After the order of reduction on 8 December, 1972 the
High Court issued orders posting the appellant as Additional
District Magistrate Sambalpur and directed him to join at
his new station. The appellant did not join the new station
nor did he apply for leave. A fresh disciplinary proceeding
was started against the appellant for wilful absence from
duty. The matter was enquired into by a Judge of the High
Court The appellant submitted that the order reducing him
was beyond the powers of the High Court. The Enquiring Judge
found him guilty The appellant was given an opportunity to
show cause against the order. The appellant did not do so.
The High Court thereupon imposed the punishment of dismissal
on the appellant and dismissed him. One of the orders of
dismissal recited that in pursuance of the order passed by
the Court in exercise of its powers under Article 235 of the
Constitution in a disciplinary proceeding initiated on
charges dated 1 February, 1973 the appellant an officer of
the Orissa Judicial Service Class I officiating in the
Junior Branch of the Orissa Superior Judicial Service is
dismissed from service with immediate effect. Another order
of 3 December 1973 recited that in pursuance of the order
passed by the Court in exercise of its powers under Article
235 the appellant an officer of the Orissa Judicial Service
Class I, officiating in the Junior Branch of the Orissa
Superior Judicial Service, who has been convicted on the
charge of criminal contempt by judgment of the Orissa High
Court reported in I.L.R. 1973 Cuttack 134 (Registrar of the
Orissa High Court v. Baradakanta and Anr.) which was
confirmed by the Supreme Court by judgment dated 19
November, 1973 (Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar, Orissa
High Court & Anr.) in Criminal Appeal No. 41 of 1973 is on
the ground of conduct leading to such conviction, dismissed
from service with 'immediate effect. The judgment of this
Court is reported in [1974]2 S.C.R. 282.
In Mr Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' own
aphorism, it is revolting to have no better reason for a
rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV. prestige argument, from age alone, that
because a claimed legal rule has lasted a certain length
of time it must automatically be valid and binding at
the present day, regardless of changes in basic societal
conditions and expectations, is no longer very
persuasive. According to the basic teachings of the
Legal Realist and policy schools of law, society itself is
in continuing state of flux at the present day; and the
positive law, therefore, if it is to continue to be useful
in the resolution of contemporary major social conflicts
and social problems, must change in measure with the
society. What we have, therefore, concomitantly with
our conception of society in revolution is a conception
of law itself, as being in a condition of flux, of
movement. On this view, law is not a frozen, static
body of rules but rules in a continuous process of
change and adaptation; and the judge, at the final
appellate level anyway, is a part -- a determinant part
18. It has been well said that if judges decay, the contempt
power will not save them and so the other side of the coin is that
Judges, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion, per Krishna
Iyer, J. in Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. The Registrar of Orissa
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High Court and another, [1974] 1 S.C.C. 374. It has to be admitted
frankly and fairly that there has been erosion of faith in the dignity
of the court and in the majesty of law and that has been caused not
so much by the scandalising remarks made by politicians or
ministers but the inability of the courts of law to deliver quick and
substantial justice to the needy. Many today suffer from remedyless
evils which courts of justice are incompetent to deal with. Justice
cries in silence for long, far too long. The procedural wrangle is
eroding the faith in our justice system. It is a criticism which the
Judges and lawyers must make about themselves. We must turn the
search light inward. At the same time we cannot be oblivious of the
attempts made to decry or denigrate the judicial process, if it is
seriously done.
In Baradakanta Mishra Vs. High Court of Orissa and another, , order of dismissal passed by the High Court, on the assumption that under Article 235 of the Constitution of India, it had control over
judicial officers and also power to impose major penalty of dismissal from service was challenged by the Judicial Officer by preferring an appeal before the Governor, who dismissed the same. In this background the Supreme Court held that the High Court, within the power and control vested in it under Article 235 of the Constitution, could hold disciplinary proceedings and recommend the imposition of punishment of reduction in rank. The actual power of imposition of major punishment, namely, reduction in rank and dismissal is exercisable by Governor, who is the appointing authority. The Order of the High Court, reducing the Judicial Officer in rank was unconstitutional and liable to be quashed. It was further held that if the order of initial authority is void, the order of the appellate authority cannot make it valid. The confirmation by the Governor of such a void order cannot have any legal effect because that which is valid can alone be confirmed and not that which is void. The Court observed:-
"it may be that pleas of justification of privilege are not strictly speaking available to the defendant in contempt proceedings." 62. After the rulings in Brahma Prakash's case (1954 Cri LJ 238) (SC) (supra), C. K. Daphtary's case (1971 Cri LJ 844) (SC) (supra) and Baradakanta's case (1974 Cri LJ 631) (SC) (supra), it is not open to any contemner to take the plea that truth of the allegations is a justification.
26. Every criticism on Court's administrative capacity, which deprives authority of Court or inputs improper motive to those taking part in administrative functions, would constitute gross contempt, if it affects the image of Court and endangers confidence of public in administration of justice. Any speech, writing, action having tendency, bringing into disrespect, the authority of Court, or the decision of judicial officers, which may impair the faith of public in the authority and majesty of justice, would constitute a criminal contempt. A fair, balanced and reasonable criticism on judicial or administrative act or decision of the Court cannot be brought within the realm of contempt, of course, if it does not impair or diminish the authority of the Court or creates a general impression in the public mind, destroying its faith in the administration of justice or lowering the authority of Court. The Judges do not feel and should not feel shy of criticism nor expect super sensitiveness, but where such criticism etc goes to the act of challenging the very authority, spreading in the mind of general public, undermining the majesty of Court, the situation would be different and will come within the ambit of definition of criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of Act of 1971. The contemnors can not have freedom of stating that incident had not taken in courtroom and it is something to be seen on administrative side; or that it is not in respect to any Court's judgment or judicial function as such. As already said, in Baradakant Mishra Vs. Registrar of the Orissa High Court (supra), it has been held that for the purpose of definition of "criminal contempt" under Section 2(c) of the Act of 1971, the capacity of Judge or Court cannot be divided on judicial and administrative side since it is entire body of the institution. The authority of the Court, in every respect it has its majesty, giving a faith to the public on the authority of Court. If any attack is made to diminish, tarnish or challenge it and if one crosses limit and enters the field of definition of "criminal contempt", makes himself liable for punishment under the Act.
19. However, it follows from the aforesaid judgments that the High Court
cannot terminate the services of a District Judge or impose any
punishment of reduction in rank which power belongs to the Governor
as appointing authority under Article 311(1) of the Constitution though
the word "control" in the Article gives the High Court power to make
enquiries and disciplinary control and to recommend imposition of
such punishment (see Baradakanta v. Registrar12 and High Court of
Punjab and Haryana v. State of Haryana13).