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Vrushab S/O Shrimant Janaj vs The State Of Karnataka on 3 December, 2025 cites

People'S Union For Democratic Rights ... vs Union Of India & Others on 18 September, 1982

(Emphasis supplied) Article 23 of the Constitution of India has borne consideration in plethora of judgments. I deem it appropriate to notice the celebrated judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of PEOPLE'S UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS v. UNION OF INDIA reported in (1982) 3 SCC 235, wherein, the Apex Court interprets what is 'begar' and how the State must outlaw such practise. The Apex Court holds as follows:
Supreme Court of India Cites 31 - Cited by 436 - P N Bhagwati - Full Document

Mrs. Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr. on 25 January, 1978

NC: 2025:KHC-D:17214 WP No. 109223 of 2025 HC-KAR word "similar" and contended that it is not every form of forced labour which is prohibited by Article 23 but only such form of forced labour as is similar to "begar" and since "begar" means labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it, the interdict of Article 23 is limited only to those forms of forced labour where labour or service is exacted from a person without paying any remuneration at all and if some remuneration is paid, though it be inadequate, it would not fall within the words "other similar forms of forced labour". This contention seeks to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition against forced labour enacted in Article 23 and is in our opinion not well founded. It does not accord with the principle enunciated by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 : (1978) 2 SCR 621] that when interpreting the provisions of the Constitution conferring fundamental rights, the attempt of the court should be to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than to attenuate their meaning and content. It is difficult to imagine that the Constitution-makers should have intended to strike only at certain forms of forced labour leaving it open to the socially or economically powerful sections of the community to exploit the poor and weaker sections by resorting to other forms of forced labour. Could there be any logic or reason in enacting that if a person is forced to give labour or service to another without receiving any remuneration at all, it should be regarded as a pernicious practice sufficient to attract the condemnation of Article 23, but if some remuneration is paid for it, then it should be outside the inhibition of that article? If this were the true interpretation, Article 23 would be reduced to a mere rope of sand, for it would then be the easiest thing in an exploitative society for a person belonging to a socially or economically dominant class to exact labour or service from a person belonging to the deprived and vulnerable section of the community by paying a negligible amount of remuneration and thus escape the rigour of Article 23. We do not think it would be right to place on the language of Article 23 an
Supreme Court of India Cites 126 - Cited by 1969 - M H Beg - Full Document
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