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1 - 10 of 16 (0.20 seconds)Section 52 in The Calcutta University Act, 1979. [Entire Act]
Harla vs The State Of Rajasthan on 24 September, 1951
In the case of Harla v. State of Rajasthan, the Supreme Court no doubt held that it would be against the principles of natural justice to punish or penalise the subject under bye-laws of which they could or even with the exercise of reasonable diligence have acquired any knowledge in the absence of their publication. But even then the Supreme Court made a specific reservation by subjecting the principles to an exception "in the absence of any special law or custom". So that if the law itself provides otherwise the effect of a statutory rule or regulation need not await its formal publication.
Board Of High School & Intermediate ... vs Kumari Chittra Srivastava & Others on 20 November, 1969
Dipa Pal vs University Of Calcutta on 18 February, 1952
As a matter of fact the Supreme Court approved the earlier decisions of this Court in the case of Dipa Pal v. Calcutta University, and B. C. Das Gupta v. B. Rakshit, . This being the position the obligation to record reason is not dependent solely on the provisions of the statute or the statutory rules: it may also arise from the nature of the function itself Mr. Dey may be right that there is no express provision either in the statute or in the statutory regulation requiring the Sub-Committee or the Board of Discipline to assign any reason. It is, however, necessary to consider the scheme provided by Regulation 62 of the First Ordinance, Rule 62 (2) requires that all cases of breaches of discipline in connection with the University Examinations shall forthwith be reported with relevant documents and details to the Secretary of the Board of Discipline. Rule 62 (3) provides that on receipt of such reports the Secretary of the Board shall inform the student concerned of the charges against him and ask him to appear before the Board or the Sub-Committee and furnish an explanation verbally and in writing with regard to the charge. Rule 62 (4) provides if the Board or the Sub-Committee holds that the charges have been proved it may recommend cancellation of the examination or such other penalty as specified therein as it may deem fit. Rule 62 (5) provides that the decision of the sub-committee shall be subject to the confirmation by the Board of Discipline and that the proceedings of the Board shall be placed before the Syndicate for confirmation. Under Rule 62 (6) the decision of the Board of Discipline is made subject to confirmation by the Syndicate. On these provisions I am clearly of the view that either the Board or the Sub-Committee to whichever authority the determination is assigned must have to find that the charge of breach of discipline had been proved against the delinquent candidate. Such determination must be made with reference to the relevant documents, details and reports as also the explanation furnished by the candidate referred to in sub-rules (2) & (3) of Rule 62 of the First Ordinance. Furthermore if such determination is made by the Sub-Committee it is subject to review both by the Board of Discipline as also by the Syndicate for the purpose of approval and if the determination is by the Board itself then the review is by the Syndicate for the purpose of such approval. Rule 61 (2) of the First Ordinance similarly requires that the Secretary of the Board shall keep records of the proceedings of the meeting of the Board. The scheme of these provisions clearly implies that the Sub-Committee or the Board should record its findings on the charges and the reasons therefor as otherwise its review by the Syndicate or the Board of Discipline as the case may be for the purpose of approval becomes a useless formality. In my view if what is recorded is mere recommendation of the penalty and nothing else it is not known how either the Board of Discipline or the Syndicate would discharge its obligation of approving or confirming the same. Approval or the confirmation in my view means appraisement of the findings of the Board or the Sub-Committee as also the penalty recommended with reference thereto. On the other hand if the approval or the confirmation is to be made only with reference to the recommendation of the penalty itself and nothing else not only (will there be no scope for approval or confirmation but such approval or confirmation would be nothing else than an inconsequential formality. For these reasons I must hold that under the provisions of these rules of the First Ordinance it was necessary on the part of the Board or the Sub-Committee to record its findings along with the reasons therefor on the charges levelled against the delinquent candidate before it could recommend any penalty. Rule 62 (4) of the First Ordinance if it does not expressly lay down such a thing at least lays it down by necessary implication.
B.C. Das Gupta And Anr. vs Bijoyranjan Rakshit And Ors. on 27 June, 1952
18. That apart it has again been laid down by the Supreme Court that when a Tribunal exercises quasi-judicial or judicial function it is required to pass 'speaking' order. Giving reasons for determination is one of the fundamental and elementary requirements of judicial or quasi-judicial process. It ensures that decisions in such cases are not the result of whim or fancy but of a judicial approach to the issues; it also ensures adjudication according to law and procedure established by law and the parties to be affected by the determination is thereby made to know the grounds on which the tribunal has decided against him. This is the view expressed by the Supreme Court in a number of cases.
Bhagat Raja vs The Union Of India & Ors on 29 March, 1967
Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, which reviewed all the earlier decisions and reaffirmed the principle earlier laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Govind Rao v. State of M. P., and Harinagar Sugar Mills v. S. S. Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1961 SC 1969.
Bachhittar Singh vs The State Of Punjab on 7 March, 1962
10. Under Section 23 (1) (i) read with Section 52 of the said Act the Syndicate is to make ordinances except of course the First Ordinance framed under Section 58 (2) thereof. Section 52 (2) provides that an Ordinance made by the Syndicate is to come into force from such date as the Syndicate may determine. Now in the present case the resolution of the Syndicate adopting the amendment to the First Ordinance itself provides that the amendment is to take immediate effect and is not to await the date of its publication. But Mr. Chakraborty relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, to contend that the amendment can have no effect from any date prior to its publication in the official gazette. In my view, however, the said decision cannot be an authority for the proposition contended for by Mr. Chakraborty. In that case the Supreme Court only held that an administrative decision does not become final unless it is communicated as prior thereto it remains provisional and open to alteration, These principles, by their very nature, can have no bearing on the question as to when a statutory rule or regulation comes into effect. In such cases, the statute itself should prevail and if the statute provides the manner or the time for the application of the rules or regulations made thereunder, they should be brought into effect exactly in the manner provided unless of course the said provision is void or ultra vires. To hold it otherwise is to override the statute.
Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd vs Union Of India And Others on 16 August, 1965
It is however necessary that reference should be made to two other decisions of the Supreme Court taking a somewhat different view but in circumstances wholly distinguishable in the cases of Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, and Som Datt Dutta v. Union of India . In both these cases when the Central Government was confirming orders of subordinate authorities, the Supreme Court overruled the objection that if such confirmation is not accompanied by reasons the same is liable to be set aside. In the case of Govind Rao, the learned Chief Justice recorded his dissent and held that even in such cases it is obligatory for the Central Government to record its reasons. But in these two decisions the Supreme Court was not really considering an issue like the present one and the Supreme Court itself had distinguished this view taken in the case of in the later decision of .
Som Datt Datta vs Union Of India And Ors on 20 September, 1968
It is however necessary that reference should be made to two other decisions of the Supreme Court taking a somewhat different view but in circumstances wholly distinguishable in the cases of Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, and Som Datt Dutta v. Union of India . In both these cases when the Central Government was confirming orders of subordinate authorities, the Supreme Court overruled the objection that if such confirmation is not accompanied by reasons the same is liable to be set aside. In the case of Govind Rao, the learned Chief Justice recorded his dissent and held that even in such cases it is obligatory for the Central Government to record its reasons. But in these two decisions the Supreme Court was not really considering an issue like the present one and the Supreme Court itself had distinguished this view taken in the case of in the later decision of .