Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 3 of 3 (0.17 seconds)

State Of Gujarat vs Patel Raghav Natha & Ors on 21 April, 1969

In view of the above, I hold that in the facts and circumstances of the cases on hand, the exercise of revisional power by the Secretary (Appeals) was after the expiry of reasonable period as replaced by the Supreme Court in Raghav Natha's case (supra). I am, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned orders passed by the Secretary (Appeals) cancelling the permission granted under Section 65 of the Code must be set aside in both the cases. The rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.
Supreme Court of India Cites 13 - Cited by 726 - S M Sikri - Full Document

Muman Habib Nasir Khanji vs State Of Gujarat And Ors. on 6 September, 1969

Taking note of the decision of the Supreme Court as well as this Court in Habib Nasir's case (supra), the learned Judge observed that since the period of reasonable time must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, it would have been necessary to seriously view the proposed action if the evidence had disclosed that after the land was granted to the petitioner, the petitioner had invested moneys in the land, developed it or had done something to develop it. In the absence of such evidence, this Court held that notwithstanding the lapse of time, since the proposed action was not likely to cause prejudice to the petitioner, the same must be upheld. Both these decisions do not pertain to exercise of revisional powers relating to permission granted under Section 65 of the Code. As pointed out earlier, cases governed by Section 65 read with Section 211 stand on a different footing and in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court extracted earlier, the power must be exercised within a few months from the date of permission. Besides, in the present case the petitioners have averred that after the grant of permission, they have sold or entered into an agreement to sell the plot for the purpose of development and if the permission granted is belatedly cancelled, it would have a direct impact on the transaction entered into by the petitioners. Miss Shah was, therefore, right in contending that so far as the present two petitions are concerned since the first respondent has not given any satisfactory explanation for the delay, this Court must hold that the power was not exercised within reasonable time. She submitted that in the present case it is not the contention of the first respondent that any preliminary inquiry was made to determine whether these were fit cases for exercise of revisional powers as in the batch of petitions. Special Civil Application No. 4530 of 1983 and allied matters disposed of today and, therefore, there is no explanation whatsoever why the power was not exercised promptly within a few months from 6th November 1982. This is all the more so because in similar circumstances the Secretary (Appeals) had while dealing with land in Block No. 18 admeasuring 2723 sq. yards, withdrawn the show-cause notice on the ground that the proposed action was delayed. I am inclined to agree with the submissions made by Miss Shah in this behalf.
Gujarat High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 20 - Full Document

Bhagwanji Bawanji Patel vs State Of Gujarat And Anr. on 24 February, 1970

8. Mr. Bukhari, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, invited my attention to the decisions of this Court in Habib Nasir Khanji v. State 1970 GLR 307 and Bhagwanji Bawanji v. State of Gujarat 1971 GLR 156 and contended that the length of reasonable time must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and in the aforesaid decisions the exercise of revisional power after a lapse of a year or so was considered to be in order. He submitted that the basic idea is to see that the sword is not kept hanging on the party granted permission for an unreasonably long period as that would make it difficult for the party to make non-agricultural use of the land. It must be realised that both these decisions on which Mr. Bukhari places reliance are not concerning the grant of permission under Section 65 of the Code. The power under Section 211 of the Code can be exercised by the State Government and certain high ranking officers in respect of any inquiry or proceedings of any subordinate revenue officer. Such inquiry or proceedings may or may not relate to the question of grant of permission under Section 65 of the Code. While it is true that the length of reasonable time would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, it must be realised that insofar as permission under Section 65 is concerned, that provision itself indicates the length of reasonable time within which action must be taken under Section 211 of the Code. Where the order sought to be revised is other than the one made under Section 65 of the Code, the length of reasonable time may be governed by the facts and circumstances of that case but when an order passed under Section 65 of the Code is sought to be revised, the time factor set out in that provision itself gives a clear indication of what could be the reasonable time within which the jurisdiction should be exercised. Therefore, exercise of power under Section 211 of the Code in regard to orders made under Section 65 of the Code stand on a different footing and as observed by the Supreme Court, the revisional jurisdiction must be exercised within a few months. In the present case the order of the Secretary (Appeals) does not indicate why the decision to exercise revisional powers was delayed by Wi years. Unlike in the batch of petitions, Special Civil Application No. 4530 of 1983 and allied matters disposed of today, no preliminary inquiry was made, at least that is nobody's case, before decision to exercise revisional powers was taken. There is no explanation whatsoever why revisional jurisdiction was not exercised soon after the orders granting permission under Section 65 of the Code were made on 6th November 1982. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, it is difficult to say that the revisional power was exercised promptly and expeditiously, i.e. within a reasonable time.
Gujarat High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 25 - Full Document
1