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1 - 10 of 12 (0.25 seconds)State Of Haryana And Ors. Etc. Etc vs Piara Singh And Ors. Etc. Etc on 12 August, 1992
On behalf of the petitioners, it was claimed before the
High Court that they had been regularly selected by a duly
constituted Selection Committee and their appointment should
be treated as regular appointment. This claim was, however,
contested by the State. The High Court rejected the said
claim of the petitioners and held that nothing had been
shown that the appointment of the petitioners was made after
selection through a Selection Committee. The other
contention that was urged on behalf of the petitioners
before the High Court was that the petitioners had been
working on daily wage basis for a number of years and,
therefore, they were entitled to be regularised on the post.
The said contention was also rejected by the High Court on
the view that none of the petitioners were either ad hoc
employees or even daily wagers continuously for one year or
for 240 days as is generally claimed by the persons seeking
regularisation even in industrial establishments and,
furthermore the petitioners did not fall in any of the
categories referred to by this Court in the State of Haryana
v. Piara Singh, 1992 (1) SCC 118, as entitling
regularisation. The High Court has held that in every one of
the writ petitions none of the petitioners had worked even
for more than a few weeks or at best for a few months in a
year and consequently the entire edifice of the claim of the
petitioners seeking regularisation was knocked out. As
regards the advertisement dated March 24, 1991 issued by the
State inviting applications for appointment on the post of
Registration Clerks it was stated on behalf of the
respondents before the High Court that in view of the
amendments which have been made in the Registration Act,
1908, the State does not need any more Registration Clerks
and that no further steps have been taken for recruitment on
the basis of the said advertisement. The High Court has held
that mere advertisement in a paper about some posts lying
vacant does not confer any right whatsoever on those who may
be seeking appointment in pursuance of the advertisement and
since the State has specifically come up with the case that
they do not require any one to be appointed as Registration
Clerks in pursuance of the said advertisement dated March
24, 1991 and they are not proposing to process the said
advertisement any further, the said advertisement cannot be
invoked by the petitioners to seek regularisation as
Registration Clerks. Referring to the decision of S.H.A.
Raza J. in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3721/1990 against
which the special leave petition was dismissed by this
Court, the High Court has observed that the fact that the
special leave petition has been dismissed against the said
judgment cannot be a precedent for permitting the
petitioners in these matters to get a benefit which they are
not entitled to. The High Court has disagreed with the view
of the learned Judge in that case and has reversed the same.
The learned Judges have also referred to the judgmentment of
another learned single Judge (Vijay Bahuguna J.) in Civil
Misc. Writ Petition No. 17634-A/1991 and has not approved
the directions given by the learned Judge in that matter and
have observed that the said directions are wholly out of
bounds of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The
learned Judges have also taken note of the interim orders
that were passed by other learned Judges [sitting singly] in
various writ petitions, both at Allahabad as well as at
Lucknow, and have observed that the said interim orders were
obtained by the petitioners on the basis of averments which
were incorrect and false. The learned Judges have,
therefore, dismissed the writ petitions that were filed by
the petitioners.
Section 32A in The Registration Act, 1908 [Entire Act]
Prabodh Verma And Others, Etc vs State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others. Etc on 27 July, 1984
It has been next urged on behalf of the petitioners
that even if the petitioners are not entitled to seed
regularisation, they should be given preference in the
matter of appointment on the post of Registration Clerk
whenever regular appointment is made on that post and
reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in
Prabodh Verma & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 1985
(1) SCR 216. In that case nearly 90 per cent of teachers in
recognised institutions who were members of the Uttar
Pradesh Madhyamik Shikshak Sangh went on an indefinite
strike. The said strike was declared as illegal by the State
Government and the services of the striking teachers were
terminated. Fresh appointments on temporary basis were made
on the posts of teachers whose services were terminated.
