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Documents citing P. H. Kalyani vs M/S. Air France Calcutta on 15 February, 1963

Pandian Roadways Corporation Ltd., ... vs Presiding Officer, Industrial ... on 21 December, 2004

13. Following the ratio laid down in Kalyani P.H. v. Air France, Calcutta (supra), Central Bank of India Limited, New Delhi v. Prakash Chand Jain (supra), and other catena of decisions, namely, Bengal Bhatdee Coal Company v. Ram Prabesh Singh AIR 1964 SC 486 : 1963-I-LLJ-291; Titaghur Paper Mills Company Limited v. Ram Naresh Kumar, 1961-I-LLJ-511 (SC), Hind Construction and Engineering Company Limited v. Their Workmen, , Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company of India (P) Limited v. Management and Ors., and Eastern Electric and Trading Company v. Baldev Lal , the Apex Court framed five broad propositions with respect to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act in Lalla Ram v. D.C.M. Chemical Works Limited (supra) which reads as follows 1978-I-LLJ-507 at p. 513:
Madras High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 3 - P D Premkumar - Full Document

Hotel Taj Palace vs Shri Ravi Rohilla And Anr. on 14 March, 2016

18. Further, the Apex Court in the case of P. H. Kalyani vs. Air France Calcutta (Supra), while interpreting Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has held that the dismissal order dated May 28, 1960 and its communication to the workman on May 30, 1960, wages offered to the workman on the same day was treated to be a valid compliance under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Delhi High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 0 - I S Mehta - Full Document

Surendra Singh Chauhan vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 6 November, 2025

17. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner had earlier also punished for the similar acts. There is no oblique motive attributed to the petitioner. Thus, in view of judgment of Apex Court 12 in the case of P.H. Kalyani Vs. Air France, Calcutta reported in AIR 1963 SC 1756, which relied upon by Apex Court in the case of J. Ahmed (supra), the allegation found proved by authorities could not have been termed as misconduct.
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Ahmedabad Sarangpur Mills Company Ltd. vs Industrial Court, Ahmedabad And Anr. on 17 October, 1964

But though the order was punitive nature and the enquiry held was not proper and the company had terminated the services of respondent 2, that termination was held to be justified and therefore, on the principles laid down in P. H. Kalyani v. Air France [1963 - II L.L.J. 679] (vide supra) the order of the labour court would relate back to the date of the order of the petitioner company and therefore, respondent 2 would not be entitled to wages or compensation for the period, between the two orders.
Gujarat High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 7 - J M Shelat - Full Document

