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1 - 8 of 8 (0.98 seconds)Eicher Motors Ltd. And Anr vs Union Of India And Ors. Etc on 28 January, 1999
14. This brings us to the second pivotal question: whether the
Revenue can demand duty in cash a second time without
violating the constitutional bar against double taxation under
Article 265. The Appellant invokes the 'Vested Right' doctrine
from Eicher Motors Ltd. vs. Union of India [1999], asserting that
once a credit is debited, the property of the assessee is utilized
and the debt is extinguished. However, we find a significant
distinction here: in Eicher Motors, the State sought to
'extinguish' or 'lapse' the credit entirely. In the present appeal,
the Revenue is merely regulating the timing and mode of credit
utilization as a punitive consequence for a prior default. A 'legal
fiction' created by the legislature must be carried to its logical
conclusion. If the law deems the goods as cleared 'without
payment of duty,' the Revenue is within its statutory rights
under Section 11A to demand the duty in the correct mode--
Vidushi Wires Pvt. Ltd. And Anr. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr. on 26 November, 2002
The Revenue relies heavily on the ratio in Vidushi Wires
Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India [2003], asserting that when the
statute prescribes a specific 'manner' of payment (Cash/PLA),
any other mode is a nullity in the eyes of the law. Thus, the
demand for a fresh remittance in cash under Section 11A is not
an attempt at 'double taxation' but a necessary statutory
recovery of duty that was never 'paid' in the prescribed manner.
Lloyds Steel Industries Ltd. vs Uoi & Ors. on 6 November, 2012
13. Addressing the first limb of the Substantial Questions of Law--
whether Rule 8(3A) is a mere procedural directory or a
mandatory substantive condition--we find that the Appellant's
reliance on the 'Substantial Compliance' doctrine and the ratio in
Lloyds Steel Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India [2005] is legally
fragile. While Lloyds Steel proposed that 'Credit is as good as
Cash,' we must distinguish that case on the ground that it
predated the 2005/2006 Amendment to Rule 8(3A). The
legislature, by introducing the 'deeming fiction' of non-payment
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CEXA 62 OF 2008
& CEXA 64 OF 2008
for clearances made via credit during default, has elevated the
'mode' of payment from a procedural formality to a substantive
'condition precedent' for the lawful removal of goods.
M/S. Condor Power Products. Pvt. Ltd vs Cce, Delhi-Iv on 27 March, 2014
15. Finally, on the issue of penalty under Rule 25, we have
considered the Appellant's plea that the absence of mens rea
should grant total immunity, citing Condor Power Products P.
Ltd. vs. CCE [2007]. While we distinguish the current facts from
cases of 'clandestine removal'--noting that the Appellant
transparently disclosed all transactions in its ER-1 returns--we
cannot ignore the element of 'willful defiance' of a specific,
standing departmental order. The ratio in Condor Power serves
to mitigate the quantum of penalty in cases of technical errors,
but it does not absolve an assessee who consciously bypasses a
statutory embargo.
Article 300A in Constitution of India [Constitution]
The Central Excise Act, 1944
Indsur Global Ltd vs Union Of India & 2 on 27 November, 2014
8. Furthermore, Mr. Dugar invites this Court's attention to the
evolving jurisprudence concerning the 'draconian' nature of Rule
8(3A). Reference is made to the judgment in Indsur Global Ltd.
vs. Union of India [2014], wherein the portion of the Rule
prohibiting the use of credit was struck down as being
unconstitutional and arbitrary. He argues that forcing a
financially distressed unit to clear goods only through cash--
while its earned credit remains idle--is a recipe for industrial
insolvency. Finally, on the aspect of penalty, the Appellant
contends that the findings of the Learned Tribunal are inherently
contradictory. It is submitted that since the Tribunal itself
admitted that the Appellant had transparently disclosed all
transactions in its ER-1 returns, the essential ingredient of
'intent to evade' or 'clandestine removal' is conspicuously
absent.
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