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Documents citing President, Municipal Board ... vs District Magistrate, Shahjahanpur on 17 October, 1955

Sanjib Dhawan Son Of Sri Surendra Kumar ... vs State Of U.P. Through Secretary ... on 11 July, 2005

6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the agreement dated 13.03.1989. allowed the petitioner to avail the grant-in-aid can only be cancelled prospectively on the violation of the terms and conditions from the date of the order and not retrospectively. Before the Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 297 of 1997, Neelam Talkies Jalalabad, district Shahjahanpur v. District Magistrate similar controversy arose wherein on the violation of the terms and conditions the authority concerned has demanded the entire amount availed towards grant-in-aid under the scheme dated 21.07.1986 from the date of im(sic)ption vide order dated 21.01 1992 On the consideration of argument of the parties and the entire facts and circumstances, the Division Bench held as follows:
Allahabad High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 0 - R Kumar - Full Document

Nagar Palika Parishad, Sardhana, ... vs Chandra Prakash And Another on 18 October, 2000

7. The simple submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since the building in question had been let out to the State Bank of India, Sardhana Branch and is fetching rental Income at the rate of Rs. 7,100 per month it would, for the purpose for determination of annual value, fall within the ambit of clause (b) and not (a). Sri Naveen Sinha was vehement in his argument that since the building in question is being used for housing a bank, which subserves public purpose, it would be covered by the expression "other such buildings" occurring in clause (a) of Section 140 (1) of the Act. The thrust appears to be that the expression "other such buildings" encompasses within its sweep the building which is being used for public purposes such as a bank, even though it has been let out and consequently outside the ambit of clause (b) Sri Naveen Sinha placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Municipal Board, Muzaffanagar v. District Magistrate. Muzaffanagar and another, AIR 1996 All 37, to support his contention that the user of the building is the dominant and determining factor. In that case the building which was subject matter of assessment consisted of godowns let out on a daily charge and not by the monthly or a longer unit of time. The District Magistrate, who was the competent authority in the matter, decided that the annual value of the building was to be computed on the basis provided under clause (a) and not under clause (b) of Section 140 (1) of the Act. It was held that the test applies by the District Magistrate was erroneous. In the said case, it was observed that the "annual value" is determined because under the Act it is taken into consideration in the assessment of a tax on the annual value of building. In the assessment of water tax, and in the determination of a scavenging tax or a tax for the cleansing of latrines and privies. The tax imposed is on the "annual value" of a building and not a tax on the "annual value" of a railway station or a hotel or a college, etc. The incidence of the tax is made dependent on the existence of a building but the amount of that tax is determined by the use to which the building is put at the time of its levy. Clause (a) enumerates "railway stations, hotels, colleges, schools, hospitals, factories and other such buildings". The words "other such buildings" are to be construed ejusdem generis to include such buildings as by that rule, are related in kind to railway stations, hotels, colleges, etc. which precede that phrase. One quality common to all of them is that they refer to a use which caters to a public need. This distinction between clause (a) and clause (b) is reflected in the basis for computing the annual value. In the former clause, the annual value is determined by reference to the present cost of constructing the building added to the estimated value of the appurtenant land. The quantum of the "annual value" is dependent on the use to which the building is put and this, and not letting value. Is therefore, the basis adopted by the statute, for it is difficult to conceive of a building when used as a railway station, hotel, college, school, hospital or factory being ordinarily open to letting out. Clause (b) covers all other buildings, where the letting value provides the referential basis for calculating the "annual value".
Allahabad High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Gaya Prasad Azad vs Commissioner Faizabad Division And ... on 11 February, 1958

The proviso does not contemplate any inquiry at that stage. It merely requires that the authority concerned shall give an opportunity of explanation to the person concerned, i.e. it will ask the person concerned as to what he himself has to state on those charges. The proceedings relating to the explanation are not as such in the nature of an inquiry requiring evidence etc. to be heard and taken. This proviso came up for consideration in President, Municipal Board Shahjahanpur v. District Magistrate, shahjahanpur AIR 1956 All 369 (A) and the learned Judge laid down that "It does not contemplate an opportunity to the State Government to act as a prosecutor and to produce further material or evidence in support of the charge. The President has also not been given any opportunity under the proviso to produce oral evidence or to demand personal hearing."
Allahabad High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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