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1 - 4 of 4 (0.19 seconds)M.C. Verghese vs T.J. Ponnan & Anr on 13 November, 1968
4. Counsel representing the respondent brought to my notice the decision in M.C. Varghese v. T.J Ponnan (AIR 1970 SC 1876) to contend that a communication from the husband to the wife is publication. According to the counsel, if the communication of a libellous statement by the husband to the wife is publication, communication from counsel to client should also be taken as publication. The learned counsel proceeds to state that the reply notice sent by the petitioners to the complainant's counsel was handed over to the complainant and that handing over will amount to publication. In the above case Ponnan, husband of Rathi, sent certain letters to Rathi. Those letters contained defamatory imputations concerning Rathi's father, Mr. Varghese. When Varghese initiated proceedings to prosecute Ponnan for offence under Section 500 of the Penal Code their Lordships took the view that the communication from Ponnan to Rathi was publication of the defamatory imputations as fas as Mr. Varghese is concerned. 'This statement of law cannot be pressed into service in the instant case because the defamatory imputation was in the communication sent by petitioners' counsel to the complainant's counsel. Communication from complainant's counsel to the complainant cannot in any way be considered as publication because of the intimate relationship between the client and counsel. The counsel has no separate existence as compared with the client in matters relating to the legal duties. Communication to the counsel is communication to the client. Viewed in this manner the decision cannot be taken as one helping the complainant in this case.
Section 499 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Rev. Fr. Bernad Thattil vs Ramachandran Pillai on 6 October, 1986
5. Learned counsel representing the complainant tried to sustain the proceedings before the court below relying on the decision in Rev. Fr. Bernad v. Ramachandran Pillai (1986 KLT 1240). The facts of that case are, in short, as follows : Complainant was denied employment by the accused. Complainant then sent a lawyer notice to the accused. In reply the accused caused a lawyer notice sent to the complainant's counsel. In that notice it was mentioned that the complainant bad misappropriated a sum of Rs 90/- from the amount given to him by the accused to purchase diesel. Complainant took serious note of the said averment and filed a complaint alleging that the imputation in the notice is libellour to him. That complaint was sought to be quashed in exercise of the powers under Section 482 of the Code. This Court refused to quash proceedings. According to counsel, the facts is on all fours to the one in this case. Since this court refused to quash the complaint their learned counsel wants this petition also to be dismissed. I find it difficult to accept this argument. In that case this court proceeded on the basis that the complaint clearly brought out offence under Section 499 of the Penal Code. In other words, this court proceeded as if there was due publication of the libellous material. This court was then concerned with the question whether the accused was entitled to the benefit of 9th exemption to Section 499. This is clear from the observation in that judgment that "the petitioner (accused) has spread a scandal in the locality that the respondent (Complainant) had committed pilferage in diesel." Thus the said decision has to be distinguished on facts. In the instant case there is no such allegation that the petitioner spread the scandal in the locality that the respondent is having illicit connection with sheriff.
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