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Narayana Rao Patalay (Died) Per L.Rs. ... vs Naresh Thapper And 4 Ors. on 6 June, 2002 cites

Kamaraju Venkata Krishna Rao vs The Sub-Collector, Ongole And Anr on 8 August, 1968

Since the deceased, as P.W.1 admitted his executing Ex.P6 Will, it stood proved. As stated earlier, as per para 5 of Ex.P6 the building should vest in the 1st revision petitioner and should be run and managed by revision petitioners 2 and 3. Therefore the building undoubtedly stood vested in the 1st revision petitioner after the death of the deceased. Since the learned Chief Judge, after contest by the respondent, allowed I.A.No.114 of 1995 filed by the revision petitioners seeking leave to come on record in their capacity as legal representatives of the deceased and permit to them to prosecute the appeal filed by the deceased, there can be no two opinions about the 1st revision petitioner coming into existence. The position would have been the same had the deceased been alive and obtained possession of the building and commenced the activity of running the charitable clinic in the building because on his starting the charitable clinic, 1st revision petitioner would have come into existence and automatically the building would have vested in the 1st revision petitioner and the deceased would have ceased to be the owner of the building. So K.V.KRISHNA RAO vs. THE SUB-COLLECTOR, ONGOLE1, G.PRABHAKARA RAO vs. L.I.C., MACHILIPATNAM2 DEOKI NANDAN vs. MURLIDHAR3and SRINIVASAGAM ASARI AND ANOTHER vs. CHINNAMMAL AND ANOTHER4 relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the revision petitioners on the question of dedication of property to a charitable purpose need not be referred in this order.
Supreme Court of India Cites 1 - Cited by 17 - K S Hegde - Full Document

Shantilal Thakordas & Ors vs Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala on 23 August, 1976

In V.F. & G. INSURANCE CO. vs. M/s.FRASER & ROSS5 and SHANTILAL THAKORDAS AND OTHERS vs. CHIMANLAL MAGANLAL TELWALA6, relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the revision petitioners it is held that, if the definition of a word used in a statute is not exhaustive, depending on the subject or context, a different meaning can be given to that word.
Supreme Court of India Cites 7 - Cited by 75 - N L Untwalia - Full Document

S.Mohan Lal vs R. Kondiah on 5 February, 1979

In S.MOHAN LAL vs. R.KONDIAH7 it was held that the word 'business' in the above sub-clause is used in a wide sense, and so practicing the profession of an Advocate also would come in the meaning of 'business' in the said sub-Section. The word 'business is not defined in the Act. Standard Desk Dictionary by Funk & Wagnalls gives meaning of 'business'- as "1.An occupation, trade, or profession. 2.Any of the various operations or details of trade or industry. 3.A commercial enterprise or establishment; a firm, factory, store etc. 4.The amount or volume of trade. 5.A proper interest or concern; responsibility; duty. 6.A matter or affair. In the theater, the movements, facial expressions, etc., apart from dialogue, by which actors interpret a part....."
Supreme Court of India Cites 16 - Cited by 51 - O C Reddy - Full Document

Gaya Prasad vs Shri Pradeep Srivastava on 7 February, 2001

When Dyanora and its associates were in occupation of the entire ground floor area except the godown and store portion shown in Ex.P7, on vacation of the godown and stores by Hoechst Company during the pendency of R.C., Dyanora Associates making a request to the deceased to let out that portion to them, obviously for godown purpose, cannot be ruled out, because it would be very convenient for them to have godown near the place of business. Since the deceased contemplated running of the charitable clinic in the building only and bequeathed the building to the 1st revision petitioner, and had already filed a petition seeking eviction of the respondent, he might have thought that he could lease out the godown and store shown in Ex.P7 to Dyanora Associates under an impression that he can run the clinic in the building after obtaining possession thereof. So no mala fides can be attributed to the deceased for his letting out the godown and store portion in Ex.P7 to Dyanora Associates after vacation by Hoechst Company. As per the ratio in GAYA PRASAD (8 supra) the need of the deceased on the date of petition only would be relevant. Therefore his letting out the godown and store marked portion in Ex.P7, which fell vacant some years after his filing of R.C., to the same tenant, who is in occupation of the entire remaining area in the ground floor cannot be a ground for holding that the need of the deceased of the building was not bona fide. Since the deceased ear-marked the building for the charitable clinic, he cannot be expected to start the charitable clinic intend to be started by him in the building, in any premises that falls vacant during the pendency of the R.C. Hence the deceased not starting a charitable clinic in the godown and stores portion shown in Ex.P7, during the pendency of the R.C., cannot be taken as a ground to non-suit the deceased.
Supreme Court of India Cites 5 - Cited by 297 - Full Document

