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1 - 10 of 48 (0.35 seconds)The Slum Areas (Improvement And Clearance) Act, 1956
Section 76B in The City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 [Entire Act]
Article 21 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 26 in The Slum Areas (Improvement And Clearance) Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Section 68 in The Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 [Entire Act]
Nasir Ahemed vs Assistant Custodian General, Evacuee ... on 28 March, 1980
The grounds must be made out on the basis of the relevant material. If
the existence of the conditions required for the exercise of the power is
challenged, the Courts are entitled to examine whether those conditions
existed when the order was made. A person aggrieved by such action can
question the satisfaction by showing that it was wholly based on
irrelevant grounds and hence amounted to no satisfaction at all. In other
words, the existence of the circumstances in question is open to judicial
review. I find the reliance misconceived as such individual scrutiny of
each shop occupier is not necessary in present matter. Hon'ble Apex
Court in Nasir Ahmed, v. Assistant Custodian General, Evacuee Property,
U.P., Lucknow and another, (supra) considers Administration of Evacuee
Property Act (31 of 1950). The notice under Section 7 (1) of that Act
called upon the appellant and his brother to show cause why they should
not be declared evacuees under clause (iii) of Section 2 (d) of the Act
and the ground mentioned in the notice was also based on that clause.
The Barium Chemicals Ltd. And Anr vs The Company Law Board And Others on 4 May, 1966
In Barium Chemicals Ltd. and another, v. Company Law Board and
Others, Hon'ble Apex Court considers Section 237(b) of the Companies
Act and states that words 'If in the opinion of Central Government'
imply that formation of opinion is subjective process but existence of
circumstances suggesting inference of what has been set out in sub-
Mohammad Raihan vs State Of Uttar Pradesh And Ors. on 23 April, 1956
Raihan v. State of U.P." (supra) by Allahabad High Court is relied on for
that purpose. There the phrase "public interest" used in Section 47(1) of
the Motor Vehicles Act,1939 has been construed because of the nature of
obligation to grant or refuse stage carriage permit on RTA and Court has
found that it mean the interest of the people using that stage carriage
and not public in general. Order of ADMC passed on objection of
petitioner mentions that existing Supermarket is constructed in 1964
when commercial activities were limited. Now there is manifold increase
and area has become congested. Then adequate parking was not
provided and the public has to face serious inconvenience. Maintenance
of cleanliness in the premises and surrounding area is also found a
problem. Thus respondent NMC being local authority as also planning
authority thought it fit to construct a Shopping Mall with modern
facilities and enough parking place for public convenience. The project is
as per Development Control Rules and building bye-laws. It is stated that
it will face-lift the area and remove traffic congestion in surroundings.
Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons vs Board Of Trustees Of The Port Of Bombay on 27 April, 1989
Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of
Bombay), are shown to point out the reasons for which such exemption is
held valid. Real design of NMC is to evict poor petitioners and to induct
wealthy persons. Project as designed is of international standards and
does not take care of small businessmen like petitioners. As such it is not
for a common man and also not in public interest at all. The mode and
manner of attempted compliance with Section 76B also shows malafides
and dishonesty. Facts considered by the District Court are mostly not
appearing in SCN and hence it overlooked the deprivation of opportunity
of effective hearing. Shri Sharif, learned Counsel furthers this line by
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alleging that the decision was to have 7 such malls in City and work on
remaining Shopping Malls has come to standstill. The present project
also can not be therefore reasonably completed and as alleged public
purpose for which eviction of petitioners is being sought does not survive
now, the SCN and consequential orders passed have become
meaningless.