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Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer And ... on 30 March, 1961
cites
Section 12 in The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [Entire Act]
Section 4 in The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [Entire Act]
Section 33 in The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [Entire Act]
Section 11 in The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [Entire Act]
Section 9 in The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [Entire Act]
Section 17 in The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [Entire Act]
Jehangir Bomanji And Ors. vs C.D. Gaikwad on 18 January, 1954
On the other hand, in Jehangir Bomanji v. G. D. Gaikwad (2)
the Bombay High Court has taken the view that the element of
notice is only an essential ingredient of the first part of
cl. (b) of the proviso to s.18 which prescribes the period
of limitation as six weeks from the date of the receipt of
the notice from the Collector, not of the second part which
prescribes the maximum period of six months from the date of
the Collector's award in absolute terms. According to that
decision, as far as the limitation under the latter part is
concerned it runs from the date of the award and the date of
the award has nothing whatever to (lo with the notice which
the Collector has to give under s. 12(2). In our opinion
this decision is based on a misconstruction of the relevant
clause in the proviso to s. 18.
The Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Kavanna Vana Ena Swaminathan Alias ... vs Letchmanan Chettiar And Ors. on 26 November, 1929
so the question arose as to when the time would begin to
run. The High Court held that the time can begin to run
only from the date on which the decision is communicated to
the parties. "If there was any decision at all in the sense
of the Act", says the judgment, "it could not date earlier
than the date of the communication of it to the parties;
otherwise they might, be barred of their right, of appeal
without any knowledge of the decision having been passed".
Adopting the same principle a, similar construction has been
placed by the Madras High Court in K. V. E. Swaminathan
alias Chidambaram Pillai v. Letchmanan Chettiar (1). On the
limitation provisions contained in ss. 73(1) and 77(l) of
the Indian Registration Act XVI of 1908. It was held that
in a case where an order was not passed in the presence of
the parties or after notice to them of the date when the
order would be passed the expression "within thirty days
after the making of the order" used in the said sections
means within thirty days after the date on which the
communication of the order reached the parties affected by
it. These decisions show that where the rights of a person
are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for
the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved
against the said order by reference to the making of the
said order, the making of the order must mean either actual
or constructive communication of the said order to the party
concerned. Therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court
of Allahabad was in error in coming to the conclusion that
the application made by the appellant in the present
proceedings was barred under the proviso to s. 18 of the
Act.