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Gour Gopal Dutt And Ors. vs Satyendra Nath Mitra on 16 May, 1975 cites

Kokarmal Gurudayal vs Sagarmal Bengani on 23 February, 1972

In the case of Pokarmal Gurudayal v. Sagarmal Bengani, it was held by the Division Bench of this Court that in an application under Section 17-E (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 1963 would be applicable if sufficient cause was shown, and inasmuch as the language used in Section 17-B (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and the language used in Section 17-D of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, is the same, I am of the opinion, on the ratio of the aforesaid Division Bench judgment it must be held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act will be applicable provided sufficient cause was shown in an application under Section 17-D of the Act. Counsel for the landlord, however contended that this was not the correct position of law. But the main question is when the tenant was required to apply. It was urged on behalf of the tenant-defendants in this case that the decree was not capable of execution until the stay was vacated on the 31st December, 1974. Therefore, sufficient cause was required to be shown for the period subsequent thereto. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gojer Brothers (P.)
Calcutta High Court Cites 47 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Gojer Bros. Pvt. Ltd vs Ratan Lal Singh on 1 May, 1974

Ltd v. Ratan Lal Singh, . There the Supreme Court held that the benefit of Section 17-D was available to a tenant if the decree for possession could be said to have been passed against him before the commencement of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act of 1968 which came into force with retrospective effect from the 26th August. 1967. The Supreme Court further observed that Section 17-D conferred power on the Court to set aside a decree which was operative and was capable of execution. The Supreme Court held that where the decree of the trial court was carried in appeal and the appellate court had disposed of the appeal after a contested hearing, the decree to be executed was the decree of the appellate court and not of the trial court. The reason for this rule was that in such cases the decree of the trial court merged in the decree of the appellate court. In that case the decree for possession of the premises was passed by the trial court in 1958 but the decree was taken up in the first appeal when it was confirmed and in the second appeal the High Court after a contested hearing dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree of the first appellate court in 1969, that is, after and not before the commencement of the 1968 Act, the decree of the trial Court was held by the Supreme Court to have merged in the decree of the High Court and it was the decree of the High Court which was the only decree executable and, therefore, it was not liable to be set aside under Section 17-D of the Act. In the instant case before me there was no appeal as such from the decree for possession which was passed by consent of the parties. That decree is sought to be interfered with by this application under Section 17-D of the Act The fact that subsequent to the decree steps were taken by filing independent suit in which relief was sought to be obtained from the trial court that the decree was not executed does not in my opinion affect the position that the order in this case in respect of which relief against possession can be given was passed on the 10th July, 1958. It is true that the applicant obtained a declaration from the trial court that the decree was not executable and which was modified on the 11th October, 1974. In my opinion, in order to obtain relief under Section 17-D of the Act a tenant was obliged to act strictly within the period of 60 days from the commencement of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act, 1969. On that day there was a decree passed for possession prior to coming into operation of the Act. The tenant chose not to apply under Section 17-D of the Act but to rely on an earlier proceeding he had taken for a declaration that the decree was not executable by an independent suit. For such a tenant, in my opinion, double relief under Section 17-D was not envisaged. In any event after the decree in the appeal on 11th October, 1974 whereby it was held that the decree was executable, the tenant has not shown sufficient cause for not (prosecuting his remedy under Section 17-D of the Act. The fact that there was a stay of execution of the decree does not, in my opinion affect the tenant's right to apply under Section 17-D of the Act. In this connection, reliance may be placed on the decision in the case of Chunilal Basu v. Hon'ble Chief Justice, High Court Calcutta. .
Supreme Court of India Cites 20 - Cited by 98 - Y V Chandrachud - Full Document
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