In the case of Vidya Parkash Vs. Union of India and Others (supra) the petitioner before the Supreme Court was from Army Service and dealt with for unauthorised absence from duty for the 5th time and, the penalty of dismissal from Army Service was held neither disproportionate nor illegal.
In the case in Vidya Prakash v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1988 SC 705, the question raised before the Apex Court was in Order to awarding four red ink entries and if a person is absent without leave, whether the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate or not. In the aforesaid case the Supreme Court has held that if a person is punished for an offence of absence from duty on four occasions and there was red ink entry, then the punishment awarded by the Court Martial for dismissal of service cannot be said to disproportionate to the charge levelled against the person concerned.
In Vidya Prakash v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 705, their Lordships have held that an objection not taken before the Court Martial would be an afterthought and would not be entertained in writ proceedings.
20. The decision of this Court in Vidya Parkash v. Union of
India and Ors[1]. squarely applies to the present situation.
Unfortunately, the judgment in Vidya Parkash1 was not brought to
the notice of the Single Judge and the Division Bench. The facts
in Vidya Parkash1 were these: the appellant was posted as Jawan in
Panagarh. He left Panagarh with his wife and children for Kanpur
without taking any leave. According to Vidya Parkash, he became
unwell and he was under treatment of a doctor. When he reported to
Panagarh unit with his fitness certificate, he was served
with a charge sheet wherein it was ordered by Major P.S. Mahant
that he would be tried by summary court-martial. The summary court-
martial which was presided over by Major P.S. Mahant ordered his
dismissal from service. Vidya Parkash challenged that order in a
writ petition before Delhi High Court. Inter alia, a plea was
set up that the commanding officer Major P.S. Mahant was not
legally competent to preside over a summary court-martial. The
Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition.
It was held that no objection was taken as to the competence of
Major P.S. Mahant to act as a Judge in summary court-martial. It
was from the order of the Delhi High Court that the matter reached
this Court. This Court considered Sections 108 and 116 of the
Army Act, Rule 39(2) of the Army Rules and held that the summary
court martial held by the commanding officer Major P.S. Mahant was
in accordance with the provisions of Section 116 of the Army Act.
This Court further observed :
petitioner was properly attached to 103 A.D. Regiment. CO 103 A.D.
Regiment, thus, was the proper CO of the petitioner and rightly held
the trial of the petitioner by SCM. A trial by CO of Corps or
detachment or department to which a person belongs can
competently be held by CO of that Corps, detachment or department
as per Section 116 of the Army Act. (See Vidya Prakash Vs. Union
of India and others, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 705). In this regard,
reference can be made to a circular issued by Army Headquarters in
the year 1985, which though was not referred to by any of the
parties. This Court being aware of the same, has taken note of the
same. Relevant portion of this circular is as under:-
19. The petitioner submitted that a Commanding Officer was not
competent to hold a Summary Court Martial. The Army Act is a specialised
Act with a special procedure. The Commanding Officer is competent to hold
a Summary Court Martial under Section 116 of the Army Act, 1954. This
position was decisively ruled in Vidya Prakash v Union of India 1988 (2)
SCC 459:
The Court having satisfied itself that the accused understands the charges and the effect of his plea of "Guilty", accepts and records the same. After perusal of the documents annexed with the writ petition, it is clear that the provisions of Rule 115 (2) has been complied with. It is well settled that if a person has pleaded "Guilty" and the effect of pleading "Guilty" has been explained, the procedure in case of pleading "Guilty"' is different and in the case of not pleading "Guilty" is also different as provided under (sic) 116 of the Army Rules. Regarding the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, that the punishment, which has been awarded is disproportionate to the charge cannot be accepted in view of the Apex Court judgment in
A.I.R. 1988, Supreme Court, page 705, Vidya Prakash v. Union of India and
Ors. In the aforesaid case the Apex Court has taken a view that if an army soldier absenting himself from duty without taking any leave from lines as required under the Act and was previously punished for the same offence of absence from duty on four occasions the infliction of punishment of dismissal from service cannot be said to be disproportionate to the charge of tainted with illegality. The relevant portion in Para 14 is being quoted below-
In Vidya Prakash's case (Supra), the Apex Court clearly held that
dismissed from service for unauthorized absence from duty for the fifth times is
not illegal. In the present case, the respondent/writ petitioner had incurred 4
Page 18 of 19
(four) red entries for unauthorized absence and also the respondent/writ
petitioner despite of counseling in writing and orally failed to show any
improvement and continued with his habit of misconducts. This being the
situation, there is absolutely no reason for coming to our finding that the quantum
of punishment imposed to the respondent/writ petitioner for discharging from
service by issuing the impugned discharge order dated 14.08.2002 is shockingly
disproportionate and also decision of the appellants/respondents suffers from
procedural impropriety.