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Bombay v. Sterlite Industries AIR 2000 Bom 204. It is pointed out that the Tribunal in fact found that no risk purchase notice as contemplated under Para 9 GCA, was given by SAIL. Since this pre- condition of prior notice had not been met, SAIL could not have resorted to risk purchase at all. It is further submitted by Vale and AMCI that the Tribunal erroneously concluded that the letter dated 18th December 2007 was an unequivocal recognition by AMCI that SAIL could proceed under Para 9 GCA. The Tribunal not only acted contrary to the settled principle of waiver but also consciously disregarded Para 17 of the Agreement which mandates O.M.P. 414/2011 with O.M.P. 415/2011 and O.M.P. 451/2011 Page 29 of 46 strict compliance of the Agreement. Para 17.1 of the Agreement reads as follows:
Delhi High Court Cites 57 - Cited by 7 - S Muralidhar - Full Document

Amci Pty. Ltd. vs Steel Authority Of India Ltd. & Anr. on 1 July, 2013

In the absence of any waiver, law declared in the decisions reported as 2000 IAD (Delhi) 145 Alfa Laval (India) Ltd. Vs. Union of India, 2008 (3) ARBLR 569 (Delhi) Union of India Vs. Peekay Industries, 2009 XAD (Delhi) 486 Flowmore Private Limited Vs. National Thermal Power Corporation 2005 (6) SCC 462 Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. Vs. Hindustan Copper Ltd. AIR 2000 Bom.
Delhi High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 2 - P Nandrajog - Full Document

Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs Haryana Telecom Limited on 12 March, 2010

16. Mr. Sharma lastly submits that the arbitrator is a sole judge of the quality and quantity of evidence and this Court in Section 34 proceedings cannot interfere with it. In this connection, he refers to and relies upon the judgments in Union of India Vs. Peekay Industries reported in 160 (2009) DLT 735, and Himachal Joint Venture Vs. Panilpina World Transport (India) Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 2009 Delhi 88
Delhi High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 6 - Manmohan - Full Document

Airports Authority Of India vs Shri Shakti Resorts & Hotels Limited on 16 February, 2012

24. Learned counsel for SSRHL placed reliance on the decisions in Union of India v. Peekay Industries 67 (1997) DLT 652 and Ircon International Limited v. Arvind Construction Co. 81 (1999) DLT 268 to contend that the arbitrator is the "sole judge of the quality of the evidence and it will not be for the court to take upon itself the task of being a judge on the evidence before the arbitrator."
Delhi High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 0 - S Muralidhar - Full Document
1