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Sri.Dasharath C P vs The State Of Karnataka on 13 March, 2026 cites

Mrs. Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr. on 25 January, 1978

NC: 2026:KHC:15168 WP No. 3511 of 2026 HC-KAR principle enunciated by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 : (1978) 2 SCR 621] that when interpreting the provisions of the Constitution conferring fundamental rights, the attempt of the court should be to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than to attenuate their meaning and content. It is difficult to imagine that the Constitution-makers should have intended to strike only at certain forms of forced labour leaving it open to the socially or economically powerful sections of the community to exploit the poor and weaker sections by resorting to other forms of forced labour. Could there be any logic or reason in enacting that if a person is forced to give labour or service to another without receiving any remuneration at all, it should be regarded as a pernicious practice sufficient to attract the condemnation of Article 23, but if some remuneration is paid for it, then it should be outside the inhibition of that article? If this were the true interpretation, Article 23 would be reduced to a mere rope of sand, for it would then be the easiest thing in an exploitative society for a person belonging to a socially or economically dominant class to exact labour or service from a person belonging to the deprived and vulnerable section of the community by paying a negligible amount of remuneration and thus escape the rigour of Article 23. We do not think it would be right to place on the language of Article 23 an interpretation which would emasculate its beneficent provisions and defeat the very purpose of enacting them. We are clearly of the view that Article 23 is intended to abolish every form of forced labour. The words "other similar forms of forced labour" are used in Article 23 not with a view to importing the particular characteristic of "begar" that labour or service should be exacted without payment of any remuneration but with a view to bringing within the scope and ambit of that article all other forms of forced labour and since "begar" is one form of forced labour, the Constitution-makers used the words "other similar forms of forced labour". If the requirement that labour or work should be exacted without any remuneration
Supreme Court of India Cites 126 - Cited by 1969 - M H Beg - Full Document

People'S Union For Democratic Rights ... vs Union Of India & Others on 18 September, 1982

(Emphasis supplied) Article 23 of the Constitution of India has borne consideration in plethora of judgments. I deem it appropriate to notice the celebrated judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of PEOPLE'S UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS v. UNION OF INDIA reported in (1982) 3 SCC 235, wherein, the Apex Court interprets what is 'begar' and how the State must outlaw such practise. The Apex Court holds as follows:
Supreme Court of India Cites 31 - Cited by 436 - P N Bhagwati - Full Document

S. Vasudevan And Ors. vs S.D. Mital And Ors. on 18 January, 1961

NC: 2026:KHC:15168 WP No. 3511 of 2026 HC-KAR High Court in S. Vasudevan v. S.D. Mital [AIR 1962 Bom 53 : 63 Bom LR 774 : (1961-62) 21 FJR 441] . "Begar" is thus clearly a form of forced labour. Now it is not merely "begar" which is unconstitutionally (sic) prohibited by Article 23 but also all other similar forms of forced labour. This Article strikes at forced labour in whatever form it may manifest itself, because it is violative of human dignity and is contrary to basic human values. The practice of forced labour is condemned in almost every international instrument dealing with human rights. It is interesting to find that as far back as 1930 long before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came into being, International Labour Organisation adopted Convention No. 29 laying down that every member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this convention shall "suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms" and this prohibition was elaborated in Convention No. 105 adopted by the International Labour Organisation in 1957. The words "forced or compulsory labour" in Convention No. 29 had of course a limited meaning but that was so on account of the restricted definition of these words given in Article 2 of the Convention. Article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also prohibit forced or compulsory labour. Article 23 is in the same strain and it enacts a prohibition against forced labour in whatever form it may be found. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents laid some emphasis on the word "similar" and contended that it is not every form of forced labour which is prohibited by Article 23 but only such form of forced labour as is similar to "begar" and since "begar" means labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it, the interdict of Article 23 is limited only to those forms of forced labour where labour or service is exacted from a person without paying any remuneration at all and if some remuneration is paid, though it be inadequate, it would not fall within the words "other similar forms of forced labour". This contention seeks to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition against forced labour enacted in Article 23 and is in our opinion not well founded. It does not accord with the
Bombay High Court Cites 55 - Cited by 25 - Full Document
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