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1 - 10 of 25 (0.49 seconds)Rajeswari Mills Ltd. vs The State Of Madras on 24 June, 1963
18. Mr. Chowdhury also referred to the determinations in the case of Rajeswari Mills Ltd. v. State of Madras [1964] 15 STC 1 for the proposition that in case of taxation statutes, each year should be treated as different assessment years and as such, amalgamation of challenges, as in this case, for distinct, specific and different assessment years, would not be permitted, furthermore so when different appeals for different years on different grounds have been filed and they are pending.
Electric Lamp Manufacturers (India) P. ... vs Collector Of Central Excise on 23 May, 1980
In the Calcutta case (1980) 2 CHN 49 as indicated, after considering the findings and observations in the case of Bennett and White, etc. [1951] AC 786, on facts it was found that dissection was not possible, as the assessment in question could not be split up. The determinations of the Supreme Court in the Andhra Pradesh judgment [1970] 25 STC 202 (SC) are distinguishable on facts. But, one thing is certain, that dissection of prayers or splitting them up for doing real and substantial justice or for ends of justice, if such dissection and splitting up is possible on available facts, materials and pleadings, would be possible and permissible. In short, remedy and relief, for the reasons as indicated hereinbefore, can be given on such dissection and splitting up of the prayers, if the facts and pleadings permit them and not otherwise and furthermore, when such order would not or directly interfere with the other pending proceedings and would not bring a surprise to the other side. In this case necessary and relevant evidence was available, viz., the sales were in the course of import and even though the petitioner was authorised to import the goods, the consumers/customers really remained the importers and were liable as such and the import of the goods was inextricably linked up with the contract. In none of the cases as mentioned above, such contingencies arose.
Article 286 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd vs Union Of India on 26 November, 1973
It was the further submissions of Mr. Gupta that the impugned orders and demands, were absolutely ultra vires Article 31 of the Constitution of India as they purported to deprive the petitioners of the right of property without any authority of law and those demands were also ultra vires Articles 265 and 286 of the Constitution of India as being taxed, levied and/or collected without the authority of law. In the case of Binani Bros. (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1974 SC 1510, the petitioner was an importer and a dealer in non-ferrous metals like zinc, lead, copper, tin, etc. and was on the approved list of registered suppliers to the Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals. Licences were issued to the petitioner by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports on the basis of Import Recommendation Certificates issued by the DGS and D or other authorities like the State Trading Corporation for supplies against contracts placed by the DGS and D and was held that for effecting sales made by the petitioner as principal to the DGS and D, the petitioner had to purchase goods from foreign sellers and it was these purchases from the foreign sellers which occasioned the movement of goods in the course of import. No movement of goods in the course of import took place in pursuance to the contracts of sale made by the petitioner with the DGS and D. The petitioner's sales to the DGS and D were distinct and separate from his purchases from the foreign sellers. The purchases of the goods and import of the goods in pursuance to the contracts of purchases were, no doubt, for sale to the DGS and D. But it would not follow that the sales or contracts of sales to DGS and D occasioned the movement of the goods into this country. There was no privity of contract between the DGS and D and the foreign sellers. There was no obligation under the contracts on the part of the DGS and D to procure import licences for the petitioner. And, it was the obligation of the petitioner to obtain the import licence. Therefore, even if the contracts envisaged the import of goods and their supply to the DGS and D from out of the goods imported, it did not follow that the movement of the goods in the course of import was occasioned by the contracts of sale by the petitioner with the DGS and D. On the basis of such facts and determinations, Mr. Gupta claimed that the determinations as made therein would not be applicable in the instant case, as no import licence was issued to or in favour of the petitioners and such licence in the instant case was issued directly in favour of the actual users/customers and on application, the respondent, Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, issued the letter of authority permitting the licensee/customers to allow the petitioners to import the goods on their behalf. Other distinguishable factors in this case and from the case as cited above, Mr. Gupta claimed that all documents, which were not the case in the case as cited above, would show that the licence-holders as the customers/ultimate consignee and the goods on importation of subsequent thereto were never the properties of the petitioners. Mr. Gupta so wanted to claim that on the basis of facts and terms as stipulated in this case and those in the case as cited above, the determinations as made would also be distinguishable.
The Deputy Commissioner Of ... vs M/S. Kotak & Co., Bombay, Etc. Etc on 3 April, 1973
In view of the above, Mr. Dutta wanted to contend that the nexus in K.G. Khosla's case [1966] 17 STC 473 (SC) would apply in this case and not the determinations in Kotak's case AIR 1973 SC 2491, the more so when the facts in this case were different from those determinations or the basis in Kotak's case AIR 1973 SC 2491 and more particularly when the petitioner was the agent of the foreign exporters and in fact, the import was made and effected by the petitioner. On facts, Mr. Dutta claimed that the petitioner was dealing with the import independently and not otherwise as claimed.
A. K. Roy & Anr vs Voltas Limited on 1 December, 1972
The rule as issued on the said application was disposed of by the learned trial Judge disallowing the claim of the appellant for a declaration that all assessments made from 1961 were null and void and refusing to order reassessment for the years in question on the basis of the law laid down in A. K. Roy v. Voltas Limited AIR 1973 SC 225 and on such facts, amongst others, it has been held that when the assessment was for a lump sum and included sums not assessable, the entire assessment was bad in toto. In the instant case, the assessment cannot be split up or dissected.
Section 5 in The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956
Dwarka Nath vs Income-Tax Officer, Special Circle ... on 29 March, 1965
21. Mr. Gupta also contended that if all relevant and material facts are available from the pleadings like the present one, the court would not be powerless to mould the prayers necessarily to give complete and effective relief to the party. Such submissions were sought to be supported, firstly on a reference to the case of Gopi Nath Khanna v. Babu Bansidhar (1905) LR 32 IA 123, wherein it has been observed that when the plaint contains a statement of all the material circumstances, but the prayer of it is inartificially framed, it would be sufficient with the aid of the prayer for further relief, to enable the court to give the plaintiff the appropriate relief, if he was otherwise entitled to it. While on the point, Mr. Gupta secondly referred to the observations in the case of Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer AIR 1966 SC 81. In that case, it has been observed that Article 226 is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. A wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purposes for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised was designedly used by the Constitution. The High Court can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England, but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression "nature", which expression does not equate the Writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, the High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. The High Courts are enabled to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. To equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Article 226 with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to indroduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with an unitary form of Government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction would defeat the purpose of the article itself. But this does not mean that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this article. There are some limitations implicit in the article and others may be evolved to direct the article through defined channels and a writ of certiorari can be issued only to quash a judicial or a quasi-judicial act and not an administrative act. Before the writ can be issued the following conditions have to be complied with : (1) The body of persons must have legal authority, (2) there must be authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and (3) the body of persons should have a duty to act judicially. A writ of certiorari can be issued to quash a quasi-judicial act of an administrative tribunal or authority. The question whether an act is a judicial act or an administrative one arises ordinarily in the context of the proceedings of an administrative tribunal or authority. An act emanating from an administrative tribunal would not be anytheless a quasi-judicial act if the aforesaid tests were satisfied. The English Judges conceived and developed the concept of a quasi-judicial act with a view to keep the administrative tribunals and authorities within bounds.