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1 - 10 of 14 (0.24 seconds)Article 310 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
State Of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Etc. Etc vs Bollapragada Suryanarayana & Ors. Etc. ... on 15 July, 1997
The decision in State of A.P. and Ors. vs. Bollapragada
Suryanarayana and Ors. (supra) does not in any way assist the appellant
and, in fact, is one which goes against him. That case related to
abolition of posts by legislation. In the said case also there was a
provision for compensation specifically indicated in Section 5 of the
A.P. Abolition of Posts of Part-time Village Officers Act, 1985.
The State Of Punjab vs Sodhi Sukhdev Singh on 15 November, 1960
We need not delve into the disputed question as to whether there
was any Cabinet decision, as it has not been established that there was
any Government order in terms of Article 166 of the Constitution. The
Constitution requires that action must be taken by the authority
concerned in the name of the Governor. It is not till this formality is
observed that the action can be regarded as that of the State.
Constitutionally speaking the Council of Ministers are advisors and as
the head of the State, the Governor is to act with the aid or advice of
the Council of Ministers. Therefore, till the advice is accepted by the
Governor, views of the Council of Ministers does not get crystalised
into action of the State. (See: The State of Punjab vs. Sodhi Sukhdev
Singh AIR 1961 SC 493, Bachhittar Singh vs. State of Punjab and Anr. AIR
1963 SC 395). That being so, the first plea of the appellant is
rejected.
The Palace Administration Board vs Rama Verma Bharathan Thampuran & Ors on 27 March, 1980
Statute being an edict of the legislature, it is necessary that it
is expressed in clear and unambiguous language. In spite of Courts
saying so, the draftsmen have paid little attention and they still boast
of the old British jingle "I am the parliamentary draftsman. I compose
the country's laws. And of half of the litigation, I am undoubtedly the
cause", which was referred to by this Court in Palace Admn. Board v.
Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran (AIR 1980 SC 1187 at. P.1195).
Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd vs Custodian Of Vested Forests Palghat And ... on 6 April, 1990
Where, therefore, the "language" is clear, the intention of the
legislature is to be gathered from the language used. What is to be
borne in mind is as to what has been said in the statute as also what
has not been said. A construction which requires, for its support,
addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of
words, has to be avoided, unless it is covered by the rule of exception,
including that of necessity, which is not the case here. (See: Gwalior
Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests (AIR
1990 SC 1747 at p. 1752); Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn.
(AIR 1966 SC 1678 at p. 1682); A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak
(1984 (2) SCC 500, at pp. 518, 519)]. Indeed, the Court cannot reframe
the legislation as it has no power to legislate.
Smt. Shyam Kishori Devi vs Patna Municipal Corporation & Anr on 4 February, 1966
Where, therefore, the "language" is clear, the intention of the
legislature is to be gathered from the language used. What is to be
borne in mind is as to what has been said in the statute as also what
has not been said. A construction which requires, for its support,
addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of
words, has to be avoided, unless it is covered by the rule of exception,
including that of necessity, which is not the case here. (See: Gwalior
Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests (AIR
1990 SC 1747 at p. 1752); Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn.
(AIR 1966 SC 1678 at p. 1682); A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak
(1984 (2) SCC 500, at pp. 518, 519)]. Indeed, the Court cannot reframe
the legislation as it has no power to legislate.
L.G. Chaudhari vs Secretary, L.S.G. Department, ... on 29 October, 1979
Clause (1) requires that all executive action of the State Government
shall have to be taken in the name of the Governor. Further there is no
particular formula of words required for compliance with Article 166(1).
What the Court has to see is whether the substance of its requirement
has been complied with. A Constitution Bench in R. Chitralekha etc. vs.
State of Mysore and Ors. (AIR 1964 1823) held that the provisions of the
Article were only directory and not mandatory in character and if they
were not complied with it could still be established as a question of
fact that the impugned order was issued in fact by the State Government
or the Governor. Clause (1) does not prescribe how an executive action
of the Government is to be performed, it only prescribes the mode under
which such act is to be expressed. While clause (1) in relation to the
mode of expression, clause (2) lays down the ways in which the order is
to be authenticated. Whether there is any Government order in terms of
Article 166, has to be adjudicated from the factual background of each
case. Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellant
on L.G. Chaudhari (supra) to contend that for all practicable purposes
the decision of Cabinet has to be construed as a Government order,
because three of the decisions taken by the Cabinet have been
implemented. As noted above, learned counsel for the State took the
stand that neither in the writ petition nor before the High Court, the
Cabinet decision itself was produced. In fact, the Cabinet memorandum
and the order of the Cabinet show that no decision was taken to pay any
compensation. In this connection reference is made to the Cabinet
memorandum dated 18.3.1993 and the decision No. 57 of 1999. It was
further submitted that even if it is conceded for the sake of argument
that such decision was taken, the same cannot be enforced by a writ
petition.
State Of Kerala vs Mathal Verghese & Ors on 19 November, 1986
[See State of Kerala v.
Mathai Verghese (1986 (4) SCC 746, at p. 749); Union of India v. Deoki
Nandan Aggarwal (AIR 1992 SC 96 at p.101)
The decision in Dr. L.P. Agarwal (supra) is also of no assistance
to the appellant because the issues involved was whether in respect of
tenure post concept of superannuation is applicable and the consequences
of premature retirement. In that context direction was given for payment
of arrears of salary etc. The issues were entirely different and,
therefore, that decision has no application.
Union Of India And Anr vs Deoki Nandan Aggarwal on 4 September, 1991
[See State of Kerala v.
Mathai Verghese (1986 (4) SCC 746, at p. 749); Union of India v. Deoki
Nandan Aggarwal (AIR 1992 SC 96 at p.101)
The decision in Dr. L.P. Agarwal (supra) is also of no assistance
to the appellant because the issues involved was whether in respect of
tenure post concept of superannuation is applicable and the consequences
of premature retirement. In that context direction was given for payment
of arrears of salary etc. The issues were entirely different and,
therefore, that decision has no application.