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1 - 10 of 15 (0.40 seconds)Century Metal Recycling Pvt. Ltd. vs Union Of India on 17 May, 2019
"9. Shri Vipin Jain, Ld. Counsel appearing for the appellant
has assailed this view by citing a plethora of judgments and
decisions of which two judgments, one of the Punjab &
Haryana High Court and other of the Madras High Court are
directly on the point. The judgment of the Punjab & Haryana
High Court in the case of Century Metal Recycling Pvt. Ltd.
v. Union of India - 2009 (234) E.L.T. 234 was dealing with a
situation where refund was claimed of the amounts
deposited in the course of investigation and there was a
dispute, as in the present case between the two parties on
the question whether such payments had been made
voluntarily or under duress. The High Court held that the
question whether the payment was voluntary or under
coercion was irrelevant and that as long as there was an
assessment and demand, the amount deposited could not
be appropriated. The relevant paragraph of this judgment is
extracted below :
The Customs Act, 1962
Section 27 in The Customs Act, 1962 [Entire Act]
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
The Customs Tariff Act, 1975
Kamala Mills Ltd vs State Of Bombay on 23 April, 1965
section (3) declares in emphatic terms that
"notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any
judgment, decree, order or direction of the Appellate
Tribunal or any court or any other provision of this Act or
the rules made thereunder or any other law for the time
being in force, no refund shall be made except as provided
in sub-section (2)". Sub-section (2), it may be mentioned,
provides the circumstances in which and the grounds on
which a refund shall be made, or shall be denied, as the
case may be. It is necessary to emphasis that the
exclusivity of these provisions relating to refund - and
conversely the bar to other proceedings created by them -
is specific to the subject of refund and is apart from and in
addition to the general bar implicit in the Act or expressed
in some of its other provisions, as the case may be. Because
the Act creates new rights and liabilities and also provides
the machinery for assessment and adjudication of those
rights and liabilities, a bar to the jurisdiction to civil court
arises by necessary implication - an aspect dealt with at
some length later. [Also see Principle No. 3 enunciated in
Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay [1966 (1) S.C.R. 64]
dealt with in Paras 30 to 33.] The point to be stressed is
that the exclusive nature of the refund provisions
expressly declared in Rule 11 and Section 11B, at all
points of time, is an express and specific one
contained in a special statute. It is not the usual
finality clause found in several statutes; it is much
more.