Ramashish Singh vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 17 February, 2026
18. Coming to the facts of the present case, in view of the
definition of the State under Section 2(p) of the Act, 2013 as
also under Section 2(42) of the Chhattisgarh General Clauses
Act, 1957 and the principles of law laid down by their
Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matters of Kripalu
2 (2011) 12 SCC 94
3 AIR 1959 SC 308
12
Shankar, Jaipur Development Authority & Andhra
Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (Supra), it
is evident that the reference was made by the Commissioner,
Surguja Division on 24th March, 2014 pursuant to the
complaint made by one Kunj Bihari Singh Paikra, President,
Sarv Adivasi Samaj, Surguja regarding social status of the
petitioner after enquiring from the Collector, Surguja. It is
not the case of the State that the matter has been referred to
the High Power Certification Scrutiny Committee by the State
Government. It is the Commissioner, Surguja Division, who
on his own directed the Collector to verify the complaint and
got it verified from the Collector and thereafter referred the
matter to the High Power Certification Scrutiny Committee
for verification and as such, it cannot be said that the matter
was referred by the State Government within the meaning of
Section 2(p) of the Act, 2013. Therefore, the High Power
Certification Scrutiny Committee has no jurisdiction to
enquire into the social status certificate of the petitioner, as
neither the matter was referred by the District Level
Certificates Verification Committee under Section 6 of the
Act, 2013 nor by the State Government. The matter was
referred by the officer of the State i.e. the Commissioner,
Surguja Division, who was absolutely incompetent to refer the
matter within the meaning of Section 7 (1) of the Act, 2013.