Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 10 of 575 (3.15 seconds)
Documents citing Dadi Jagannadham vs Jammulu Ramulu & Ors on 23 August, 2001

S. Muruganandam vs J.Joseph

Shyamsunder Halder AIR 1953 SC 148, State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills, AIR 1991 SC 772, State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr., (1998) 3 SCC 234, Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 744, CST v. East India Cotton Mfg. Co. Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 531, Paul Enterprises and Ors. v. Rajib Chatterjee & Co. and Ors. AIR 2009 SC 187, Sakshi v. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 518, CIT v. Tata Agencies, (2007) 6 SCC 429, Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459, S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp Scc 87, Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu, (2001) 7 SCC 71, P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries, (1990) 2 SCC 378, Crawford v. Spooner, (1846) SCC Online PC 7, Royal Trust Co. v. Minister of Finance of the Province of British Colombia, AIR 1921 PC 184, Padma Sundara Rao Ors. v. State of T.N. and Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 533 has observed that what legislation wanted has been stated in the provision. The court cannot give extended meaning to the expression. It is not open to the Court to aid defective phrasing of the Act or to make up for the deficiencies. It is not open to the Court to recast, rewrite, or re frame the provision. The 66/92 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis CRP NPD Nos.3056, 3061, 3062, 3063, 3067 and 3094 of 2021 court cannot assume omission and add or amend words. Plain and unambiguous construction has to be given without addition and substitution of the words. The temptation of substituting words by explaining what it thought legislation is endeavouring is to be discouraged. Court has to consider what has been said and what has not been said. It is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for the words of the statute. When literal reading produces an intelligible result it is not open to read words or add words to statute. Making any generous addition to the language of the Act would not be a construction of the statutory provision; rather, would be an amendment thereof. While interpreting the provision the Court only interprets the law. The intention of the legislation must be found by the words used by the legislature itself. The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. When language of the provision is clear, there is no scope for reading something into it. The scenario that thus emerges in relation to an interpretation of a statute can be explained as follows. It is a salutary principle that it is not open to the Court to add or substitute some words in place of the words of the statute. The court cannot reframe the 67/92 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis CRP NPD Nos.3056, 3061, 3062, 3063, 3067 and 3094 of 2021 legislation. The court cannot add to, or amend, the provisions; neither can the expressions used in the statute be treated as fungible.”
Madras High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 0 - R Subramanian - Full Document

Jagat Singh vs The Asst. Commissioner And Ors. on 5 July, 2004

The settled principles of interpretation are that the Court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The Court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly, if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The Court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The Court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and by construction, make up deficiencies which are there, (Para 13), Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu, (2001) 7 SCC 71".
Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi Cites 38 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Sh. Chaman Lal vs Municipal Corporation Of Delhi on 13 January, 2010

Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu, (2001) 7 SCC 71 held that when the intention of the legislature is clear in a rule framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, nothing can be added or subtracted by the Court and the intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the wording of the provision. In such an event, the safest way to interpret is to give the rule its literal and grammatical connotation in the form of interpretation.
Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi Cites 211 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Najra Pravin @ Nazra Praveen vs The State Of Bihar on 16 December, 2025

Similarly, the Division Bench in Parmeshwar Mandal (supra) being a Bench of co-equal strength, could not have rendered the Division Bench judgment in case of Raghunath Yadav (supra) per incuriam only on the ground that the principle of law discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Dadi Jagannadham (supra) was not applied by the earlier Division Bench.
Patna High Court - Orders Cites 57 - Cited by 0 - R R Prasad - Full Document

S. Muruganandam vs J.Joseph

Shyamsunder Halder AIR 1953 SC 148, State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills, AIR 1991 SC 772, State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr., (1998) 3 SCC 234, Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 744, CST v. East India Cotton Mfg. Co. Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 531, Paul Enterprises and Ors. v. Rajib Chatterjee & Co. and Ors. AIR 2009 SC 187, Sakshi v. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 518, CIT v. Tata Agencies, (2007) 6 SCC 429, Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459, S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp Scc 87, Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu, (2001) 7 SCC 71, P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries, (1990) 2 SCC 378, Crawford v. Spooner, (1846) SCC Online PC 7, Royal Trust Co. v. Minister of Finance of the Province of British Colombia, AIR 1921 PC 184, Padma Sundara Rao Ors. v. State of T.N. and Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 533 has observed that what legislation wanted has been stated in the provision. The court cannot give extended meaning to the expression. It is not open to the Court to aid defective phrasing of the Act or to make up for the deficiencies. It is not open to the Court to recast, rewrite, or re frame the provision. The 66/92 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis CRP NPD Nos.3056, 3061, 3062, 3063, 3067 and 3094 of 2021 court cannot assume omission and add or amend words. Plain and unambiguous construction has to be given without addition and substitution of the words. The temptation of substituting words by explaining what it thought legislation is endeavouring is to be discouraged. Court has to consider what has been said and what has not been said. It is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for the words of the statute. When literal reading produces an intelligible result it is not open to read words or add words to statute. Making any generous addition to the language of the Act would not be a construction of the statutory provision; rather, would be an amendment thereof. While interpreting the provision the Court only interprets the law. The intention of the legislation must be found by the words used by the legislature itself. The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. When language of the provision is clear, there is no scope for reading something into it. The scenario that thus emerges in relation to an interpretation of a statute can be explained as follows. It is a salutary principle that it is not open to the Court to add or substitute some words in place of the words of the statute. The court cannot reframe the 67/92 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis CRP NPD Nos.3056, 3061, 3062, 3063, 3067 and 3094 of 2021 legislation. The court cannot add to, or amend, the provisions; neither can the expressions used in the statute be treated as fungible.”
Madras High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 0 - R Subramanian - Full Document

Uco Bank Employees Association vs The Union Of India on 5 July, 2002

In Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu ((2001) 7 Supreme Court Cases 71), the Constitution Bench has considered the issue relating to interpretation of Statutes. The following conclusion is relevant (para 13) "13. We have considered the submission made by the parties. The settled principles of interpretation are that the court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly, if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by by legislature, the court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there."
Madras High Court Cites 42 - Cited by 0 - P Sathasivam - Full Document

Iqbal Masud Khan vs Director General & 5....Opponent(S) on 8 August, 2014

In such circumstances referred to above, we reject the vociferous contention canvassed by Mr. Trivedi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that only repairs or renovation can be done in the prohibited area. We also reject the submission that if "construction" includes "demolition", then, it cannot be done in the prohibited area. If we accept the submission of Mr.Trivedi, then we will have to read "demolition" also in the definition of the term "construction" as defined under Section 2(dc) of the Act.
Gujarat High Court Cites 51 - Cited by 2 - B Bhattacharya - Full Document
1   2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Next