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1 - 10 of 15 (0.52 seconds)Section 41 in The Indian Easements Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Section 13 in The Indian Easements Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Sir Chunilal V. Mehta And Sons, Ltd vs The Century Spinning And Manufacturing ... on 5 March, 1962
The second
appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The
concurrent findings of facts will not be disturbed by the High
Court in exercise of the powers under this section. Further, a
substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a
substantial question of fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal V.
Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR
1962 SC 1314) held that :
Reserve Bank Of India And Anr. vs Ramkrishna Govind Morey on 20 January, 1976
The question of law raised will not be considered as a
substantial question of law, if it stands already decided by a
larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy
Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court.
Where the facts required for a point of law have not been
pleaded, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question
as a substantial question of law in second appeal. There mere
appreciation of facts, the documentary evidence or the
meaning of entries and the contents of the documents cannot
be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where
it is found that the first appellate court has assumed
jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be
adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial
question of law. Where the fact appellate court is shown to
have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be
termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring
interference in second appeal. This Court in Reserve Bank of
India v. Ramkrishna Govind Morey (1976 (1) SCC 803) held
that whether the trial court should not have exercised its
jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying
interference.
Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs Savitkibai Sopan Gujar An Dors on 16 April, 1999
([See: Kondiba Dogadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan
Gujar and Others (1999(3) SCC 722)].
Guran Ditta vs T. Ram Ditta on 24 April, 1928
In Guran
Ditta v. T. Ram Ditta (AIR 1928 PC 172) , the phrase
'substantial question of law' as it was employed in the last
clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by
the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and
their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial
question of general importance but a substantial question of
law which was involved in the case.
Rimmalapudi Subba Rao vs Noony Veeraju And Ors. on 22 March, 1951
In Sri Chunilal's case
(supra), the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the
following view taken by a full Bench of the Madras High Court
in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju (AIR 1951 Mad.
Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi vs Rama Krishna Narain And Others on 8 October, 1953
In Dy. Commnr. Hardoi v. Rama Krishna Narain (AIR
1953 SC 521) also it was held that a question of law of
importance to the parties was a substantial question of law
entitling the appellant to a certificate under (the then) Section
100 of the CPC.
Santosh Hazari vs Purushottam Tiwari (Dead) By Lrs on 8 February, 2001
To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable,
not previously settled by law of the land or a binding
precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision
of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the
parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law
"involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it
laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the
sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it
must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and
proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for
the first time before the High Court is not a question involved
in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will,
therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case
whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in
the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being
the need for striking a judicious balance between the
indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and
impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any
lis. (See :Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by
Lrs. [(2001) 3 SCC 179].