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The Revenue Divisional Officer, ... vs A.N. Damodara Mudaliar And Ors. on 10 October, 1977 cites

N.M. Venkatarama Iyer vs Collector Of Tanjore on 5 February, 1928

In Venkatarama Iyer v. Collector of Tanjore, 60 Mad LJ 410 : (AIR 1930 Mad 836) it was held that the personal notice under Section 9(3) of the Act should afford the occupier of the land the same interval of 15 days for stating the particulars of his claim for compensation as is provided for in the case of a public notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 9. In that case of course the Court was concerned with the notice under Sub-section (3) of Section 9. The principle appears to us to be the same and this prescription in Section 9(2) of the Act read in conjunction with the well-known principles of natural justice, requires that it is the date of service of a statutory notice in any enactment which ought to be the relevant factor to consider whether the subsequent conduct of the addressee is in accordance with the statute or not. In the instant case, R. W. 2, examined on behalf of the referring Officer, admits that Exs. B-2 and B-5, were served only a week prior to the date of the hearing. Undoubtedly such service, contravenes the main intention of the salutary provision in Section 9(2) of the Act. There is also evidence on the side of the claimants in A. S. 367 of 1973. The Executive Officer of the Devastanam maintains a diary. He produced Ex. A-17, a certified copy of an extract from the diary kept by him during the relevant period. That shows that the temple was only served on 19-5-1965. Hero again, it falls short of the 15 days time for appearance prescribed in Section 9(2) of the Act. Thus this is a case where the date of the notices Exs. B-2 and B-5 alone cannot govern the situation. But it is the date of service of such notices which is the essential criteria to consider whether the claimants have acted in accordance with the statute or not. Obviously, the learned Government Advocate would stress upon this as this factor is linked with another provision in the Land Acquisition Act, namely, Section 25 of the Act. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 25 of the Act contemplate two different situations. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act, the applicant should have refused to make a claim or omitted, without sufficient reason, to make such a claim. In both the above cases, the amount awarded by the Court shall in no case, exceed the amount awarded by the Collector. What is contemplated in Sub-section (3) of Section 25 of the Act is that if the claimant has omitted for a sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such a claim, then the amount awarded to him shall not be less, but may exceed the amount awarded by the Collector. The objection therefore of the State is that as the claimants did not prefer their claims in time and as there was no sufficient reason for their omission to do so, they ought not to be awarded any amount in excess of the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. We are unable to agree. On merits, we have already come to the conclusion that the 15 days time provided for under Section 9(2) of the Act was not given to the claimants in both the appeals and that by itself is a sufficient reason for the learned Subordinate Judge to act under Sub-section (3) of Section 25 of the Act and award an amount in excess of that awarded by the Collector.
Madras High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

The State Of Madras, Represented By The ... vs T.K. Srinivasa Iyengar And Anr. on 17 December, 1969

This question also was considered by our Court in State of Madras v. Srinivasa Iyengar, 1970-2 Mad LJ 628. The Court held that if there was a deliberate refusal on the part of the claimant to make a claim and if the omission to make it was without sufficient reason, then the Court would be justified in not awarding a compensation in excess of that awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. But if there are circumstances to show that the omission was for a sufficient reason, then Sub-section (3) of Section 25 of the Act would come into play,
Madras High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 4 - Full Document
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