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1 - 10 of 23 (0.26 seconds)Section 138 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
Kamala S vs Vidyadharan M.J. & Anr on 20 February, 2007
2.4. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamala S vs Vidyadharan M.J. & Anr Appeal (crl.) 233 of 2007, decided on
20.02.2007
"15. The Act contains provisions raising presumption as regards the negotiable
instruments under Section 118(a) of the Act as also under Section 139 thereof. The
said presumptions are rebuttable ones. Whether presumption stood rebutted or not
would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
Rangappa vs Sri Mohan on 7 May, 2010
2.7. I am of the opinion that an accused has a right to rebut the presumption by placing reliance upon the
circumstances brought and material placed by the complainant. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rangappa Vs. S. Mohan
(2010) 11 SCC 441 has further held that:
Section 4 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
Ashok Yeshwant Badave vs Surendra Madhavrao Nighojakar & Anr on 14 March, 2001
On same facts is the decision of this Court in Ashok
Yeshwant Badave v. Surendra Madhavrao Nighojakar.
Electronics Trade And Technology ... vs Indian Technologists And Engineers ... on 22 January, 1996
The
decision in Modi case overruled an earlier decision of this
Court in Electronics Trade & Technology Development
Corpn. Ltd. v. Indian Technologists & Engineers
(Electronics) (P) Ltd. which had taken a contrary view.
Mahadeo Laxman Sarane And Anr. vs State Of Maharashtra on 3 May, 2007
20. It is now trite that if two views are possible, the appellant court shall not
reverse a judgment of acquittal only because another view is possible to be taken.
The appellate courts jurisdiction to interfere is limited. [See M.S. Narayana
Menon (supra) and Mahadeo Laxman Sarane & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, 2007
(7) SCALE 137] The High Court furthermore has not met the reasons of the
learned Trial Judge. It proceeded on the premise that the appellant had not been
able to discharge his burden of proof in terms of Section 139 of the Act without
posing unto itself a further question as to how the said burden of proof can be
discharged. It furthermore did not take into consideration the legal principle that
the standard of proof upon a prosecution and upon an accused is different. "