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Amit Dhansing Jagtap vs Chandrashekhar Uttamrao Shinde on 15 October, 2024 cites

Amar Nath And Others vs State Of Haryana & Others on 29 July, 1977

"11. [....] It is now well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v State of Haryana, Madhu Limaye v State of Maharashtra, 8 VC Shukla v State,9 and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v Uttam 10). The feasible test is whether upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objection raised by the appellants were upheld by the Court the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable."
Supreme Court of India Cites 24 - Cited by 775 - S M Ali - Full Document

Madhu Limaye vs The State Of Maharashtra on 31 October, 1977

"11. [....] It is now well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v State of Haryana, Madhu Limaye v State of Maharashtra, 8 VC Shukla v State,9 and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v Uttam 10). The feasible test is whether upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objection raised by the appellants were upheld by the Court the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable."
Supreme Court of India Cites 27 - Cited by 1313 - N L Untwalia - Full Document

Ruchi Majoo vs Sanjeev Majoo on 13 May, 2011

8.12 The question, therefore, that needs to be addressed by us is whether the Family Court in the facts of the case, though there was no dispute on the aspect of permanent address of the child being at Maharashtra, vis-a-vis the past residence of the child at Navsari, could have decided in favour of the father only on the ground of his past residence at Navsari before the death of the mother. We also note that the Trial Court would have, therefore, to reweigh its options in deciding the jurisdictional aspects of the application in accordance with the law set out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ruchi Mazoo (supra).
Supreme Court of India Cites 24 - Cited by 154 - T S Thakur - Full Document

Shah Harichand Ratanchand vs Virbbal And Ors. on 14 September, 1973

8.11 Perusal of the order impugned before us would indicate that this factual inquiry has not been undertaken by the Family Court. Even in the case of Shah Harichand (supra), though a Division Bench of this Court considered the question of the application in the facts where the ward was removed from the father's custody in this case, what needs to be noted is that the Division Bench observed that if there are two places Page 31 of 35 Uploaded by BIMAL B CHAKRAVARTY(HC01089) on Fri Oct 18 2024 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 18 21:34:57 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/FA/1268/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 15/10/2024 undefined where it could be held that the minor was ordinarily residing the question would be one of convenience because the legislative test would be fulfilled. The question, however, cannot be decided on presumptive, legal or constructive custody but by an application of the statutory test of ordinary residence of the minor. This, according to the Division Bench would surely be a question of facts to be resolved in each case by taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances. Para 3 of the decision reads as under:
Gujarat High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

Amit Kapoor vs Ramesh Chander & Anr on 13 September, 2012

"6. [...] It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so Amit Kapoor v Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460; Sheetala Prasad v Sri Kant, (2010) 2 SCC 190 6 (1977) 4 SCC 137 as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court."
Supreme Court of India Cites 43 - Cited by 1303 - S Kumar - Full Document

Sheetala Prasad & Ors vs Sri Kant & Anr on 17 December, 2009

"6. [...] It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so Amit Kapoor v Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460; Sheetala Prasad v Sri Kant, (2010) 2 SCC 190 6 (1977) 4 SCC 137 as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court."
Supreme Court of India Cites 17 - Cited by 80 - J M Panchal - Full Document
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