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Goldmines Telefilms Private Limited vs Narendra Hirawat And Co And Anr on 26 August, 2021 cites

T. O. Abraham vs Jose Thomas on 31 August, 2018

59. As an alternate submission, Plaintiff argued that the licences granted under 2018 Agreements are exclusive licences under the Copyright Act, 1957, and it has a special status. It was contended that an exclusive licence is akin to an assignment for a particular duration and is not like a mere licence. The exclusive licence can also be used to create further sub-licence. Reliance is placed on Sections 2(j), 30 and 54 of the Copyright Act. It was stated the schedule of 2018 Agreements, parts-1, 2 and Clause-6, will show that the licences are exclusive. Reliance is placed on the decisions in the cases of Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc., Kraft Foods Schweiz AG and Kraft Foods Belgium SA15; T.O.Abraham v. Jose Thomas and Upma Khanna v. Tarun Sawhney16.
Supreme Court - Daily Orders Cites 0 - Cited by 14 - Full Document

P. D'Souza vs Shondrilo Naidu on 28 July, 2004

Reliance is placed on the decisions in the cases of General Manager, North Railways v. Sarvesh Chopra1; P.D'Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu2; KSL & Industries Ltd. National Textiles Corporation Ltd. 3; Jagad Bandhu Chatterjee v. Smt. Nilima Rani4; and Rashik Lal v. Shah Gokuldas5. The Counsel for Sholay Media submitted that the short answer is that none of these decisions is applicable as the payment is not made fully, and in no manner it can be inferred that Sholay Media has waived its rights.
Supreme Court of India Cites 12 - Cited by 233 - S B Sinha - Full Document

Jagad Bandhu Chatterjee vs Nilima Rani & Others on 17 October, 1969

Reliance is placed on the decisions in the cases of General Manager, North Railways v. Sarvesh Chopra1; P.D'Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu2; KSL & Industries Ltd. National Textiles Corporation Ltd. 3; Jagad Bandhu Chatterjee v. Smt. Nilima Rani4; and Rashik Lal v. Shah Gokuldas5. The Counsel for Sholay Media submitted that the short answer is that none of these decisions is applicable as the payment is not made fully, and in no manner it can be inferred that Sholay Media has waived its rights.
Supreme Court of India Cites 5 - Cited by 50 - Full Document

Rashik Lal And Others vs Shah Gokuldas & Anr on 2 February, 1989

Reliance is placed on the decisions in the cases of General Manager, North Railways v. Sarvesh Chopra1; P.D'Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu2; KSL & Industries Ltd. National Textiles Corporation Ltd. 3; Jagad Bandhu Chatterjee v. Smt. Nilima Rani4; and Rashik Lal v. Shah Gokuldas5. The Counsel for Sholay Media submitted that the short answer is that none of these decisions is applicable as the payment is not made fully, and in no manner it can be inferred that Sholay Media has waived its rights.
Supreme Court of India Cites 2 - Cited by 27 - L M Sharma - Full Document

Adhunik Steels Ltd vs Orissa Manganese And Minerals Pvt. Ltd on 10 July, 2007

44. That the Court has the power to grant mandatory interim relief cannot be disputed, but the parameters are strict. Guidance can be found in the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Ltd.6 and in the case of Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra. 7. There could arise cases where the grant of interim relief would be tantamount to granting of final relief, is justified, and withholding of interim relief would be tantamount to dismissal of the main petition. However, a very strong prima facie case must exist to grant such interim relief akin to final relief.
Supreme Court of India Cites 22 - Cited by 252 - P K Balasubramanyan - Full Document

Deoraj vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 6 April, 2004

44. That the Court has the power to grant mandatory interim relief cannot be disputed, but the parameters are strict. Guidance can be found in the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Ltd.6 and in the case of Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra. 7. There could arise cases where the grant of interim relief would be tantamount to granting of final relief, is justified, and withholding of interim relief would be tantamount to dismissal of the main petition. However, a very strong prima facie case must exist to grant such interim relief akin to final relief.
Supreme Court of India Cites 4 - Cited by 181 - R C Lahoti - Full Document

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd vs Amritsar Gas Service And Ors on 19 November, 1990

46. On behalf of Plaintiff, it was sought to be argued and as referred by the learned Single Judge, regarding the nature of the contract as to whether it can be said to be as falling under section 14(d) (as amended) of the Act of 1963. The learned Single Judge referred to the legal position under Section of 14(d) of the amended Act of 1963 first by referring to the decision of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service 8 distinguished it, and after that relying on the decision of Kerala High Court in the case of T.O.Abraham v. Jose Thomas9, the learned Single Judge observed that the 2018 Agreements did not confer any right upon the Licensors to terminate the Agreement at their sweet will and, thus, the Agreements were not in their nature determinable. The learned Judge thus concluded that since the 2018 Agreements did not contain a clause that termination of the Agreement will be at the sweet will of the licensor, the case does not fall under section 14(d) of the Act of 1963.
Supreme Court of India Cites 7 - Cited by 319 - J S Verma - Full Document

Tarun Sawhney vs Uma Lal And Others on 5 February, 2019

48. According to us, the arguments based on section 14(d) is not relevant as there is no prima facie case at all in respect of readiness and willingness and even assuming that the present a falls outside the purview of section 14(d); still, basic principles in section 16 of the Act of 1963 regarding readiness and willingness apply. All that we observe is that the impugned order has proceeded as if the only test to determine whether the contract falls under section 14(d) is whether the contract contains a clause of termination at the will of a party. The of the learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in the skn 39 COMAP(L)-8026.2020--.doc case of Tarun Sawhney v. Uma Lal and others10 referred to section 14(c) (unamended) and stated that the nature of the agreement for this purpose would have to be asserted from the special characters or from special stipulations.
Delhi High Court Cites 33 - Cited by 5 - M Gupta - Full Document

General Manager Northern Railways & Anr vs Sarvesh Chopra on 1 March, 2002

Reliance is placed on the decisions in the cases of General Manager, North Railways v. Sarvesh Chopra1; P.D'Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu2; KSL & Industries Ltd. National Textiles Corporation Ltd. 3; Jagad Bandhu Chatterjee v. Smt. Nilima Rani4; and Rashik Lal v. Shah Gokuldas5. The Counsel for Sholay Media submitted that the short answer is that none of these decisions is applicable as the payment is not made fully, and in no manner it can be inferred that Sholay Media has waived its rights.
Supreme Court of India Cites 11 - Cited by 179 - R C Lahoti - Full Document

Spice Digital Ltd vs Vistaas Digital Media Pvt. Ltd on 12 October, 2012

We also note that in the decision in the case of Spice Digital Ltd. v. Vistaas Digital Media Pvt. Ltd.12, the learned Single Judge of this Court had interpreted the agreement before the court in the facts of that case which would indicate a different test to be applied than the one in the impugned order. As stated earlier, we don't need to decide on this position in law because of our earlier findings. Plaintiff sought to urge another position of law as to whether the amendment to section 14 of the Act on 1 December 2018 was retrospective or otherwise. Again this is a line of enquiry wholly unnecessary for the determination of the appeals. The suits were filed in August 2019, and none of the Appellants argued that the amendment is not retrospective.
Bombay High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 13 - R D Dhanuka - Full Document
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