Kuriakose Kurian vs Saramma Chacko And Ors. on 12 November, 1963

14. KURIAKOSE KURIAN vs. SARAMMA CHACKO9 relied on by the learned counsel for respondent has no application to the facts of this case. In that case a landlord filed the petition for eviction of his tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent under Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease, and Rent Control) Order, 1950, which was allowed by the Rent Controller. Appeal filed by the tenant was dismissed by the appellate authority. Revision filed by tenant before the District Judge was also dismissed. During the pendency of Revision, Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Ordinance came into force, which was later replaced by an Act, the provisions of which are the same as that of the Ordinance. Under Section 11 of the said Act certain new rights were conferred on tenants. One such right was a right to deposit arrears of rent within one month from the date of order of eviction passed on the ground of his default in payment of rent, and to get the order of eviction vacated. In that case the tenant within three days of dismissal of his revision by the District Judge, after making the necessary deposit in the District Court, filed an application for vacating the order of eviction as per the provisions of the new Act. As per Section 11(2)(b) of the said Act the deposit has to be made before the 'Rent Control Court'. The question therefore was whether the deposit made by the tenant before the District Court can be considered as deposit in the 'Rent Control Court'. The Full Bench held that the expression 'the Rent Control Court' used in Section 11(2)(b) of the Act does not necessarily mean the original Rent Control Court in all the provisions where that expression occurs, and that expression will have that meaning only where that restricted meaning would not lead to any anomaly or absurdily, and so in the context expression 'Rent Control Court' used in Section 11(2)(b) would include both appellate and revisional authorities.
Kerala High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Joginder Pal vs Naval Kishore Behal on 10 May, 2002

17. Recently the Supreme Court in JOGINDER PAL vs. NAVAL KISHORE BEHAL11 considered the scope of the expression 'for his own use, used in Section 13(3)(a)(ii)(a) of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 and held that that expression must be assigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning, and the requirement of the premises need not be the requirement of the landlord alone, in the sense that the landlord must for himself require the accommodation, and that he himself must physically occupy the premises, and that the requirement of a member of the family or of a person on which he is dependant, or who is dependant on him can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord 'for his own use'. The ratio in that decision applies to the facts of this case also because the deceased sought eviction of the respondent from the building on the ground he wants to run a charitable clinic therein. When the charitable Trust comes into operation, it, no doubt, becomes a separate entity and would be juristic person. But the Trust being a creation of the deceased, would be his baby, and so the need of the Trust would also be the need of the deceased. The deceased, thus, satisfied all the ingredients required for seeking eviction of the respondent from the building under the above extracted clause of Section 10(3) of the Act. So, had the deceased been alive and had he himself filed this revision, for the reasons mentioned above, it would have to be allowed. After the death of the deceased during the pendency of the appeal, since the cause of action survived revision petitioners were allowed to come on record and continue the appeal. Therefore revision petitioners, on the same cause of action on which the deceased filed the R.C. can seek eviction of the respondent from the building. They need not file a fresh petition seeking eviction of the respondent on the ground that 1st revision petitioner came into existence after the death of the deceased. Therefore I hold that the revision petitioners are entitled to seek eviction of the respondent from the building. The point is answered accordingly.
Supreme Court of India Cites 33 - Cited by 399 - R C Lahoti - Full Document
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