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1 - 10 of 27 (0.25 seconds)The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
Section 398 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
The Companies Act, 1956
Allen Berry & Co. (P) Ltd vs Union Of India, New Delhi on 5 January, 1971
The same principle was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Alien Berry & Co. v. Union of India, .
Champsey Bhara And Company vs The Jivraj Balloo Spinning And C. Co. ... on 6 March, 1923
There the Supreme Court referred to the well-known decision on this point of the Privy Council in Champsey Bhara and Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., 1923 AC 480 : (AIR 1923 PC 66) and reiterated that as the parties chose their own arbitrator they could not, when the award was good on the face of it object to the decision either upon the law or the facts. Therefore, even when an arbitrator committed a mistake either in law or in fact in determining the matters referred to him but such mistake did not appear on the face of the award or in a document appended to or incorporated in it so as to form part of it the award would neither be remitted nor set aside notwithstanding the mistake.
N. Chellappan vs Secretary, Kerala State Electricity ... on 21 November, 1974
In the case of N. Chellappan v. Kerala S. E. Board, , the Supreme Court again reiterated the well-known principle that an error of law on the face of the award means that you can find in the award or in a document actually incorporated therein as for instance a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which was the basis of the award and which you could (then) say was erroneous. The Court has no jurisdiction to investigate into the merits of the case and to examine the documentary and oral evidence on the record for the purpose of finding out whether or not the arbitrator had committed any error of law.
Bacha F. Guzdar vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay on 28 October, 1954
7. Now, in this case the first point on the aspect of the error of law was that the arbitrator had purported to divide the assets of the company which under the law the arbitrator was not competent. I have set out the award before. My attention in this connection was drawn to Clauses (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (11) of the award in support of the contention that the assets of the company had been dealt with by the
award which could not be the subject-matter of the award by the arbitrator in the manner done by him. Now in this connection before I deal with the actual contentions it may be necessary to remember that in the background of the litigation leading to this award by the arbitrator there was proceeding under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956 and in this connection therewith the parties had agreed to refer the matters to the arbitration of the arbitrator. In support of the proposition that in dealing with the assets of the company the arbitrator committed an error of law reliance was placed on the observations of the House of Lords in the case of Ma-caura v- Northern Assurance Co. Ltd., 1925 AC 619, where the House of Lords reiterated that neither a shareholder nor a creditor of a company had any insur-able interest in any particular assets of the company. My attention was drawn to the observations of Lord Buckmaster at pages 625 and 627 of the report and the observations of Lord Wrenbury at p. 633 of the report where the learned Lord observed that the corporator even if he held all the shares was not the corporation and neither he nor any creditor of the company had any proprietary right legal or equitable in the assets of the corporation. Similarly, reliance was placed on the case of Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commr. of I.-T., Bombay, and my attention was drawn to the observations of the Supreme Court in para 7 of the judgment.
Union Of India (Uoi) vs M.L. Dalmiya & Co. Ltd. on 21 September, 1976
8. It may be appropriate to bear in mind that the company was a party to the arbitration agreement and I have set out the schedule to the arbitration agreement which indicated the assets which were the subject-matters of dispute. It is indisputable that company is a separate entity than the shareholders and the assets of the company as such cannot be bartered away or parted with in liquidation of claims inter se between the shareholders and directors. But in a private limited company which is in the nature of a partnership and where the company is a party to the agreement referring the disputes to the arbitration and where, as in this case there were evidence of claims by the shareholders against the company in respect of their dues, his remuneration as director and unpaid dividends etc., there is no violation of any principle of law in distribut-ing in specie the assets of the company
in lieu of or in satisfaction of the claims of the creditors even if they are the shareholders of the company. Giving up a part of the tenancy or parting with some of the assets of the company is possible in law in liquidation of the claims against its creditors even if such creditors are the shareholders of the company and such claims perhaps originated out of the shareholdings in the company. There was evidence before the arbitrator on this point and, furthermore, the entire proceedings before the arbitrators proceeded on the basis that the parties were willing to divide the assets of the company. In such circumstances, in my opinion, the arbitrator did not commit any error of law in the award that he made on this aspect of the matter. Where certain consequences might be expected of certain adjudication if such disputes, are referred for adjudication then it cannot be said that the arbitrator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction if those consequences follow. Some support for this proposition was sought to be drawn on behalf of the respondents from the decision in the case of Union of India v. M. L. Dalmiya & Co., (1977) 81 Cal WN 168.
Nilkantha Shidramappa Ningashetti vs Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti And ... on 28 April, 1961
Upon this basis it was urged that there was no proper award filed before the 12th of July, 1978 and until the award had been properly filed no party could apply for the setting aside of the award It was urged that filing as such was not a mere technical matter. It was further contended on behalf of
the petitioners that in view of the notice issued by this Court if there was any delay the same should be condoned. It was further urged on behalf of the respondent that the petitioner had notice of the filing of the award and it was not necessary to have separate notice from the Court. Reliance in this connection was placed on the decision in the case of Nilkantha v. Kashinath, , State v. L. M. Das, AIR 1976 Cal 403, Parasramka Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, . I am inclined to think that this application in view of the facts narrated above is barred by limitation. But in the view I have taken on the other aspect of the matter it is not necessary for me to rest my decision on this aspect of the matter, so it is not necessary to discuss this question in detail.