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1 - 10 of 31 (0.52 seconds)Section 43 in Government of India Act, 1935 [Entire Act]
Section 39 in Government of India Act, 1935 [Entire Act]
Section 39 in The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [Entire Act]
The Trade Marks Act, 1999
Section 107 in Government of India Act, 1935 [Entire Act]
Section 76 in The Trade Marks Act, 1999 [Entire Act]
Maung Ba Thaw vs Ma Pin on 15 January, 1934
The expression "final" prima facie connotes that an order
passed on appeal under the Act is conclusive and no further
appeal lies against it. The last sentence in S. 43 of the
Act, in our view, does not restrict the scope of the said
expression; indeed, the said sentence imposes a further bar.
The expression "final" in the first part of s. 43 of the Act
puts an end to a further appeal and the words "shall not be
called in question in any original suit, application or
execution proceeding" bar collateral proceedings. The
section imposes a total bar. The correctness of the
judgment in appeal cannot be questioned by way of appeal or
by way of collateral proceedings. It is true that the
expression "final" may have a restrictive meaning in other
contexts, but in S. 43 of the Act such a restrictive meaning
cannot be given, for Ch. VI of the Act provides for a
hierarchy of tribunals for deciding disputes arising
thereunder. The Act is a self contained one and the
intention of the Legislature was to provide an exhaustive
code for disposing of the appeals arising under the Act.
The opening words of S. 43 of the Act "save as otherwise
expressly provided in this Act emphasize the fact that the
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finality of the order cannot be questioned by resorting to
something outside the Act. Some of the decisions cited at
the Bar defining the expression "final" may usefully be
referred to. In Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin() the Judicial
Committee had to consider whether an appeal lay to the Privy
Council against the order of the High Court under s. 75(2)
of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. The said Act
provided by S. 4(2) that subject to the provisions of the
Act and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force, the decision of the District
Court under the Act was final; but under S. 75 (2), however,
there was a right of appeal to the High Court from the
decision of the District Court. The judicial Committee held
that in a case where the Act crave a right to appeal to the
High Court, an appeal from the decision of the High Court
lay to the Privy Council under, and subject to, the Code of
Civil Procedure. It reiterated the principle that where a
Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the
country, the ordinary rules of the Code of Civil Procedure
applied. It will be notice at once that the order of the
District Court was final subject to the provisions of the
said Act and under the said Act a right of appeal was given
to the High Court. The order of the High Court in the
appeal was not made, final. Therefore, the Judicial
Committee held that an appeal lay to the Privy Council
against the order of the High Court. This decision,
therefore, does not really help the appellant.