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1 - 7 of 7 (0.17 seconds)Section 4 in The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [Entire Act]
Natwarlal Jerambhai Patel vs State Of Gujarat And Ors. on 17 April, 1970
5. The other question that remains to be considered is the consequential reliefs to which the petitioners are entitled. It has been submitted before us that in some cases the parties have been relegated to the stage of the notification under Section 4 with opportunity to file objection. We, however, find that a time imperative is provided in Section 5A and an objection if any has to be filed within thirty days from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1). This absolute requirement of filing objection within the statutory fixed time, is not available to be extended. We, therefore, deem it proper to quash the notification under Sections 4(1) and 17(1), and consequently the declaration under Section 6 as contained in Annexures 1, 2 and 3 respectively. A view similar to that taken by us was adopted by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Natwarlal Jerambhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1971 Guj 264. It would, however, be open to the appropriate authorities to issue fresh notifications if so considered necessary, and to proceed in accordance with law.
Periathambi Mudaliar vs Special Tahsildar (L.A.) Planning ... on 18 August, 1964
4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the State has not justified resort to Section 17(4) in the facts of the case. The use of emergency powers cannot be a usual feature and only in extraordinary circumstances the same can be applied. It is only where the emergency is of such a nature that it would not brook a delay of 30 days, the time requisite for filing an objection, that the emergency provisions can be resorted to. The State has to justify, if questioned, that any delay would have frustrated the purpose for which the acquisition was sought to be made and/or that great prejudice and inconvenience would have been caused. A valuable right is conferred by Section 5A and a person whose land is sought to be acquired has a right to make representation. If the State wants to take away this valuable right of participation, it has to justify its action by showing existence of emergent situations. The emergency provisions cannot be applied casually. The purpose For which a party is granted an opportunity of filing its objections is manifold in an appropriate case it can establish absence of public purpose and even suggest alternative sites. See AIR 1965 Madras 328 : Periathambi Mudaliar v. Special Tahsildar (L.A.) Planning Scheme, Coimbatore. While it cannot be gainsaid that it depends upon subjective satisfaction of the State Government as to in which cases the emergency provisions are to be applied, yet the Court can consider whether the situations warranted resort to the emergency provisions. It can also consider whether such emergent situations existed when enquiry under Section 5A was dispensed with. Authorities have to indicate basis for the conclusion that there was an urgency which necessitated elimination of summary proceedings under Section 5A. It is not just the existence of urgency, but the need to dispense with hearing of objections under Section 5A, which has to be established by the authorities. In the instant case, nothing has been shown to us as to how and on what material the authorities were satisfied that such an emergent situation existed. As rightly contended on behalf of the petitioners, the very fact that the notification under Section 6 was issued after a considerable time betrays the stand taken by the State about existence of such urgency. The plea of the State and its functionaries in the return filed is that a considerable time was consumed for making detailed enquiry about the market value of the land to be acquired, and moving the appropriate authorities for sanction of the same for awarding compensation to the land owners and that on 9-11-1982, Government in the Revenue Department issued orders under Section 7 directing the Collector to take order for acquisition of the land and also communicated approval of a sum of Rs. 2,94,430.28 towards compensation of the land, as sanctioned by the Administrative Department. However, since no funds were placed by the Requisitioning Officer with the Land Acquisition Officer, the latter moved the former on 30-11-1982 to place necessary funds with him. We may point out here that it has not been indicated as to what transpired between 11-3-1981 and 14-9-1982; except stating about delay in ascertaining the market value of the land to be acquired. It is hardly a plausible reason for dispensing with right of objection available under Section 5A. A bald statement without details is hardly a justification for exercise of emergency powers. Action if any taken after publication of the notification on 14-9-1982 under Section 6 is hardly of consequence. The State was required to justify the existence of emergent situation as well as need for dispensation of enquiry under Section 5A at the time of issuance of the notification under Section 17(4). No material whatsoever in this regard has been placed before us. We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that no justifiable ground existed for invocation of the emergency provisions under Section 17(4).
Section 7 in The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [Entire Act]
Section 17 in The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [Entire Act]
The Land Acquisition Act, 1894
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