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1 - 10 of 10 (0.67 seconds)Section 4 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Bibi Rahmani Khatoon & Ors vs Harkoo Gope & Ors on 22 April, 1981
7. I find merit in the 2nd submission of Mr. Mishra. The Petitioners could not be blamed for non effecting of the delivery of possession of the land in question. They did execute their decree for eviction but Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 got further proceedings in the execution case stayed. The consolidation authorities also could not place reliance on different orders passed by the authorities in the suit and the appeal arising there from inasmuch as after passing of the order of abatement the judgments in the suit and or the appeal became nought which is cler from the
following observations made by the Supreme Court in Mst. Bibi Rahmani Khatoan v. Harkoo Gope, AIR 1981 SC 1450 (at page 1452; of AIR) :--"
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 3 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Section 5 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Chandra Bhushan & Anr vs Deputy Director Of Consolidation ... on 15 December, 1966
In Chandra Bhushan v. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, Uttar Pradesh (Regional) Lucknow, AIR 1967 SC 1272 : (1967 All LJ 264) a Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court, when a writ petition was summarily rejected by this Court observing that the period of limitation expired on 7th November 1961 and no explanation has been furnished why the writ petition could not be filed on November 7, 1961 which was filed on November 13, 1961, the said order was set aside holding as follows :-
The Limitation Act, 1963
Smt. Sudama Devi vs Commissioner And Ors. on 14 January, 1983
I further find that when this Court again dismissed a writ petition by its order dated 1-2-1982 observing that "writ petition was beyond time by 136 days. Neither the explanation of 136 days nor the explanation for
filing it today, was given", the Supreme Court in Smt. Sudama Devi v. The Commissioner. AIR 1983 SC 653 : (1983 All LJ 731 (1)) set aside the aforesaid order of this Court and remanded the writ petition 10 the High Court for Us disposal on merits in accordance with law by observing as follows (at page 653: of AIR) :--
Mongey vs Board Of Revenue And Ors. on 28 February, 1956
"(2) The High Court of Allahabad has not framed any rule prescribing a period of limitation for filing petition for writs of Certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Ordinarily in the absence or a specific statutory rule, the High Court may be justified in rejecting a petition for a writ of certiorari against the judgment of a subordinate Court or tribunal, if on a consideration of all the circumstances, it appears that there is undue delay. But the aggrieved party should have a reasonable time within which to move the High Court for certiorari. Sometimes it has been suggested that the remedy be certiorari is in the nature of that afforded by writ of error, it will not be issued or if issued will be quashed or superseded, where, in the absence of special facts or circumstances excusing the delay, the application is not made until after the time within which a writ of error must be prosecuted has elapsed; see Ferris and Perries - "Extraordinary Legal Remedies" p. 202. The Allahabad High Court in Mongey v. Board of Revenue, U. P. Allahabad, AIR 1957 All 47 : (1956 All LJ 334) has consistently with that view laid down the practice that "writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution should be filed as quickly, after the delivery of judgment of the infereiorr tribunal, as possible. A period of 90 days, which is the period fixed for appeals to the High Court from the judgments of Courts below, should be taken as the period for application for the issue of a writ of certiorari, and that time can be extended only when circumstances of a special nature, which are sufficient in the opinion of the Court, are
shown to exist." But in the absence of a statutory rule the period prescribed for preferring an appeal to the High Court is a rough measure; in each case the primary question is whether the applicant has been guilty of laches or undue delay. A rule of practice cannot prescribed a binding rule of limitation; it may only indicate how discretion will be exercised by the Court in determining whether having regard to the circumstances of the case, the applicant has been guilty of laches or undue delay."
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