R. Balasubramanian And Ors. vs Carborandum Universal Ltd., Okha on 19 August, 1975

7. Mr. Nanavati, however, vehemently relied on the decision in P. H. Kalyani v. Air France Calcutta, [1963-I L.L.J. 679]; (1963) 24 FJR 464 (S.C.), in the context of West Bengal Rule 71 which was almost in similar language, except for the fact that there was one clause which required that copies to communication under sub-rules (1) and (2) by the trade union and the employer shall also be sent to the Labour Commissioner and the conciliation officer concerned. In that case their Lordships pointed out that the mere fact that a letter was written to the manager of the company mentioning the names of the office-bearers who should be recognised as protected workmen would not be enough. Their Lordships in terms referred to the relevant fact in the case that the company had replied to that letter pointing out certain legal defects therein and there was no evidence to show what happened thereafter. In view of these facts, the Labour Court had held that according to the rules framed by the Government of West Bengal as to the recognition of the protected workmen, there must be some positive workmen, action on the part of the employer with regard to the recognition of the employees as protected workmen before they could claim to be protected workmen under S. 33. As nothing was shown to their Lordships against this view, in absence of any further evidence as to recognition, it was held that Labour Court was right in holding that the person concerned was not protected workman and, therefore, no previous permission under S. 33(3) was necessary before his dismissal. That ratio clearly proceeds on the special facts that as the company had in its reply clearly pointed out legal defects and had, therefore, raised a question of statutory exception under S. 33(4), unless these legal defects were duly remedied, there would be no question of recognition. In such context the Labour Court was right in insisting on the recognition in such case by some further positive action of the employer and as there was no evidence to show what had happened after this letter of the employer, the decision of the Labour Court was upheld. That ratio could never apply to the facts of the present case where, on admitted facts, there is no ground whatsoever on which the recognition could be disputed. The case was of a single trade union where his employer had no right allot the number and the recognition having been claimed of the minimum number of the five officers as per statutory limits in S. 33(4), the employer had no right whatever to refuse to give recognition, once the choice was duly exercised by the concerned trade union. In such a context there was no question of any dispute being raised because there was no statutory ground which would justify the employer in refusing recognition to these officers as claimed by the concerned trade union under Rule 66(1). The employer had, therefore, no option but to send its recognition as per the mandatory requirement of Rule 66(2) within 15 days period. In such a context even if the employer fails to perform the statutory duty of sending recognition, by such a default or from the fact of complete absence of reply by the employer, there could be no inference of non-recognition as vehemently contended by Mr. Nanavati. The recognition can be express or may be necessarily implied from the admitted facts, where there would be no statutory ground whatsoever for refusing this recognition, so that any question of a dispute could arise. The dispute in the present context of Rule 66(4) can only be a bona fide dispute as per the relevant provision and, therefore, such a dispute can only arise when the employer after receiving the choice of the trade union under Rule 66(1) raises in its reply any of the relevant statutory grounds open to it under S. 33(4). If no such grounds are indicated and even they did not exist, there would be no question of any bona fide dispute within the meaning of Rule 66(4). In such a case the employer can never by his mere failure to reply or to carry out the mandatory obligation of Rule 66(2) escape the statutory obligation which would arise in such a case. There being no objection whatever which could come under S. 33(4), the employer being under a statutory obligation to give recognition as per the union's list of the minimum number of five officers under Rule 66(1), even in the absence of any express recognition, the recognition would have to be necessarily presumed. Any other construction of this rule would require us to presume that the employer was committing a default in his statutory obligation, and by his default he cannot set at naught the salutary protection which is sought to be conferred by the Legislature to these protected workmen.
Gujarat High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Statesman Limited And Anr. vs First Industrial Tribunal And Ors. on 25 April, 2003

20. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P.M. Kalyani v. Air France, Calcutta (supra), is clearly distinguishable in the facts of the present case. In the aforesaid decision, admittedly, the employer company had replied to the letter of the union pointing out certain legal defects. Relevant portion from the said judgment is quoted hereunder 1963-1-LLJ-679 at p. 682:
Calcutta High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 1 - P K Chattopadhyay - Full Document

Ashok Leyland Ltd. Represented By Its ... vs The Presiding Officer, Labour Court And ... on 3 December, 1987

The logical corollary of these observations would be that it would be open to the High Court to give reasons why the opinion of a particular bench of the Supreme Court was not applicable tod the facts of the case before it. We are therefore inclined to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that having regard to the decision of the Five Judges of the Supreme Court in Kalyani's case, that what is open before the Tribunal is the propriety of an order of dismissal in the case of a defective enquiry and that the Labour Court was entitled to go into the question whether the dismisssal was justified or not. If on evidence it is found that the dismissal was justified then it would operate from the date of the order of dismissal.
Madras High Court Cites 32 - Cited by 12 - Full Document

Ram Kishan Singhal vs The Presiding Officer & Others on 11 November, 1999

Setting the controversy at rest the Supreme Court held that ratio laid down in the Constitutional Bench decision in the case of P.H. Kalyani (supra) is binding and the view expressed in Gujrat Steel Tubes Ltd. versus Mazdoor Sabha (supra) Deshraj Gupta (supra) that the discharge/dismissal did not relate back but was operative from the date of judgment of Labour Court is not good law. Following pertinent observation of the Supreme Court in the case Punjab Diary Development Corporation Ltd. is reproduced below:-
Delhi High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 1 - A K Sikri - Full Document
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