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K.Kuberan vs The Management Of Express Publications on 3 September, 2013 cites

Management Of Binny Ltd., Engineering ... vs Presiding Officer, Industrial ... on 31 July, 2003

"10. ...... The sequence of events referred to above would clearly indicate that opportunities of explaining the charges against the workman have been given, but the tenor of the letters submitted by the workman/second respondent right from the reply to the show-cause notice and even after the conclusion of the enquiry before the enquiry officer, would manifestly indicate that the workman was not inclined to participate in the enquiry and he was gathering materials for future litigation. The persistent request of the second respondent for the Tamil version of the notice, dated April 20, 1992, would clearly prove the abovesaid intention of the second respondent. When such notice is of no consequence, his persistent request for the Tamil version and the non-furnishing of such Tamil version of the notice cannot at all be regarded to be a violation, which caused prejudice to the respondent in participating in the enquiry. One cannot import fine principle of law and weigh the same in golden scales to come to the conclusion that the principles of natural justice have been totally violated.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 7 - K R Pandian - Full Document

Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Chandigarh vs Suresh Chand And Anr on 21 February, 1978

12. Before considering the said issue, it is to be noted that what was sought by the Management before the second respondent was an approval of the order of punishment and that granting of such approval does not preclude the employee from challenging the order of punishment in a separate proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the very same issue in PUNJAB BEVERAGES Vs. SURESH CHAND (1978 (II) LLJ 1). The Apex Court has held in paragraph 6 of the said decision that the only scope of the enquiry before the Tribunal exercising jurisdiction under Section 33 is to decide whether the ban imposed on the employer by that Section should be lifted or maintained by granting or refusing the permission or approval asked for by the employer. It is observed therein that if the permission or approval is refused by the Tribunal, the employer would be precluded from discharging or punishing the workman. But the reverse is that even if the permission or approval is granted that would not validate the action of the discharge or punishment by way of dismissal taken by the employer. It is observed therein that the permission or approval would merely remove the ban so as to enable the employer to make an order of discharge or dismissal but the validity of the order of discharge or dismissal would still be liable to be tested in a reference at the instance of the workmen under Section 10. Thus, the validity of the discharge is still open to be challenged by the workman, even after the grant of approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the said Act. Therefore, this Court in this proceedings cannot go into the correctness or otherwise of the order of discharge passed by the first respondent Management. So, what is to be seen is as to whether the grant of approval as contemplated under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has been validly made or not.
Supreme Court of India Cites 25 - Cited by 433 - P N Bhagwati - Full Document
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