Thereafter a settlement took place between the striking
teachers and the State Government and the services of the
newly appointed teachers were terminated. Thereafter, the
Governor of Uttar Pradesh promulgated an ordinance which
provided for the absorption of certain teachers in the
institutions recognised under the Intermediate Education
Act, 1921 and for that purpose a provision was made for
maintaining a register of "reserve pool teachers" consisting
of persons who were appointed as teachers during the period
of the strike and it was further provided that where any
substantive vacancy in the post of a teacher in an
institution recognised by the Board of High school and
Intermediate Education was to be filled by direct
recruitment, such post should at the instance of the
Inspector be offered by the management to the teacher whose
name was entered in the said register. The validity of the
said ordinance was challenged before the Allahabad High
Court by some of the applicants who were not in the reserve
pool. The said ordinance was declared as invalid by the High
Court on the ground that it was violative of the right to
equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution.
Reversing the said view of the High Court, this Court upheld
the said ordinance and held that there was an intellingile
differential which distinguishes the teachers put in the
reserve pool from other applicants for posts of teachers in
recognised institutions inasmuch as the reserve pool
teachers were those who had come forward at a time when the
teachers employed or a large majority of such teachers, in
the recognised institutions, had gone on an indefinite
strike and had continued the strike even after it had been
declared illegal and had the strike continued almost all the
recognised institutions in the State would have had to close
down putting the students to great hardship and suffering
and causing a break in their education and that it was in
these difficult and trying times that the reserve pool
teachers came forward to man the recognised institutions. It
has also been observed that the reserve pool teachers joined
the recognised institutions during the period of the strike
in circumstances in which they exposed themselves to great
hostility from the striking teachers and that they did so
running a certain amount of risk for there was always a
possibility of a strike turning violent and that almost all
those who applied for these posts and were not in the
reserve pool and were seeking to challenge the validity of
the ordinance must have qualified to be appointed to the
post of teachers in the recognised institutions during the
pendency of strike and none of these applicants, however,
came forward to join a recognised institution during that
period as the reserve pool teachers did and, therefore, they
stood in a different class from the reserve pool teachers.
We find it difficult to appreciate how the petitioners can
claim preference in the matter of regular appointment on the
post of Registration Clerk on the basis of this decision. It
cannot be said that the petitioners had to undergo any risk
when they joined as Registration Clerks on daily wage basis.
They joined the posts of their own free will knowing fully
well that the said appointment was for a very short duration
and would not exceed three months during the course of a
financial year. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the
petitioners who had worked as Registration Clerks on daily
wage basis form a separate class and are entitled to claim
preferential treatment in the matter of appointment on the
post of Registration Clerks as and when recruitment is made
for the said post.
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 14 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 19 in The Registration Act, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 69 in The Registration Act, 1908 [Entire Act]
Majeed Khan And Ors. vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 28 July, 1990
A number of writ petitions were filed in the Allahabad
High Court by persons who had worked as registration clerks
on daily wage basis in the past or who were actually working
as Registration Clerks on daily wage basis wherein the
petitioners sought regularisation of their appointment on
the post of registration clerk and prayed for quashing of
the Press notification inviting applications for appointment
on the post of registration clerks. Many of these writ
petitions had been disposed of by learned single Judges of
the High Court and special appeals against these judgments
were pending before the Division Bench while other writ
petitions were pending for disposal before learned single
Judges. In a large number of cases interim orders had been
passed directing that the petitioners in the writ petitions
may be allowed to continue in service during the pendency of
the writ petitions. One such writ petition (Civil Misc. Writ
Petition No. 3721/90, Majeed & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors.)
filed at the Lucknow Bench of the High Court had been
allowed by a learned single Judge (S.H.A. Raza J.) and the
special leave petition (Civil) No. ....../93 [CC no.
121212/91] filed against the said judgment was dismissed on
the ground of delay by this Court by order dated August 10,
1993. All the special appeals and writ petitions that were
pending in the High Court at Allahabad as well at the
Lucknow Bench were taken up and were disposed of by the
Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment
dated February 8, 1995.