Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 35 (0.39 seconds)Section 4 in The Urban Land (Ceiling And Regulation) Act, 1976 [Entire Act]
Section 5 in The Urban Land (Ceiling And Regulation) Act, 1976 [Entire Act]
The Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Section 23 in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Jambu Rao Satappa Kocheri vs Neminath Appayya Hanammannaver on 10 April, 1968
33. On going by the facts in the first decision reported in Jambu Rao Satappa Kocheri v. Neminath Appayya Hanamannayar, and also provisions of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, I do not think that the decision has any application to the facts of this case. Under Bombay Act, there is no prohibition for transferring land]. It is clear from paragraph 6 of the Judgment, wherein it is held thus,
"......The Act has imposed no restriction upon the transfer of agricultural
lands from one agriculturist to another. It is true that by S. 35 a person who
comes to hold, after the appointed day, agricultural land in excess of the
ceiling, the lands having been acquired either by purchase, assignment, lease,
surrender or by request, the acquisition in excess of the ceiling is invalid. The
expression "acquisition of such excess land shall be invalid" may appear
somewhat ambiguous. But when the scheme of the Act is examined, it is clear
that the Legislature has not declared the transfer or bequest invalid for S.84-C
provides that the land in excess of the ceiling shall be at the disposal of the
Government when an order is made by the Mamlatdar. The invalidity of the
acquisition is therefore only to the extent to which the holding exceeds the
ceiling prescribed by S.5, and involves the consequence that the land will vest
in the Government.
Shah Jitendra Nanalal vs Patel Lallubhai Ishverbhai on 10 April, 1984
In the decision reported in Shah Jitendra Nanalal v. Patel Lallubhai Ishverbhai, (FB), one of the questions that was raised before the Full Bench was whether a decree for specific performance could be given condition. What is the effect of Section 5(3) read with Section 20 of the Central Act in the agreement of transfer was the matter in issue. Once it is held that Section 6 is an absolute bar, question of granting conditional decree also will not arise. The said argument pre-supposes that agreement and sale are valid and is invalid only as against Government.
Gian Chand vs Gopala & Ors on 18 January, 1995
In Gian Chand v. Gopala, this Court had held that after the notification under Section 4(1)
is published, any encumbrances created by the owner of the land does not bind
the Government. The agreement of sale, if any, was frustrated by the
publication of the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under
Section 6.
The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948
State Of Tamil Nadu And Ors. vs Narendra Dairy Farms (P) Ltd. And Anr. on 17 September, 1986
In paragraph 5 of the Judgment, their Lordships held thus,
"... As would be seen from a plain reading of the section, the Urban Land Ceiling Act overrides the other laws for the time being in force or any custom, usage or agreement or decree or order of a court, tribunal or other authority. In view of section 43 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, the Urban Land Ceiling Act has to be given a full play and any proceeding which are pending on the date ' when the Urban Land Ceiling Act comes into force would have to cease in case the Urban Land Ceiling Act applies to those proceedings, to the extent of such application and declaration of the excess land. A provision similar to S.43 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act is available in S.4 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961. The Division Bench in State v. Narendra Dairy Farms (P) Ltd., however, did not advert to the effect of S.4 on the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. It appears that the provisions of S.4 were not brought to the notice of the learned Division Bench, for, had the same been brought to the notice of the learned Division Bench, for, had the same been brought to its notice, the overriding effect of S.4 could not have been ignored and the judgment would then perhaps have been different.